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Abstract 
The current thesis investigates the link between gestures and representation of abstract 
meaning in the form of metaphor. The big question addressed in the thesis is whether gestures 
with a particular hand, enhance cognitive processing in the contra-lateral hemisphere, such 
that left-hand gestures compared to right-hand gestures enhance metaphor processing which 
particularly involves the right hemisphere. In Chapter 3, we investigated whether left-hand 
co-speech gestures improve explanation of metaphorical phrases compared to right-hand 
gestures or not gesturing at all. Additionally, we collected individual measurements for 
hemispheric involvement during speech production using the mouth asymmetry technique. 
We found a left-over-right hand gesturing advantage, which was higher for those with 
stronger right hemispheric involvement during speech production. This finding suggested that 
gestures with the left hand help the metaphorical mapping of concrete to abstract concepts 
which particularly involves the right-hemipshere. In Chapter 4, we investigated whether co-
speech left-hand gestures rather than meaningless tapping movements trigger metaphorical 
language use. We found no evidence that left-hand gestures compared to left-hand taps 
increase the likelihood for metaphorical language use. However, we found that gestures 
compared to taps increased the number of words uttered, which in turn led to the use of more 
metaphors. This finding points towards gestures’ facilitative effect on speech production, but 
further research is needed to pin-point exactly what process is facilitated. In Chapter 5, we 
investigated whether action gestures with a particular hand, when produced without speech, 
prime semantic categorisation of sentences (metaphorical and literal). We found no evidence 
for priming effects, and further research is needed to examine the effects that gestures, when 
produced alone might have on semantic processing. Finally, in Chapter 6 we found that 
producing content words related to metaphor compared to function words, makes metaphor 
processing right hemisphere specific. This indicated that semantic processing is the key to the 
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lateralisation of metaphor processing. The results validated the use of the mouth asymmetry 
technique as a measurement of hemispheric involvement during speech production tasks.  
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1 Overview of thesis 
 
The current thesis investigates the link between gestures and metaphor and provides 
evidence for gestures’ self-oriented functions and the hemispheric involvement for metaphor 
processing. It contains seven chapters (including this one).  
Chapter 2 contains the review of the literature. This chapter integrates semantic 
theories on the role of sensory-motor information for meaning representation. It also reviews 
research and theories on metaphor as a way of grounding abstract meaning into sensory-
motor experience. In addition, it includes a review of theories on gestures and their functions. 
Finally, it contains a review of theories and studies about the involvement of brain 
hemispheres for gesture and speech production, and metaphor processing.   
Chapter 3 includes the first experimental study in the form of an article. This study 
investigated whether left hand co-speech gestures improve explanation of metaphorical 
phrases as opposed to right hand gestures or not gesturing at all. It also investigated whether 
this left-over-right hand gesturing advantage relates with the right hemispheric involvement 
during speech production measured by asymmetric mouth movements.  
Chapter 4 contains the second experimental study in the form of an article. This study 
investigated whether left hand co-speech gestures compared to left hand meaningless tapping 
movements trigger the use of metaphorical language.  
Chapter 5 includes the third experimental study in the form of an article. This study 
examined whether gestures with a particular hand without speech, prime the semantic 
categorisation of metaphorical and literal sentences.  
Chapter 6 contains the fourth experimental study in the form of an article. This study 
examined whether the right hemisphere is particularly involved in metaphorical as opposed to 
concrete speech production. It also investigated if semantics is crucial for this particular 
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involvement. In this study we used the mouth asymmetry technique as a valid measurement 
of hemispheric involvement in speech production tasks.  
Finally, the thesis contains a general discussion (Chapter 7). This chapter brings all 
the previous chapters together, outlines the findings and conclusions of the empirical studies, 
and puts them in the context of the literature. Additionally, it includes suggestions for future 
work.  
 
 
  
15 
2 Literature review 
 
The next sections include the review of literature, which has informed and motivated 
the current thesis. Parts of the literature are reviewed (a) to set the background, which the 
thesis falls within and aims to extend, (b) to reveal gaps and new research questions, which 
the thesis aims to address, and (c) to inform methodologically the empirical studies conducted 
(e.g., choice of linguistic task and measurements; experimental manipulations).  
The current thesis focuses on the link between gestures and metaphor processing and 
the issues surrounding this. It falls within the embodied semantic accounts, which 
acknowledge a functional role of sensory-motor information systems for processing meaning, 
and investigates whether gestures have an effect on the embodied representation of abstract 
meaning in the form of metaphor. In addition, it draws upon the approaches on gestures’ self-
oriented functions, and investigates whether hand choice for gesturing affects the degree of 
gestures’ impact on metaphor processing. Finally, it sheds more light on the hemispheric 
involvement for metaphor processing, focusing on production tasks.  
 
2.1 Embodied and disembodied semantic theories 
Several theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain how meaning is 
represented, and whether sensory-motor information is necessary for processing and 
representing meaning (= semantics). The current thesis draws upon the “continuum” of 
semantic theories, as introduced in Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2012), and 
falls in line with the embodied accounts. In the next section we describe the two extremes of 
the continuum (i.e., disembodiment and strong embodiment) and the accounts in the middle 
(i.e., secondary and weak embodiment).  
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Disembodiment  
The disembodied theories suggest that sensory-motor information has no role for 
semantic representation. This means that there is a symbolic association between the meaning 
and the reference. This symbolic and arbitrary conceptual knowledge is all we need to know 
about the world. For example, Levelt’s model of language production (1989) suggested that 
language is symbolic and propositional. The four components of language production 
(conceptualiser, formulator, articulator, speech comprehension system) are independent, 
autonomous modules. In particular, the conceptualiser, which is responsible for conceptually 
encoding information, does so by accessing declarative knowledge (i.e., encyclopaedic 
knowledge of the world), the situation and discourse. In turn, symbolic lexical representations 
are activated to generate messages (Levelt, 1989). Similarly, Landauer and Dumais (1997) 
introduced the Latent Semantic Analysis to explain knowledge representation and word 
learning. They proposed that what defines meaning representation is the relations between 
words, and the mechanisms to extract those relations (e.g., induction), rather than the word 
references. 
 
Strong Embodiment  
Theories of strong embodiment place simulation (i.e., re-creation of our direct 
experience with the world by modulation of primary sensory-motor areas) in the heart of 
meaning representation, hence semantic processing highly depends on sensory-motor 
systems. The Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003) suggested that language and 
perception and action systems are tightly linked in such a way that language comprehension 
is achieved by performing simulations using the same neural systems responsible for action 
planning and execution. In the same line, Zwaan and Ross (2004) introduced the Immersed 
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Experiencer Framework according to which words activate referent-specific “vicarious” 
experiences. Perceptual and motor representations are necessary for language comprehension, 
to reconstruct an experience cued by the linguistic input and integrated with its referent. 
Finally, Gallese and Lakoff (2005) suggested that the sensory-motor systems characterise 
both concrete and abstract concepts. To understand the meaning of an action concept such as 
“grasp” we should be able to re-create the experience of grasping. This conceptualisation of 
grasping via imaginative simulation uses the same functional clusters as in real action and 
perception of grasping. Crucially, these functional clusters and imaginative simulations are 
used to perform abstract conceptual inferences and reasoning to represent abstract meaning.  
 
Secondary Embodiment 
The theories of secondary embodiment suggest that conceptual representation of 
meaning is abstract and amodal, but an instant-specific passive activation of sensory-motor 
information could be possible to make representations more specific. For example, Mahon 
and Caramazza (2008) introduced the general Domain-Specific Sensory-Motor Hypothesis 
and the “grounding-by-interaction” account for meaning representation. According to this 
account, conceptual knowledge has an abstract and symbolic level, which is not necessarily 
constituted by sensory-motor information (similarly to disembodied accounts). However, 
sensory-motor information can enrich and complement conceptual knowledge, and place it 
within a relational context (contrary to disembodied accounts). For example, apraxic patients 
see an object (e.g., hammer) and name it without difficulty or say that it is used with nails. 
However, they cannot demonstrate how the object is used, and this impairment is not due to 
peripheral motor deficits (for example patients produce meaningless movements). Part of 
what we know about the world is not dependent on sensory-motor information only, but other 
parts depend on the interaction between symbolic content and sensory-motor information 
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(Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Therefore, the account is freeing cognition and conceptual 
representations from bodily experiences, but at the same time allows their interaction for 
enrichment of representations. Similarly, Patterson, Nestor, and Rogers (2007) suggested that 
sensory-motor systems are not necessary for abstract, general content (e.g., when seeing a 
robin name it “bird”), but sensory-motor specific representations are instantiated only when 
representing specific content (e.g., “robin”). The authors suggested that the anterior temporal 
lobe has a particular role for this process, acting as a semantic hub in combination with 
distributed sensory and motor regions (Patterson et al., 2007).  
 
Weak Embodiment  
Theories of weak embodiment acknowledge an active representational role for 
sensory-motor information (contrary to disembodiment and secondary embodiment), thus 
semantic processing partially depends on sensory-motor systems, but not primary sensory-
motor cortical regions (contrary to strong embodiment).  
One hypothesis (Featural and Unitary Semantic Space hypothesis;  Vigliocco, Vinson, 
Lewis, & Garrett, 2004) suggests that the meanings of words derive at two levels which both 
interact with sensory-motor systems. At one level the meanings of words can be conceived as 
featural representations of conceptual knowledge, and they follow the organisation of the 
modality-specific sensory-motor systems (e.g., visual, motor). At a separate level, meaning 
derives by the organisation of the conceptual features into lexico-semantic representations, 
which are partly grounded into sensory-motor representations (Vigliocco et al., 2004). In 
addition, work by Damasio (1989) suggests that conceptual knowledge about an entity is held 
in convergence zones in the brain, which are the neurons that store the association between 
modalities. Low order convergence zones include regions responding to modality-specific 
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features and high order zones include regions responding to patterns of these features for a 
specific input (e.g., visual for seeing an entity). Therefore, both of them are necessary for 
representations (Damasio, 1989). The perceptual model of knowledge (Barsalou, 1999) 
suggests that we create schematic representation of meaning based on the perceptual 
components we extract from our experience with the world. Then, limitless simulations of 
these components are created based on sensory-motor experience, proprioception and 
introspection. These simulators can be integrated to create a fully functional conceptual 
system to include representations of concrete and abstract concepts. Finally, Pulvermüller 
(1999) suggests that meaning representation is dependent on the association between cortical 
areas related to the word form and areas related to the word referent, hence highly dependent 
on sensory-motor information systems. This dependence occurs for some symbols but not all 
(e.g., abstract), hence Pulvermüller’s account can not be considered as strongly embodied. 
 
2.1.1 Empirical evidence for embodiment 
The empirical evidence supporting the embodied cognition account is mainly of three 
types: (a) behavioural demonstrations for an inter-relation between language and action, (b) 
neurophysiological evidence that the motor system is activated during perceptual and 
conceptual processing and that sentence comprehension can trigger activation of the sensory-
motor systems, and (c) cases that patients with deficits in the motor system exhibit poor 
processing of action verbs. In addition, most of the studies have sought to demonstrate that 
the activation of the motor system during conceptual processing is fast, automatic and 
somatotopic. Finally, evidence for the relationship between language and action comes from 
research on the link between gestures and language.  
Behavioural studies provided evidence for the inter-relation between action and 
meaning by measuring performance during concurrent visuo-motoric and linguistic tasks. 
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Boulenger et al. (2006) measured participants’ performance in a reaching task (i.e., lift your 
arm from a pad and grasp an object if a letter string is a word, and lift your arm but do not 
grasp the object if a letter string is a non-word). The reaching task was either concurrent with 
or followed the lexical decision task. Words were either action verbs (e.g., “paint”) or 
concrete nouns (e.g., “star”). Results showed that processing action verbs, but not concrete 
nouns, interfered with the reaching movement when the motoric and linguistic tasks co-
occurred, but facilitated it when the lexical decision preceded the reaching movement. This 
finding suggested that cortical motor regions are activated when processing action words. In 
addition, Meteyard, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2007) measured participants’ performance in a 
motion-detection task (i.e., participants had to indicate whether or not they saw movement in 
visually presented stimuli). During the task participants passively listened to verbs referring 
to upward or downward movement. Results showed that listening to verbs mismatching with 
the motion direction of the visual stimuli impaired perceptual sensitivity. Thus, low-level 
perception can be affected by language processing. Similarly, Kaschak et al. (2005) asked 
participants to listen and judge the sensibility of sentences representing motion towards (e.g., 
“the car approached you”) or away (e.g., “the squirrel scurried away”), while watching visual 
stimuli representing motion direction. The sensibility judgement was slowed down when the 
sentence and the visual stimuli represented the same motion direction. Thus, there is an 
overlap between the systems of perceiving the motion and understanding the motion 
sentence. In Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), participants judged whether sentences were 
meaningful by making a response that required moving toward or away from their bodies. 
When a sentence implied action in one direction (e.g., “close the drawer” implies action away 
from the body), the participants performed worse in sensibility judgment that required a 
response in the opposite direction. This “action sentence compatibility effect” was 
demonstrated for three sentences types: imperative sentences, sentences describing the 
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transfer of concrete objects, and sentences describing the transfer of abstract entities, such as 
“Liz told you the story” (in this phrase information is moving away from the body). Findings 
from these studies suggest that language processing (even when action is not explicitly 
encoded) share representations with the motor system.  
A few additional behavioural studies have extended the previous findings to provide 
evidence for the inter-relation between action and metaphorical language. In particular, 
Wilson and Gibbs (2007) showed that real and imagined bodily movements congruent to 
metaphorical phrases facilitate people’s immediate comprehension of these phrases. For 
example, when participants executed, or imagined the execution of, a “grasping” hand 
movement, they were faster to understand the meaning of a subsequently presented 
metaphorical phrase “to grasp a concept”, as compared to when primed with a mismatching 
movement or no movement. In addition, Santana and de Vega (2011) found that reading an 
upward metaphor such as “rise to victory” reduced the time for eliciting a concurrent upward 
hand movement. The action-to-meaning and meaning-to-action effects obtained in these two 
studies suggest that the motor component is not only important for processing of concrete 
action meaning, but also for abstract action meaning in the form of metaphor.  
Neurophysiological studies provide evidence that the motor system is activated during 
perceptual and conceptual processing and that sentence comprehension can trigger activation 
of the sensory-motor systems. For example, processing of body-part specific action words 
(e.g., “kick”, “pick”) includes neurons involved in the programming of the respective actions 
(e.g., leg- and arm- related areas) (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Hauk & 
Pulvermüller, 2004). Similarly, Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni (2006) 
extended these findings to the sentence level. The study found motor activations during 
conceptual processing (in a passive reading task) of phrases describing literal action (e.g., 
“grasping the scissors”). Along the same line, Tettamanti et al. (2005) showed that listening 
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to sentences that describe actions (arm-, mouth-, leg- related) engaged the visuo-motor 
circuits, which also sub-serve action execution and observation. Furthermore, Glenberg et al. 
(2008) explored the role of the motor system during comprehension of concrete and abstract 
language using transcranial magnetic stimulation. They found greater motor system 
modulation, evidenced by larger motor evoked potentials, for transfer (including abstract 
transfer sentences such as “delegate responsibilities”) than non-transfer sentences. Finally, 
even comprehension of sentences that imply motor information but do not lexically encode it, 
such as indirect requests for action (e.g., “it is hot in here” – implying the opening of a 
window) activate cortical motor regions (van Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, & 
Rueschemeyer, 2012). 
A few additional neurophysiological studies have extended previous findings to 
include the inter-relation between perceptual-motor information and metaphorical meaning. 
Desai and colleagues explored the inter-relation between sensory-motor and conceptual 
system in the brain in two fMRI studies (Desai, Binder, Conant, Mano, & Seidenberg, 2011; 
Desai, Conant, Binder, Park, & Seidenberg, 2013). They compared brain activations during 
meaningful judgment of literal, metaphorical and abstract action sentences (e.g., “the thief 
bashed the table”, “the council bashed the proposal”, “the council criticised the proposal”, 
respectively). The literal and metaphorical sentences (but not the abstract) both activated 
secondary motor areas, which are also involved in action planning. This finding suggests that 
secondary sensory-motor systems play an important role for comprehension of literal and 
metaphorical action meaning (Desai et al., 2011; Desai et al., 2013). Similarly, Boulenger, 
Hauk, and Pulvermüller (2009) showed, for the first time1, somatotopic semantic organisation 
and body-part specific motor cortex activation for the comprehension of idioms in a passive 
reading task. Leg-action idioms, such as “kick the habit”, activated the dorsal motor cortex 																																																								1	Note that activation of the motor systems has not been found in other studies using idioms (Raposo, 
Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009) and highly conventional metaphors (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006).  
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stronger than arm-action idioms, such as “grasp the idea”, which activated the lateral motor 
cortex.  
Patient studies showed that deficits in the motor system also cause poor performance 
on processing action words. For example, Neininger and Pulvermüller (2003) showed that 
patients with deficits in the right frontal cortex (with no apparent aphasia) performed worse 
compared to healthy controls in the lexical decision of action verbs (but not in visually 
related nouns). Patients with right temporo-occipital deficits performed worse than healthy 
controls in the lexical decision of visually related nouns (but not in action verbs). Similarly, 
Boulenger et al. (2008) found impaired processing of action verbs for patients with 
Parkinson’s disease. They used a masked priming task to assess performance in a lexical 
decision task. Participants were patients with Parkinson disease in two groups: one being 
under treatment to activate motor cortices, and one receiving no treatment. The target stimuli 
were action verbs or concrete nouns. Findings showed that patients receiving no treatment 
performed worse, compared to those undergoing treatment, in the lexical decision of action 
verbs, but not nouns.  
Finally, a distinct line of evidence for embodied semantics comes from gesture 
research. “Gestures are often considered to be valid evidence of the embodiment of language 
and cognition” (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, p.495). According to embodied accounts of 
cognition, language processing (concrete and abstract) involves activation of images that rely 
on simulations of perception and action. Gestures emerge from these simulations of the motor 
and perceptual components of visuo-spatial imagery (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Gestures as 
bodily manifestation of these simulations can help the maintenance of mental images (Wesp, 
Hesse, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001), the identification and organisation of the features from 
these images to be uttered (Kita, 2000), the selection of words to be uttered (Rauscher, 
Krauss, & Chen, 1996), and the reduction of cognitive load for concurrent tasks (Goldin-
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Meadow, 2003). Therefore, including gestures in the study of embodied semantics sheds 
more light in the inter-relation between perception, action, language and thought.  
 
2.1.2 Embodiment: relevance to the thesis 
The literature as reviewed in the above sections has motivated and informed the 
current thesis in several ways.  
Firstly, which side of the continuum of semantic theories is more likely to be correct? 
Several studies provided evidence for the embodied accounts on the basis that the motor 
system is activated during conceptual processing (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Glenberg et 
al., 2008; Hauk et al., 2004; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004). But is this enough to falsify the 
disembodied accounts? It seems that the extreme disembodied and strongly embodied 
accounts cannot hold true. If disembodied accounts were true, how could encyclopaedic 
knowledge be enough to represent the whole range of knowledge? In addition, disembodied 
accounts, which rely on a system functionally detached from sensory-motor systems, cannot 
explain the process of semantic grounding. Namely how words and symbols are related to 
specific types of perceived objects and executable actions. On the other hand, evidence for 
embodied representation of abstract meaning is still weak (Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012). In 
addition, the bulk of the evidence for the embodied accounts comes from neuroimaging 
studies. This complicates interpretations, because brain activations are correlational and 
ambiguous with respect to the processing stage at which they occur. In addition, it is not clear 
whether sensory-motor activations reflect mental imagery processing or semantic processing. 
Furthermore, most studies supporting embodied accounts relate to language comprehension 
rather than production. The current thesis draws upon the embodied side of the continuum, 
and aims to provide more evidence for the embodied representation of abstract meaning in 
the form of metaphor, and from both comprehension and production of language. In addition, 
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it investigates how important sensory-motor information is for semantic processing by 
focusing on the inter-relation between gestures and metaphor.  
More specifically, in Chapters 3 and 4 we focused on metaphor as a way of 
semantically grounding abstract conceptual knowledge in sensory-motor experience. We 
measured two types of metaphorical processing, namely explanation of metaphorical phrases 
and spontaneous use of metaphorical expressions. We experimentally manipulated 
participants’ hand movements (e.g., gesturing or tapping with different hands). If sensory-
motor information is important for processing meaning and representing abstract meaning in 
the form of metaphor, then gestural representation of meaning should modulate the two types 
of metaphorical processing. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 we aimed to provide more direct 
evidence for the strong or weak embodied accounts by directly comparing the effects that 
gesture priming might have on the comprehension of metaphorical and literal action 
sentences. The priming paradigm addresses the issue of whether the two processes (gestural 
representation of visuo-spatial information and action sentence comprehension) interact: if 
so, they might prime each other.  
To sum up, the current thesis focuses on metaphor and gesture as examples of 
embodied language and thought, and investigates their inter-relation. The next sections 
include review of the literature related to metaphor and gestures.  
 
2.2 Metaphor: an example of abstract embodied semantics 
2.2.1 Theories of metaphor 
The pioneering work by Lakoff and Johnson almost thirty years ago challenged the 
traditional assumptions that metaphor is merely poetic and absent from everyday 
communication, and has no relation to the way we think. The current thesis follows the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), which is in line with embodied 
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semantics, and suggests that knowledge is derived from sensory experience. The theory 
coherently explains the nature and structure of metaphor. However, we also acknowledge 
other theoretical accounts (Glucksberg, 1991; Searle, 1979), which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, rather complementary. 
 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
Metaphors are pervasive in our everyday thinking, speaking and acting. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980a) suggested that our ordinary conceptual system when we think, speak and act 
is fundamentally metaphorical. They introduced the term of conceptual metaphors, which are 
reflected in language, and in the way we see and perceive the world. For example, the 
conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is lexically encoded in expressions such as “I 
demolished his argument”, and it structures our understanding of someone we are arguing 
with as an opponent and our aggressive behaviour towards them.  
According to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphor is a way to understand one 
concept in terms of another one (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). At the core of 
metaphor lie cross-domain mappings, which are central to ordinary natural language semantic 
processing. Metaphor can be understood as a mapping from a source domain to a target 
domain. The mappings are tightly structured and particular entities from the one domain, the 
target, (e.g., LOVE; the lovers, the relationship, their goals) correspond systematically to 
entities of the other, the source domain (e.g., JOURNEY; the travellers, the vehicle, 
destination). These mappings follow the Invariance Principle. That is “metaphorical 
mappings preserve the image-schema structure (i.e., the embodied prelinguistic structure of 
experience) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target 
domain” (Lakoff, 1993, p.199). In other words, mappings are under constraints for fixed 
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correspondences (e.g., the battling aspects of an argument may include tension, hostility but 
not blood). Each mapping is fixed and conventional, however it creates limitless options for 
lexical items from each domain to be used and create novel metaphors. Mappings are 
motivated on an experiential basis such that “we see what someone means”, because in most 
cases only when we see something we understand it and we know it is true.  
This view of metaphor raises two questions. First, are all concepts understood through 
metaphor? Lakoff’s and Johnson’s answer was that probably nothing is understood in its own 
terms; not even spatial concepts (like UP). Even these concrete, spatial concepts are 
understood through our constant spatial experiences and interaction with our physical 
environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). Second, does metaphorical speech really reflect 
metaphorical thought? In other words, how important are conceptual metaphors and 
mappings for the understanding and production of metaphor in everyday discourse? Different 
types of evidence confirm the importance of conceptual metaphors and mappings for 
understanding and producing meaning.  
Firstly, from a historical perspective, metaphor is a mechanism for evolution of word 
meaning. Sweetser (1990) suggested that conceptual metaphors such as UNDERSTANDING 
IS SEEING explain the extension of the physical meaning of verbs like “see” towards a non-
physical meaning (e.g., “I see your point”). Secondly, the systematicity of conventional 
metaphors as outlined in the work by Lakoff and Johnson provides evidence in favour of 
conceptual metaphors. This systematicity suggests that “metaphoric thought motivates 
linguistic meanings and has some role in people’s understanding of language”, and 
“metaphoric thought motivates an individual speaker’s use and understanding of why various 
words and expressions mean what they do” (Gibbs, 1998, p.92). In other words, the only way 
to explain why it is acceptable to talk about relationships using phrases such as “look how far 
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we have come or we are at a crossroads” is by accepting that we understand the concept of 
love in terms of the concept of journey.    
Thirdly, there is a line of empirical evidence suggesting that metaphoric thought and 
conceptual metaphors motivate why many expressions mean what they do, and influence 
people’s learning of linguistic meaning and immediate understanding. For example, in a 
mental imagery study, R. W. Gibbs and Obrien (1990) showed participants an idiomatic 
phrase (e.g., “flip your lid”) and asked them to explain it and then to form a mental image of 
the expression. They then had to verbally describe this image in detail. Findings showed that 
participants had similar schemas underlying their mental images for idioms with similar 
figurative meanings and those schemas were constrained to the underlying conceptual 
metaphor. For example, they would describe the mental image of both idioms “flip your lid” 
and “hit the ceiling” (meaning “to get angry”) with details about a container releasing 
pressure (based on the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HEATED FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER). Interestingly, participants were not consistent in their mental images of 
literal phrases (e.g., not everyone used the same detail when describing someone spilling 
peas). The authors suggested that the meaning of many idioms is not arbitrary, but motivated 
by speakers’ knowledge of the conceptual metaphors. However, they did not make strong 
claims about the automatic activation of mental imagery when listening, understanding and 
using idioms.  
In addition, conceptual metaphorical mappings are a key part for metaphor 
interpretation. Nayak and Gibbs (1990) presented participants with short scenarios about an 
emotional concept, which were structured to include phrases priming a specific conceptual 
metaphor. For example, an emotional scenario about anger would include phrases such as 
“Mary was tense […] made her fume […] the pressure was building up” to prime the 
conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. After reading the 
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texts participants had to select from two idioms, the one which more appropriately expressed 
the meaning of the scenario. The related idiom was motivated by the primed conceptual 
metaphor (e.g., “blew her top”) and the unrelated one had the same meaning but different 
underlying conceptual metaphor (e.g., “bit her head off”; ANGRY BEHAVIOUR IS 
ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR). Participants selected the related idiom thus suggesting that 
congruent conceptual mappings can prime each other. The authors suggested that the use of 
idioms can be conceptually motivated, however they did not make strong claims about 
conceptual metaphors being always instantiated when processing idioms.  
Similarly, R. W. Gibbs, Bogdanovich, Sykes, and Barr (1997) showed that conceptual 
metaphors have a role in the on-line processing of idioms. In Experiment 1, participants 
performed a self-paced reading task of a short text finishing with an idiom (e.g., “he blew his 
stack”) or a literal paraphrase of the idiom (e.g., “he got very angry”) or a control sentence 
(e.g., “he saw many dents”). A visual lexical decision task followed. The words were either 
related to the conceptual metaphor underlying the preceding idiom (e.g., “heat”; motivated by 
the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER) or unrelated 
(e.g., “lead”). Findings showed that participants’ lexical decision was faster when they 
responded to the related targets having read the idioms compared to reading literal 
paraphrases and control sentences. Thus, conceptual metaphors are accessed even when 
attention is not focused on metaphor. A control study further supported this suggestion. It 
could be that faster responses to the related target “heat” were because of the association of 
heat with the literal meaning of the idiom. However, it seems this was not the case. 
Participants read short texts followed by a literal use of idioms (e.g., “blow the stack”) or a 
literal paraphrase (e.g., “vacuum the dirt”) or a control phrase (e.g., “get a big truck”). 
Lexical decision of related (e.g., “heat”) and unrelated (e.g., “lead”) targets did not differ. In 
Experiment 2 participants read short stories, which ended with two idioms representing the 
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same meaning but being motivated by different conceptual metaphors (e.g., “it was a shot in 
the arm”; motivated by the conceptual metaphor ENCOURAGEMENT IS GIVING 
SOMEONE A DRUG; “it really got her going”; motivated the conceptual metaphor 
ENCOURAGEMENT IS HELPING SOMEONE START A JOURNEY). They performed 
lexical decision on target words that were consistent with the one or the other idiom (e.g., 
“drug” was the related word consistent with the idiom “it was a shot in the arm” but not “it 
really got her going”). Findings showed that participants were faster only after reading idioms 
consistent and related to the target word. The authors suggested that conceptual metaphors 
can be quickly accessed during immediate idiom comprehension, however they did not make 
strong suggestions about the necessity for automatic access of conceptual metaphors in order 
to understand what an idiom means.   
Finally, the conceptual metaphor theory has received support by brain-imaging 
research. The theory would predict that metaphor processing would trigger activity in sensory 
areas that are involved in processing the domain from which metaphors are motivated. In a 
recent study, Lacey, Stilla, and Sathian (2012) used a covert reading time task (i.e., “press a 
button once you understood the sentence”) and focused on metaphors motivated by the 
domain of texture (e.g., “she had a rough day”). Findings showed that compared to literal 
conditions, the textural metaphors activated somatosensory regions known to be texture-
selective during haptic perception. Thus, metaphor processing selectively activates sensory 
areas in the modality from which the metaphorical meaning is motivated.  
To conclude, Conceptual Metaphor Theory coherently describes the systematicity 
underlying metaphors and explains what motivates linguistic meaning. It allows 
understanding of conventional metaphors and creation of new metaphorical meaning through 
the systematic organisation of metaphorical mappings. In addition, empirical evidence, 
including recent brain-imaging studies, has shown that conceptual metaphors are able to 
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motivate speakers’ understanding and expression of meaning. The metaphorical mappings 
from source domains related to bodily experience with the environment on to abstract, target 
domains constitute the heart of metaphor processing. Therefore, the current thesis draws upon 
the Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a solid theory explaining the interaction between 
metaphorical thought and language, and that of linguistic form and physical experience.  
However, in the next sections, we acknowledge the existence of other metaphor theories. 
 
Alternatives to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
Contrary to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), the first 
theories of metaphor mainly focused on metaphor in language use. The Standard Pragmatic 
Model, introduced by Searle’s work, considered understanding of literal meaning granted and 
non-literal understanding complicated. This is because non-literal understanding requires 
derivation of the literal meaning and sensibility judgment (i.e., if sensible we stop, if not we 
seek for an extra-linguistic, non-literal interpretation) (Searle, 1979). However, this model 
studies metaphor in language use only (rather than thought), and implied that metaphorical 
interpretations always need additional and longer processing than literal, while several2 
studies have shown that metaphors may be processed faster than literal phrases (for a review 
see Gibbs, 2013). In addition, the Implicit Comparison view, introduced by Gentner (1983) 
proposed that metaphors are understood as comparisons of X is like Y, and once the 
comparison is made we look for matching between properties of X and Y. However, this 
view requires a priori knowledge of X. For example, if someone hears the expression “their 
																																																								2	For example, Gibbs (1980) reported that phrases such as “spill the beans” were read faster in a 
context biasing their idiomatic compared to their literal explanation. Similarly, Connine, Blasko, 
Brandt and Kaplan Layer (1992) showed that participants responded faster to the last word of 
idiomatic phrases such as “get off my back” compared to literal phrases such as “get off my pack”.  
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marriage was a rollercoaster ride”, and they do not know that the couple is going through 
difficulties, they could infer that their marriage is a funny and exciting one.  
Furthermore, some scholars were sceptical about the view that conceptual metaphors 
really reveal how people ordinarily think. They rather suggested that when people speak 
metaphorically they do not necessarily refer to the underlying conceptual metaphor. 
Glucksberg and colleagues proposed the Attributive Categorisation Framework (Glucksberg, 
1991; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999). According to this proposal, when understanding 
metaphors, we create an attributive class in which the topic (equivalent to the target domain 
in Conceptual Metaphor Theory) of the metaphor can be included. The vehicle (equivalent to 
the source domain in Conceptual Metaphor Theory) of the metaphor exemplifies the class. 
For example, in the expression “the lawyer is a shark” the topic “lawyer” is not a member of 
the taxonomic category “fish” exemplified by the vehicle “shark”, but a member of a an 
attributive category such as “vicious beings” (Glucksberg, 1991; Glucksberg & McGlone, 
1999). This approach implies good knowledge of the topic and all the multiple attributive 
categories it may belong to, thus metaphorical interpretation might not be systematic 
(compared to Conceptual Metaphor Theory), and it can vary depending on context and 
individual differences.  
Experimental support for the attributive approach was provided in several studies. For 
example, M. S. McGlone (1996) showed that reference to a conceptual metaphor is not the 
modal strategy that people use when they paraphrased metaphors, rated the similarity 
between metaphors, or retrieved metaphors from memory. In each of these situations, 
participants relied primarily on the stereotypical properties of the vehicle concept. In 
addition, reading time measurements indicated that conceptual metaphors do not necessarily 
motivate conventional meaning. Reading times of idioms were not facilitated even when their 
underlying conceptual metaphor was explicitly mentioned in the preceding text (Glucksberg, 
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Brown, & McGlone, 1993; Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, & Horton, 2000). Similarly, Keysar 
and Bly (1999) gave the same, new idioms to different groups. The context of the idioms 
implied a positive or negative meaning for each group. Both groups reported that the idioms 
made sense. This finding indicated that people’s intuitions about idiom transparency can vary 
as a function of what they believe to be the meaning of the idiom, thus idiom meaning does 
not only derive from fixed, underlying conceptual metaphors. Along the same line, 
Glucksberg, McGlone, and Manfredi (1997) found that priming a metaphorical phrase with 
its topic or vehicle may facilitate comprehension of the metaphor only when they are 
unambiguous. For example, the phrase “life is a soap opera” has a low-constraint topic (i.e., 
many aspects of life could resemble a soap opera). Priming this phrase with the word “life” 
did not facilitate comprehension (Glucksberg et al., 1997). This finding suggested that 
metaphor comprehension relies on property attribution rather than conceptual metaphors.  
In addition, Coulson and Van Petten (2002) proposed a “conceptual blending” 
approach for metaphor interpretation, which combined the role of metaphorical mappings and 
that of attributive categories. Their theory is based on the general theory of conceptual 
integration known as “conceptual blending” (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). They provided 
empirical evidence by recording event related potentials (ERPs). Participants read sentences 
in the form of “X is Y” with literal (e.g., “he knows that whiskey is a strong intoxicant”) and 
metaphorical (e.g., “he knows that power is a strong intoxicant”) meaning, and sentences 
representing literal mappings, when one thing is substituted for another (e.g., “he has used 
cough syrup as an intoxicant”). They answered true or false questions probing their 
comprehension of the sentences. Results showed a graded processing difficulty in the 
following order: literal sentences, literal mapping sentences and metaphorical sentences. The 
authors proposed a blending theory according to which (a) attributes and relational structure 
from distantly related conceptual domains (source-target) are mapped and imported into a 
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blended mental space, (b) these blended spaces can explain the emergent properties triggered 
by metaphorical expressions, (c) what makes metaphor “special” is the establishment and 
retrieval of the mappings motivated by conceptual metaphors, and (d) literal and non-literal 
language processing may share some processing mechanisms (= continuity claim) 
considering the existence of non literal mappings. We acknowledge the value of some of the 
account’s components, such as the continuity claim, however it has not been exhaustively 
tested, and in essence it could stand as a complement to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory.  
Furthermore, the more recent Career of Metaphor approach (Bowdle & Gentner, 
2005) offered a unified theoretical framework between comparison and categorisation models 
of metaphor, and shifted attention to other aspects, rather than metaphoricity per se, that may 
influence metaphor understanding. This approach suggested that metaphorical mappings shift 
from a comparison to categorisation procedure as metaphors are conventionalised. More 
specifically, processing of novel metaphors involves comparison between the source and 
target of metaphors, whereas conventional metaphorical terms are processed essentially as if 
they are established categories. We believe, that the implication of this approach is mainly 
methodological (rather than explanatory), such that metaphor conventionality, which is 
subject to individual differences, must be controlled in metaphor research.  
Finally, there are socio-cognitive approaches to metaphor, which highlight the 
importance of communicative intention (Happe ́, 1993) and language competence (Norbury, 
2005) for metaphor comprehension. In particular, Happe ́ (1993) compared performance of 
subjects with autism and controls in a metaphor task and suggested that theory of mind and 
the ability to represent speaker’s intention is necessary in order to interpret metaphor. 
Similarly, Norbury (2005) compared performance of children with autism and controls in 
metaphor tasks and suggested that theory of mind is necessary, but not sufficient to interpret 
metaphor. Language competence and in particular semantic knowledge plays also an 
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important role for metaphor comprehension. These approaches are not standing alone, rather 
complement Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and they can be incorporated in metaphor 
research focusing on individual differences and specific populations.  
 
2.2.2 Hemispheric involvement for metaphor processing 
Hemispheric involvement for metaphorical processing has attracted attention in 
research the past thirty years. This is because metaphors are fundamental elements of speech 
and thought. Hence, understanding the underlying neural mechanisms for metaphorical 
processing is relevant to understanding the mechanisms for linguistic processes, verbal 
creativity and complex cognition. The current thesis draws upon the weak version of the 
Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor (e.g., Bottini et al., 1994), which suggests the co-
ordination and divided labour in the two brain hemispheres for different components of 
semantic processing. That is, both hemispheres contribute to language processing, but the left 
hemisphere is particularly important for fine (i.e., links between strong and focused semantic 
features) semantic processing while the right for the coarse (i.e., large semantic fields and 
links between distant and unusual semantic features) semantic processing (Jung-Beeman, 
2005). This ability of the right hemisphere to bring together coarse semantic associations 
underlies metaphorical processing. However, we acknowledge that some studies failed to 
support a particular involvement of the right hemisphere for metaphorical processing (e.g., 
Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2004; Stringaris, Medford, Giampietro, Brammer, & 
David, 2007), and we believe that this, mainly, highlights task- and methodology-related 
differences.  
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Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor 
The first line of evidence for right-hemispheric involvement during metaphorical 
processing came from research with brain-damaged patients. In Winner and Gardner (1977), 
normal controls and patients with either right or left hemisphere lesions performed a pictorial 
and a verbal metaphorical task. Participants listened to a metaphorical phrase (e.g., “he has a 
heavy heart”). They had to match the meaning of the sentence to the appropriate picture 
representing the metaphorical meaning (e.g., a picture of someone crying) vs. a picture 
representing the literal meaning (e.g., a picture of someone carrying a heart). In addition, they 
had to verbally explain what the phrase means. The patients with right hemisphere lesions 
selected the literal version of the pictures, but they were able to accurately explain the 
phrases. On the other hand, patients with left hemisphere lesions accurately selected the 
metaphorical version of the pictures, but they sometimes literally explained them. This 
finding suggests that the left hemisphere is not adequate and responsible for the processing of 
every linguistic message, and the right hemisphere is involved but not adequate for the 
processing of metaphorical meaning. In another patient study, Brownell, Simpson, Bihrle, 
Potter, and Gardner (1990) asked patients with right and left lesions, and controls to perform 
a similarity judgment between triads of words, which included one target ambiguous word 
(e.g., “warm”), a word related to the metaphorical meaning of the target (e.g., “affectionate”), 
and a word related to the prior meaning of the target (e.g., “blanket”). The selection of the 
two metaphorically related words was considered the correct response. Patients with right 
hemisphere damage performed worse compared to controls and those with left hemisphere 
damage, suggesting that the right hemisphere is particularly involved for the evaluation of 
alternate, metaphorical meaning.   
More evidence for the right-hemispheric involvement for metaphor came from brain-
imaging studies. Bottini et al. (1994) used plausibility judgment and lexical decision tasks for 
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literal and metaphorical sentences in a PET scan study. Findings showed that comprehension 
of metaphorical and literal meaning is associated with similar activations in the left 
hemisphere, but metaphorical comprehension is associated with additional activations in right 
hemisphere regions (the prefrontal cortex, the middle temporal gyrus, the precuneus and the 
posterior cingulate). Thus, brain hemispheres are bilaterally activated for language 
processing, and the right hemisphere is particularly involved for metaphorical processing. In 
addition, Mashal and colleagues provided evidence for the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for 
metaphor in several brain-imaging studies. In Mashal, Faust, and Hendler (2005) and Mashal, 
Faust, Hendler, and Jung-Beeman (2007) participants read Hebrew word pairs representing 
four semantic relationships: literal (e.g., “broken vase”), conventional metaphorical (e.g., 
“bright student), novel metaphorical (e.g., “crystal river”), and unrelated (e.g., “boot 
laundry”). They performed a silent semantic judgment task while in the fMRI scan (i.e., 
decide if the word pairs are literally related, metaphorically related or unrelated). Findings 
showed shared activation of a core bilateral network for all conditions, and a special role of 
the right homologue of Wernicke’s area for the novel metaphorical pairs.    
Finally, behavioural studies using the divided visual field technique have provided 
evidence in favour of the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis. Anaki, Faust, and Kravetz (1998) 
combined the divided visual field technique with the semantic priming paradigm to 
investigate hemispheric involvement for metaphorical and literal semantic associations in 
Hebrew. Participants read a prime (e.g., “stinging”) and performed a lexical decision on a 
target, which would be either literally (e.g., “mosquito”) or metaphorically  (e.g., “insult”) 
related to the prime. Findings for short stimulus onset asynchronies (200ms) suggested 
facilitation for metaphorically related targets in both hemispheres while literally related 
targets were facilitated only in the RVF (= left hemisphere). Findings for long stimulus onset 
asynchronies (800ms) suggested that metaphorically related targets were facilitated in the 
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right hemisphere, whereas literally related targets were facilitated in the left hemisphere. In 
addition, Schmidt, DeBuse, and Seger (2007) used the divided visual field technique at 
sentence level to investigate hemispheric involvement for metaphorical and literal semantic 
relationships. Participants read sentences with three different endings (e.g., “the camel is a 
dessert […]” “animal”-literal or “taxi”-metaphorical or “table”-anomalous). They would read 
the endings presented either in the right-visual field (left hemisphere) or the left-visual field 
(right hemisphere). They performed a semantic judgment task (i.e., respond whether the 
ending fits the sentence or not). Findings showed right hemisphere time advantage for 
metaphorical relationships and left hemisphere advantage for literal relationships. In a second 
divided visual field experiment, they varied familiarity of stimuli by creating conditions of 
literal-familiar, literal-unfamiliar and metaphorical sentences for a plausibility judgment task. 
Findings showed a right hemisphere time advantage for both literal-unfamiliar and 
metaphorical sentences, but not for literal-familiar. In a third divided visual field experiment, 
they varied familiarity of metaphorical stimuli only by creating four conditions of “very high, 
high, low and very low” metaphor familiarity in a sensibility judgment task. Findings showed 
right hemisphere time advantage for unfamiliar metaphors and left hemisphere advantage for 
familiar ones. 
Some studies failed to provide support for a particular involvement of the right 
hemisphere during metaphorical processing. For example, in Rapp et al. (2004) participants 
read short, simply structured German sentences with either a metaphorical (e.g., “the lovers’ 
words are harp sounds”) or literal (e.g., “the lovers’ words are lies”) meaning. Participants 
performed an overt connotation judgment task (i.e., they decided if the sentence had a 
positive or negative connotation) while in the fMRI scanner. Findings showed that metaphors 
elicited increased BOLD contrasts in the left rather than the right hemisphere. Similarly, in 
Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, and Kircher (2007) participants read the same stimuli and 
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performed an additional metaphorical judgment task where they decided if the sentence had a 
metaphorical or literal meaning. Brain activations showed left lateralisation overall, however 
there were more right hemisphere regions activated for the metaphorical than the connotation 
judgment (though not significant). In Stringaris et al. (2007), participants read metaphorical 
(e.g., “some surgeons are butchers”), literal (e.g., “some surgeons are fathers”) or 
meaningless sentences (e.g., “some surgeons are shelves”). They performed an overt 
sensibility judgment task while in an fMRI scanner (i.e., they decided if the sentence made 
sense or not). Contrasts between the literal and metaphorical conditions failed to provide 
support for a predominant role of right hemispheric structures (e.g., right inferior frontal 
gyrus). Finally, Coulson and Van Petten (2007) assessed the lateralisation of metaphorical 
thinking by recording event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants read sentences that ended 
literally, with either high or low predictability, and metaphorically. The final part of the 
sentence was presented in either the left or the right visual hemifield. Findings provided no 
evidence for differential metaphoricity effects between hemifields, and suggested that the 
integration of metaphoric meanings required similar involvement of the two hemispheres. 
To conclude, the empirical evidence about the hemispheric involvement during 
metaphorical processing reveals a heterogeneous picture. It seems that the right hemisphere 
has a particular role for metaphorical processing, however its involvement could vary as a 
function of other factors rather than metaphoricity per se. For example, familiarity of stimuli 
(novel vs. conventional metaphors), complexity of stimuli (word pairs vs. sentences), task 
and instructions (overt vs. covert responses; tasks that rely heavily on semantic processing vs. 
passive reading tasks), and measurements (behavioural vs. neurophysiological) could 
determine the degree of right hemispheric involvement (see Schmidt, Kranjec, Cardillo, & 
Chatterjee, 2010 for a review of studies on the neural basis of metaphor). More importantly, 
whether the semantic, as opposed to syntactic properties of a metaphorically used term drive 
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the involvement of the one or the other hemisphere has received little attention. To our 
knowledge, only one study directly compared the role of syntactic and semantic processing 
for the hemispheric involvement in metaphorical comprehension. In Cardillo, Watson, 
Schmidt, Kranjec, and Chatterjee (2012), participants passively read in the scanner metaphors 
that had the same base term used metaphorically but differed in their syntactic structure. Half 
of the metaphors were nominal (e.g., “the shop display was was a gentle tug”) and half were 
predicate (e.g., “the urgent letter tugged at her sleeve”) metaphors and crucially the nominal 
metaphors had a nominalised verb as a metaphor base term. All sentences were carefully 
matched for lexical and sentential properties (e.g., frequency, imageability, and 
figurativeness). Results showed no differences in the neuronal activations (e.g., the inferior 
frontal gyrus on the left hemisphere and its right hemisphere homolog) for the two types of 
metaphors that differed syntactically but were equated semantically. This result suggested 
that semantic rather than syntactic features are crucial to the hemispheric involvement for 
metaphorical comprehension. However, this study did not test a non-metaphor condition, 
hence interpretation is tenuous. 
 
2.2.3 Theoretical explanation of hemispheric involvement for metaphor processing 
In this section we review the predominant theories, which explain the hemispheric 
involvement for metaphorical processing. The theories are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. They rather focus on aspects of metaphorical processing from a different angle 
(saliency/familiarity, semantic distance).  
The Graded Salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997; Giora, Zaidel, Soroker, Batori, & 
Kasher, 2000) characterised the difference between right-hemisphere and left-hemisphere 
semantic processing without explicitly referring to the literal vs. metaphor distinction. That 
is, both literal and non-literal language processing are controlled by the principle of salience 
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in such way that salient meanings are processed primarily in the left-hemisphere, where most 
of our linguistic knowledge is stored. The right-hemisphere has a selective contribution for 
understanding non-salient meanings. Given that meanings are made salient through 
familiarity, conventionality and/or prototypicality, the graded salience account predicted that 
salient, familiar metaphors are processed in the left-hemisphere, and less salient, novel 
metaphors in the right-hemisphere. In other words, there is a shift in increased activations 
from the right to the left hemisphere as metaphors become familiar. Cardillo et al. (2012) 
proposed a slightly different approach, which is also based on the relationship between the 
level of metaphor familiarity and hemispheric involvement. They found that activations in 
critical bilateral regions sub-serving metaphorical comprehension negatively correlated with 
familiarity of metaphors. That is, as metaphor familiarity increases and categorisation 
processing takes place (following the Career of Metaphor model; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), 
activations in both hemispheres decrease, rather than activations increasingly shifting from 
the right to left hemisphere.  
The Fine-Coarse Semantic Coding Model, introduced in Beeman and Chiarello 
(1998) and Jung-Beeman (2005), is most commonly used to explain the right-hemisphere 
bias for metaphorical processing. According to this model, the two hemispheres process 
semantic information in a qualitatively different, yet complementary way based on the notion 
of “semantic distance”. In particular, any meaning depending on distant and coarse semantic 
relationships (i.e., distant and unusual semantic links) is processed in the right-hemisphere, 
and any meaning depending on close and fine semantic links (i.e., dominant and strong 
interpretations) is processed in the left-hemisphere. This is because the right hemisphere is 
more interconnected than the left hemisphere (i.e., the right hemisphere has more white 
matter and neuron connections than the left hemisphere) (Jung-Beeman, 2005). So, when 
encountering a word, the left hemisphere is involved for a dominant interpretation (= fine 
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semantic coding), and the right hemisphere is involved for maintaining larger semantic fields, 
which include more distant, unconventional semantic associations (= coarse semantic 
coding). Almost by definition, metaphorical compared to non-metaphorical language includes 
links between more distantly related meanings (e.g., “animal” as opposed to “taxi” is more 
closely linked to “desert” in the phrases “a camel is a desert animal” and “a camel is a desert 
taxi”). Therefore, the right-hemisphere is particularly engaged in processing metaphors.  
 
2.2.4 Metaphor: relevance to the thesis 
The literature related to metaphor as reviewed in the above sections has motivated and 
informed the current thesis in several ways.  
Firstly, why study metaphor? Metaphors – as conceptualised in cognitive linguistics – 
are holistic and multifaceted representations of knowledge, because they rely on the whole 
abstract-to-concrete continuum of semantic knowledge. As a matter of both language and 
thought, metaphors enable the study of interactions between cognition, speech and non-verbal 
behaviours. The current thesis focused on metaphor, as it requires complex embodied 
cognitive processing, yet it is a pervasive component of everyday communication. 
More specifically, theories about metaphor and in particular the Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory informed the selection of tasks and measurements in the empirical studies of the 
current thesis. In Chapters 3 and 6 we used a metaphorical explanation task, which required 
the explanation of phrases focusing on the metaphorical mappings between conceptual 
domains. For example, participants had to explain how the concrete concept of “beans” 
represents the abstract concept of “secrets” in the phrase “to spill the beans”. In Chapters 3 
and 4 we developed coding schemes to measure metaphoricity levels in speech and identify 
the use of metaphorical language in verbal responses on the basis of conceptual metaphors. 
For example, the phrase “focus on important aspects” would be identified as metaphorical, 
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because it derives from the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. Finally, 
Chapter 5 aimed to provide support for the Conceptual Metaphor Theory by investigating the 
sensorimotor basis of metaphor comprehension focusing on the role of action gestures for 
semantic judgment of action sentences. In this way we put the heart of metaphorical 
processing in the heart of the thesis.  
In addition, we drew upon the evidence for the right hemispheric involvement in 
coarse semantic processing, in particular metaphorical processing, and we aimed to further 
explore factors determining this involvement. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we investigated whether 
hand choice for gesturing (e.g., left hand gestures) determines different types of metaphorical 
processing (e.g., metaphorical explanation; spontaneous use of metaphors; metaphorical 
judgment of sentences). This question is motivated by the account that the right hemisphere is 
particularly involved for metaphorical processing. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 we explicitly 
explored the role of semantic processing, which has received little attention, for the particular 
involvement of the right hemisphere during metaphorical explanations. This way, the thesis 
informed the discussion of hemispheric involvement for metaphorical processing.  
 
2.3 Gestures: a visible example of embodiment 
2.3.1 Types of gestures 
The visible hand movements that a speaker produces while speaking can be either 
gestures or non-gestures. Non-gestures mainly comprise of self-touching movements (e.g., 
stroking the hair; scratching) or object manipulation. Gestures comprise of imagistic and non-
imagistic hand movements that often accompany speech. Based on the imagistic degree of the 
movement, a number of gesture classification schemes have been proposed. McNeill (1992) 
introduced four types of gestures: iconic, metaphoric, beat, and deictic. A gesture is iconic 
when it has a close semantic relationship with the concurrent speech. Iconic gestures depict 
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actions, physical objects (size, shape), and movement, and carry information, which could be 
present or absent in the concurrent speech. For example, if someone utters the sentence “he 
grasped the ball”, they could produce two different iconic gestures to depict the size of the 
ball and the way of grasping (e.g., both hands semi-closed, palms facing each other, forming 
a circular space in front of the body to describe a big ball or one hand with semi-closed palm 
facing to the front to describe a small ball). Metaphoric gestures are similar to iconic in 
representing imagery, but they represent an image of an abstract concept. For example, if 
someone utters the sentence “he revealed a secret”, they could produce a metaphoric gesture 
representing the concept of “secret” as an object on an open palm, and move the arm away 
from the body representing the action of sharing information. Deictic gestures are pointing 
movements used to indicate concrete entities present or absent in the environment, or even 
refer to abstract concepts. Finally, beat gestures are rhythmic hand movements (usually 
vertical), which do not carry meaning, but they might carry information about the discourse 
(e.g., emphatic information).  
 
2.3.2 Types of gestures: relevance to the thesis 
The current thesis focused on “representational” gestures, which comprise McNeill’s 
iconic and metaphoric gestures. Representational gestures represent units of thoughts and 
allow the investigation of how non-verbal encoding of meaning can affect the way we think 
and speak. More specifically, in Chapters 3 and 4 we focused on representational gestures 
and their role on metaphorical processing when gestures and speech co-occur. In addition, in 
Chapter 4 we directly compared the effect that representational and meaningless tapping hand 
movements have on spontaneous production of metaphors. Finally, in Chapter 5, we 
investigated whether representational gestures when produced alone may prime sentence 
comprehension.  
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2.3.3 Generation of gestures  
Where do gestures arise? In this section we review the most closely aligned 
frameworks developed to explain what gestures are and when they emerge.  
According to the Interface Model (Kita & Ozyürek, 2003), gestures arise during the 
conceptualisation stage of speech production. Generators are responsible for planning the 
form of gesture (action generator) and speech (message generator). Both of them access 
visuo-spatial images in working memory and most importantly, they communicate bi-
directionally. This bi-directional communication between gesture and speech means that 
gestures can be influenced by linguistic and visuo-spatial properties of information. Evidence 
for this model comes from cross-linguistic research (Kita & Ozyürek, 2003) suggesting that 
gestures representing motion events can be influenced by the way each language encodes 
aspects of motion and the visuo-motoric properties of an event per se. For example, native 
speakers of English, Turkish and Japanese described an event in which a protagonist swings 
on a rope like Tarzan. The English speakers encoded the arc-shaped trajectory of the motion, 
both linguistically and in gestural content. However, this was not the case for Turkish and 
Japanese, because they do not have such an easily accessible linguistic unit. Therefore, 
speakers produced a gesture to represent the change of location only, without the arc-shaped 
trajectory.  
The Gesture-as-Simulated-Action account (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) brings the link 
between perception and action in the centre of the gesture production system, and suggests 
that gestures emerge from the perceptual and motor simulations that underlie embodied 
language and mental imagery. That is, whenever ideas are simulated in the form of perceptual 
and motor information (both physically and metaphorically spatial), a gesture may emerge. 
The strength of speakers’ perceptuo-motor activations during conceptual processing, and the 
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conceptual content are factors that determine whether simulations will be executed as 
gestures. For example, the more the speakers evoke visuo-spatial imagery during conceptual 
processing, the more likely they are to produce gestures. In addition, action related content of 
speech gives rise to gestures, because it depends on motor-information (Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008). The Gesture-as-Simulated-Action account does not explicitly propose a bi-directional 
communication between gesture and speech, but speakers’ perceptual and motor simulations 
may rely on linguistic constraints of their languages (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008).  
 
2.3.4 Functions of gestures 
The first wave of gesture research has considered gestures as communicative tools 
elicited after cognitive processing (e.g., lexical access, conceptualisation), which constitute a 
cognitively independent bodily output (Graham & Argyle, 1975; Kendon, 1994). However, 
cumulative studies on embodied cognition and gestures have made it clear that gesture is 
more than that, and that gestures can influence cognitive processing of speakers themselves. 
In the next sections, we review the theories and empirical evidence for different functions of 
gestures.  
 
2.3.4.1 Communicative Functions of Gestures 
Features of communicative contexts modulate gesture production. Speakers produce 
gestures to enhance listeners’ understanding of the message they convey. There is a great deal 
of evidence for the communicative functions of gestures (see Hostetter, 2011 for a meta-
analysis). Alibali, Heath, and Myers (2001) showed that the frequency of gesture production 
increased when the speaker/gesturer and listener had visual contact compared to when they 
did not. In addition, Melinger and Levelt (2004) suggested that speakers intend for their 
gestures to communicate, because when they communicate much information, they utter 
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some of it (e.g., size of a stimulus) and represent other pieces of information (e.g., shape) in 
gestures only. Holler and Stevens (2007) showed that speakers adjust the information they 
convey in speech and gestures depending on the listener’s previous knowledge. When 
speakers were aware of the listener’s knowledge gap about the content of speech, they used 
both gestural and verbal information, whereas they only used verbal information for informed 
listeners. Similarly, speakers changed their gestures before and after addressees’ feedback. 
For example, when feedback was confirmatory, speakers produced less gestures than when 
feedback encouraged elaboration or specifications. Also, gestures were larger and more 
precise after than before feedback (Holler & Wilkin, 2011). Finally, listeners’ understanding 
may (Graham & Argyle, 1975; Kendon, 1994) or may not (Kelly & Goldsmith, 2004) benefit 
from seeing gestures. For example, listeners fail to understand speakers’ verbal message 
when it is accompanied by mismatching gestures or no gestures at all (Goldin-Meadow, Kim, 
& Singer, 1999). In addition, gestures may help understanding of intentions, which remain 
unuttered. For example, Kelly et al. (1999) found that when speakers uttered the sentence “it 
is getting hot in here” and pointed to a window, the listener interpreted it as a request, thus 
opened the window. However, this was not the case when the sentence was uttered without 
gesture.  
 
2.3.4.2 Self-oriented Functions of Gestures 
Speakers often produce gestures when having a telephone conversation which are not 
visible to their listener (Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton, & Prevost, 2008). In addition, congenitally 
blind children gesture when they speak to blind listeners (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 1998). 
These findings suggested that gestures do not occur only for the listeners, but they must 
facilitate cognitive processing of the speakers-gesturers themselves. In the following sections, 
  
48 
we review the various theoretical accounts proposed to describe the processes facilitated by 
gestures, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, rather complementary. 
  
The Lexical Gesture Process Model  
The Lexical Gesture Process Model proposed by Krauss and colleagues (Krauss, 
1998; Krauss & Hadar, 2001) holds that gestures facilitate the generation of utterances at the 
surface level. More specifically, gestures that share semantic content with a word can help 
speakers formulate speech by helping the lexical access at the stage of phonological 
encoding. Evidence for this “lexical function” of gestures mainly comes from studies using 
cross-modal priming paradigms and showing that representing a concept in gestures may 
prime the lexical representation of this concept (R. Krauss, Chen, & Gottesmann, 2000). 
Also, gesture prohibition studies show that preventing speakers from gesturing may affect 
qualities of speech (e.g., fluency, speech rate). For example, when speakers are prohibited 
from gesturing during speech, and in particular speech with spatial content, they are less 
fluent and have lower speech rates than when gesturing is allowed (Rauscher et al., 1996). 
Similarly, participants who were allowed to gesture retrieved more lexical items from their 
definition than those who were prohibited (Beattie & Coughlan, 1999). The reverse link has 
also been shown and more gestures are produced when lexical access is difficult (e.g., during 
the tip of the tongue phenomenon where the speaker tries to recall word forms) (Chawla & 
Krauss, 1994). In addition, gestures are synchronised with speech (e.g., produced either 
before or simultaneously with the relevant utterance), and the more familiar the word the 
smaller the gesture-speech asynchrony (Morrel-Samuels & Krauss, 1992). These findings 
suggested that gesture production is linked to features of lexical access. Finally, the account 
has been confirmed in developmental studies. Children of 6 and half years old performed 
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better in a naming task when they were allowed to gesture compared to not gesturing (Pine, 
Bird, & Kirk, 2007).  
 
The Information Packaging Hypothesis  
According to the Information Packaging Hypothesis (Kita, 2000), representational 
gestures help the organisation of spatio-motoric information into packages to enhance the 
content of speech to be uttered. The key idea is that gestures help cognitive processes by 
organising and packaging of information into “verbalisable” units. Evidence for this “spatio-
motoric organisation function” of gestures mainly comes from studies on the effect of 
gestures on processing visuo-spatial information. For example, more gestures emerge during 
a task with high spatial cognitive demand, such as description of a mental rotation problem 
and difficult-to-conceptualise figures (Hostetter, Alibali, & Kita, 2007), or description of 
complex geometrical figures (Kita & Davies, 2009). Moreover, encouraging participants to 
gesture during a mental rotation problem task enhances their performance, by improving the 
internal computation of spatial transformations (Chu & Kita, 2011). In addition, studies with 
children showed that gestures help them for what information to attend to and in turn verbally 
express. When children performed an explanation task (i.e., they explained if two containers 
include the same or different quantity), they produced many gestures to represent perceptual 
dimensions of the containers and information, which was not uttered (Alibali, Kita & Young, 
2000). Also, when children were prohibited from gesturing in an explanation task, they 
referred to more perceptually absent objects than when gesturing (Alibali & Kita, 2010). 
Thus, gestures help the conceptual planning of speech and highlight information, which is 
perceptually present. Similarly, when adults were asked to divide information (e.g., the 
manner and the path of a movement) in separate gestures, they also verbally encoded the 
information in separate clauses (Mol & Kita, 2012). Thus, gestures can influence information 
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packaging in speech. Finally, studies on cross-cultural differences of speech and gesture 
production (Kita & Ozyürek, 2003; Kita, Ozyürek, et al., 2007) provided evidence that 
gestures derive from spatio-motoric processes and interact with speech at the conceptual 
planning level. For example, Turkish and Japanese speakers differ from English speakers in 
how they organise and package information about the Manner and Path of motion events in 
gestures and speech (i.e., separation of Manner and Path in Turkish and Japanese gestures is 
due to difficulty to verbalise the two pieces in a single processing unit for speech production) 
(Kita & Ozyürek, 2003).  
 
The Gesture-in-Learning-and-Development Framework 
According to the Gesture-in-Learning-and-Development framework (Goldin-
Meadow, 2003) gestures help cognitive processing by reducing the cognitive load and 
allowing more effort to be devoted in another task (e.g., speech production). For example, 
gestures helped speakers to reduce working memory load during a math explanation problem, 
and freed capacity to perform a secondary letter recall task (Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, 
Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Wagner, Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004). Gesticulation 
reduced the working memory load imposed by explaining math problems even when the 
secondary task was visuo-spatial (e.g., remember a visual grid pattern) (Wagner et al., 2004). 
In addition, speech-gesture matches (i.e., the same information was conveyed in speech and 
gesture) increased the amount of items participants remembered (Wagner et al., 2004). These 
findings suggested that gestures aid cognitive processing because of their propositional 
organisation rather than their visuo-spatial form, and unload working memory by 
complementing speech. 
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The Image Maintenance Theory  
According to the Image Maintenance Theory, introduced in Wesp et al. (2001), spatial 
imagery serves a short-term memory function during the lexicon search, and gestures may 
facilitate the maintenance of the non-lexical imagistic concept during lexical access. Even 
earlier studies pointed towards this account. For example, Rime, Schiaratura, Hupet, and 
Ghysselinckx (1984) found that when gesturing is prohibited, the vividness of imagery in 
spontaneous conversations is decreased compared to when gesture is free, suggesting that 
gestures are part of the representational process, rather than the lexical one, and maintain a 
focus on spatial information. In addition, de Ruiter (1998) found that when participants 
described shapes, which were not visible, they produced more gestures compared to when the 
shapes were visible to the addressee. This finding suggested that gestures maintain images in 
mind. Similarly, Wesp et al. (2001) showed that when participants explained pictures to a 
listener and the pictures were absent – thus the need for image maintenance was higher –, 
they produced more gestures compared to when the pictures were visible to the listener. Thus, 
gestures can help the pre-linguistic representation of spatial information by maintaining the 
spatial images in memory. Finally, prohibiting gestures reduces the amount of spatial 
metaphors in a free speech production task, confirming the imagistic nature of gestures, 
which has a special role for the verbalisation of abstract spatial imagery in the form of 
metaphor (Bos & Cienki, 2011). 
 
2.3.5 Functions of gestures: relevance to the thesis 
The literature related to functions of gestures as reviewed in the above sections has 
motivated and informed the current thesis in several ways.  
We followed the Gesture-as-Simulated-Action account (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) 
that gestures arise from embodied thinking, and we included gestures, the “visible evidence 
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of embodiment”, in the study of embodied abstract thinking in the form of metaphor. In 
addition, following the bi-directional link between gesture and speech as proposed in the 
Interface Model (Kita & Ozyürek, 2003), and the role of conceptual knowledge and sensory-
motor simulations for metaphor processing as proposed in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), we investigated whether gestures may influence metaphorical 
processing. More specifically, we focused on the self-oriented functions of gestures and 
aimed to bring the literature a step forward. Gestures may reinforce our mental images and 
help maintain them in memory, as the image maintenance account (Wesp et al., 2001) 
suggests. Also, they may help speakers identify which features of a mental image to mention 
and organise information to be uttered, as the information packaging account (Kita, 2000) 
suggests. Or they may help speakers identify which lexical features to use, as the lexical 
processing model suggests (R. M. Krauss, 1998). So, there are many accounts describing 
which cognitive processes are facilitated by gestures, but the exact mechanism underlying 
these facilitative effects is underspecified (Pouw, de Nooijer, van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 
2014). In the current thesis, we aimed to approach this underspecified issue by investigating 
if facilitative functions of gestures relate to gesture handedness and its mutual involvement 
with hemispheric involvement for cognitive processing.  
More specifically, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we measured several components of 
embodied processing of abstract meaning in the form of metaphor (e.g., explanation of 
metaphorical mappings; spontaneous use of metaphors; metaphor comprehension) as a 
function of gesture production. In addition, we did not simply measure if gestures facilitated 
cognitive processing. We measured if gestures can actually modulate and determine language 
processing, such that they can change the content of speech. Thus, providing more evidence 
for gestures’ self-oriented functions. 
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In the following section we outline research, which motivated us to investigate a 
hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis for gestures’ self-oriented functions, and whether 
left- and right-hand gestures differ in the degree of impact they have on language processing.   
 
2.3.6 Hemispheric involvement for gesture production  
We can investigate the inter-relation between speech and gesture by investigating the 
role that the cerebral hemispheres may play in speech-gesture production. For example, does 
the left hemisphere only control speech and gesture production? Several behavioural and 
patient studies investigating hand choice for gesturing, and brain imaging studies have 
addressed this issue.  
Research on human motor function includes the study of hemispheric dominance and 
handedness. The traditional approach suggests a left hemispheric advantage for the 
production of simple hand actions. For example, Kim et al. (1993) in a brain imaging study, 
found that the right motor cortex was activated in a contra-lateral manner, that is, during the 
movement of the left hand (movement of fingers). However, the left motor cortex was 
activated in a contra-lateral and ipsi-lateral manner, that is, during movement in either hand. 
Similarly, the left-hemisphere is specialised for the bilateral control of repetitive, meaningless 
hand movements (Kimura & Archibald, 1974; Wyke, 1971). However, more recent studies 
using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) provide ambiguous evidence. Some studies 
(Franceschini, Fantini, Thomspon, Culver, & Boas, 2003; Sato et al., 2007) suggested that the 
hemispheric control of simple hand movements (e.g., finger tapping) is contra-lateral, while 
other studies (Helmich, Rein, Niermann, & Lausberg, 2013) showed that both hemispheres 
are equally activated during simple movements (e.g., flexion/extension with the thumb) with 
the one or the other hand.  
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Therefore evidence for hemispheric involvement for the production of simple motoric 
movements is not clear, and the picture becomes more vague when it comes to hemispheric 
involvement for more complex movements, such as meaningful gestures.  
The traditional neuropsychological view is that speech and gesture production 
systems share a common brain mechanism, which, for most speakers, is the language 
dominant, left hemisphere (Kimura, 1973a, 1973b). Kimura’s research is based on the contra-
lateral cortical control for hand movements, that is, the right hemisphere controls hand 
movements with the left hand and the left hemisphere controls hand movements with the 
right hand. Kimura (1973a) suggested that healthy right-handed speakers with left 
hemisphere language dominance (evidenced by a right-ear advantage in a dichotic listening 
task) presented increased frequency of right hand movements3  compared to left hand 
movements in a free speech production task. Similar patterns of results were found in left-
handers (Kimura, 1973b), but in a less exclusive unilateral degree (e.g., left handers, 
regardless of their ear advantage, would use the left hand for gestures more than right 
handers), because language is also less unilateral in left-handers4. This finding suggested that 
hand preference for movements is influenced by which hemisphere is language dominant, as 
evidenced by a dichotic listening task. In addition, Lavergne and Kimura (1987) videotaped 
right-handed subjects as they spontaneously spoke about spatial and neutral topics. 
Participants gestured more in the spatial than the neutral topics, which suggested that the 
nature of the speech task might influence the amount of gestures. However, and contrary to 
an expected asymmetry (i.e., spatial content was associated with right hemisphere processing, 
																																																								3	Note, that in Kimura’s research free hand movements are defined as “any motion of the limb which 
did not result in touching of the body or coming to rest” (Kimura, 1973a, p.46). 4	Some (but not all) left-handers might have right-hemisphere language dominance (Hunter & 
Brysbaert, 2008) and even strong right-handers might have right hemisphere language dominance 
(Knecht et al., 2000). 
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hence left hand preference was predicted), speakers consistently preferred the right hand for 
gesturing regardless of the topic.  
More recent evidence from brain imaging studies also suggests the left hemispheric 
involvement for gesture production. Regardless of the hand used, transitive (e.g., stirring) and 
intransitive (e.g., waving) action gestures (Kroliczak & Frey, 2009), and pantomimed and 
imagined actions (Moll et al., 2000) activate the left hemisphere more strongly than the right. 
Finally, evidence from the development of language skills showed that infants (10-12 
months) who had a strong right hand preference for pointing gestures also had a larger 
receptive vocabulary (Mumford & Kita, under review). Similarly, Gonzalez, Li, Mills, Rosen, 
and Gibb (2014) showed that children (4-5 years old) with stronger right hand preference for 
hand-to-mouth grasping gestures were better at differentiating sounds (e.g., the acoustic 
distance between “s” and “sh”). These findings suggested that gesture and speech are 
developed and produced intertwined5 in the left hemisphere. 
However, the role of the language dominant left hemisphere for gesture production 
may have been “overestimated” and “oversimplified”. The right hemisphere may also be 
involved for gesture production. For example, Kita, de Condappa, and Mohr (2007) showed 
that right-hand preference for gesturing is reduced when right-handed speakers explained 
metaphorical phrases (e.g., “to spill the beans” meaning to reveal a secret), which are known 
to particularly engage the right-hemisphere (see section 2.2.2 “Hemispheric involvement for 
metaphor processing”), compared to non-metaphorical, concrete phrases (e.g., “to spill the 
marbles”). Similarly, K. Miller and Franz (2005) found that when right-handed speakers 
talked about their daily routines and sequential events (e.g., “describe how your daily routine 
was at the university”), they used more unimanual gestures with the left hand than when they 																																																								5	Fagard, Sirri, and Raemae (2014) highlighted that this relationship between hand preference for 
gesturing and language development is not causal, but reflects the tendency of language development 
and right-handedness to recruit the hemispheres in a lateralised manner.  
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talked about spatial conditions (e.g., “describe the house where you live now”). This finding 
suggested that hemispheric involvement relative to the content of speech might determine 
hand choice for gesturing.  
Moreover, studies with clinical populations provided evidence that the language 
dominant left hemisphere is not the only one involved in gesture production. Foundas et al. 
(1995) showed that aphasic stroke patients with left hemisphere damage produced 
comparable amount of gestures with their healthy controls. In addition, they produced 
gestures with either one or both hands, thus the intact right hemisphere may compensate for 
gesture production. Similarly, Hadar, Wenkert-Olenik, Krauss, and Soroker (1998) showed 
that aphasic patients with lexical retrieval deficits in the left hemisphere produced iconic 
gestures. Studies with split-brain patients (patients with callosal disconnection) showed that 
speech and gesture production systems are closely related, but can be independent. In split-
brain patients, the right hemisphere controls the left hand and the left hemisphere the right 
hand. If Kimura’s theory was right, then split-brain patients with left hemispheric language 
production should produce right-hand gestures only. However, this has not been the case. 
Lausberg, Zaidel, Cruz, and Ptito (2007) showed that split-brain patients were unable to use 
the left hand for verbal command (e.g., experimenter would give command to use toothbrush 
and patients were unable to do so), but they used the left hand for gesturing. Similarly, Kita 
and Lausberg (2008) showed that split-brain patients (with either left-hemisphere dominant 
or bilateral language representation) produced gestures with spatial content with both left and 
right hands. This finding suggested that even the non-language-dominant right hemisphere 
could generate gestures independently from left hemispheric speech production.  
Finally, there are always other aspects that may determine hand choice for gesture 
production. For example, Lausberg and Kita (2003) showed that semantic aspects of the 
message determined the choice of the right or left hand for gesturing (e.g., use of left hand to 
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gesturally depict an object moving in the relative left position). In addition, Casasanto and 
Jasmin (2010) found that speakers used their dominant hand (either left or right) to represent 
messages with positive connotations in political debates. This finding suggested that 
emotional valence (positive-negative), and the way right- and left-handers represent valence 
(e.g., the dominant side, either left or right, is positive) may determine hand choice for 
gesturing. Furthermore, cultural conventions and type of gestures may also influence hand 
choice for gesturing. For example, speakers of the Arrernte dialect in central Australia always 
use their left hand to refer to targets that are on the left (Wilkins & de Ruiter, 1999). Pointing 
gestures show a right hand preference (McNeill, 1992; Wilkins & de Ruiter, 1999), while 
self-touching (e.g., shoulder shrugs) and beat gestures, which often co-occur with increased 
stress levels, show a left hand preference indicating the right hemispheric involvement for 
emotional expression (Kimura, 1973a; Lausberg et al., 2007).  
To sum up, speech and gesture production systems are linked in the brain, but they 
may also be dissociated. The functional activity in the left or right hemisphere relative to 
cognitive processing may give rise to gestures with the right or left hand, respectively. This 
has an important implication for the rehabilitation of patients with unilateral damage. For 
example, Hanlon, Brown, and Gerstman (1990) found that right hand pointing, compared to 
left hand pointing or right hand fisting movement, enhanced performance of patients with 
left-hemisphere damage in a naming task. This finding suggested that gestures with one hand 
might enhance activations in the contra-lateral hemisphere, and in turn enhance processing 
involving this hemisphere. However, whether this enhancement occurs for cognitive 
processing in healthy speakers is unknown. If so, it could reveal an important aspect of the 
mechanism underlying gestures’ self-oriented functions related to the mutual influence 
between hand choice for gesturing and hemispheric involvement for cognitive processing.  
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2.3.7 Hemispheric involvement for gesture production: relevance to the thesis 
The literature related to the inter-relation between speech and gesture production 
systems in the brain, and hand choice for gesturing as reviewed in the above section has 
motivated and informed the current thesis in several ways. We investigated whether gestures 
with a particular hand may enhance processing in the contra-lateral hemisphere in healthy 
adults, and how gesture and speech interact in the right hemisphere. 
More specifically, we know that hemispheric involvement in a cognitive task may 
determine hand choice for gesturing (e.g., Kita et al., 2007; Miller & Franz, 2005). In the 
current thesis, we manipulated the hand choice for gesturing to investigate if the reverse 
causal chain is also true. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we investigated whether gestures with the left 
hand may enhance several types of metaphorical processing in the right hemisphere (e.g., 
metaphor explanation; metaphor production and comprehension). If so, a hemisphere-specific 
feedback hypothesis would explain gestures’ self oriented function, which implies that 
functional activation of the left hand for the production of gestures gives feedback and 
enhances activation in the right hemisphere areas involved in metaphorical processing.  
 
2.4 Mouth asymmetry and hemispheric involvement during cognitive tasks  
Several behavioural paradigms have been used to infer hemispheric involvement 
during different cognitive processes (e.g., visual hemifield tasks; dichotic monitoring tasks; 
mouth asymmetry tasks). In the current thesis, we are interested in hemispheric involvement 
during production tasks, and, as far as we know, mouth asymmetry is the only behavioural 
measurement for speech production. In this section, we review studies, which reported robust 
mouth asymmetry effects as evidence for the relative contribution of the two hemispheres 
during different tasks. The foundation of these studies is the contra-lateral cortical control of 
the facial musculature (Adams, Victor, & Ropper, 1997; Gardner, 1969). That is, if a process 
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involves the left hemisphere and includes a mouth movement, the right side of the mouth will 
open wider than the left.  
Research measuring mouth movements indicated the left-hemispheric involvement for 
speech production as evidenced by right-sided dominant mouth openings. Speakers open the 
right side of their mouth wider than the left during propositional speech production (e.g., 
spontaneous speech, word list generation) (R. Graves & Landis, 1985; Wolf & Goodale, 
1987). The pattern is reversed (i.e., left side opens wider than the right) during automatic 
speech (e.g., singing, counting), which is considered to involve the right hemisphere (R. 
Graves & Landis, 1985).  
Additionally, research measuring mouth movements indicated hemispheric 
involvement for emotional expressions (e.g., smiles). For example, Wyler, Graves, and 
Landis (1987) found a clear left-sided dominance for smiles, and in particular, this is true for 
spontaneous compared to posed smiles (Wylie & Goodale, 1988). Similarly, Holowka and 
Petitto (2002) showed that infants (5-12 months old) opened the right side of their mouth 
wider than the left when they were babbling (considered a precursor to speech) compared to 
smiling.  
Research with clinical populations showed different mouth asymmetry patterns, but 
confirmed the sensitivity of the technique to capture hemispheric involvement across 
different populations. For example, Ulrich, Sydathnunez, and Mulleroerlinghausen (1990) 
found that patients with bipolar depression did not show strongly right-sided dominant mouth 
openings. Similarly, Choo, Robb, Dalrymple-Alford, Huckabee, and O'Beirne (2010) found 
that adult stuttering speakers showed left-sided dominant mouth openings, compared to a 
control non-stuttering group. This finding suggested that the right-hemisphere is also 
involved for speech production in these groups.  
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Finally, mouth asymmetry during speech production may affect visual perception. 
Nicholls, Searle, and Bradshaw (2004) suggested that listeners have an intuitive knowledge 
of the mouth asymmetry, because they preferentially attended to the right side of a speaker’s 
mouth. This suggests that mouth asymmetry is a valid measurement of the visual expression 
of speech that could potentially affect speech comprehension.  
 
2.4.1 Mouth asymmetry: relevance to the thesis 
The literature reviewed in the above section suggested that the mouth asymmetry is a 
safe, inexpensive technique, and the only way to infer hemispheric involvement during online 
speech production rather than perception (such as dichotic listening tasks). In addition, the 
patterns of mouth asymmetry seem to feature a similar trend to those of gesture lateralisation 
and handedness (as reviewed in section 2.3.6 “Hemispheric involvement for gesture 
production”), and the systems of mouth and hand movements are linked for the production of 
language (Iverson & Thelen, 1999). Thus, mouth asymmetry during speech production 
provides evidence for hemispheric involvement during speech production at an individual 
level. More specifically, in Chapter 3 we collected mouth asymmetry measurements in 
explanation tasks as an index of individual differences for hemispheric involvement during 
speech production. We assessed the relationship of this index with the gesture handedness 
effect on metaphorical explanation, in order to further support a hemisphere-specific 
feedback hypothesis for gestures’ self-oriented functions.  
In addition, in Chapter 6 we collected mouth asymmetry measurements during 
different explanation tasks (metaphorical and concrete), and during production of different 
word types (content and function words) to investigate whether metaphorical as opposed to 
literal meaning particularly involves the right hemisphere. We also investigated whether 
semantics, as in metaphorical representation of meaning in content words rather than 
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expression of grammatical relationships in function words, are crucial for this right-
hemispheric involvement during metaphorical speech production.  
 
2.5 Summary and research aims 
To sum up, the current thesis investigates how language interacts with other cognitive 
functions, by exploring how language and gesture inter-relate, and how sensory-motor 
information influences language processing. It particularly focuses on how sensory-motor 
information expressed in gestures influences semantics during metaphor processing, that is 
the representation of the semantic link between concrete and abstract meaning whilst 
speakers explain and comprehend metaphors. It explores the bi-directional relation between 
language and gestures with a focus on the link ‘from gesture to language’. The thesis draws 
upon and aims to extend four core theoretical fields:  
(a) The Embodied Theories of meaning representation suggest that sensory-motor 
information systems have a functional role for language processing (see for a review 
Meteyard et al., 2012). Strong embodied accounts suggest so for processing both abstract and 
concrete language (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003). The current thesis investigates whether 
representing sensory-motor information in gestures (rather than producing meaningless 
motoric movements or not moving) determines the semantic representation of abstract 
meaning in the form of metaphor. If so, sensory-motor information and physical experience 
would be necessary for language processing, and gestures would help cognitive functions due 
to semantic (i.e., they carry and represent meaning) rather than motoric properties.  
(b) The Conceptual Metaphor Theory supports that metaphor comprehension relies on 
conceptual metaphors and systematic metaphorical mappings between semantically distant 
concepts (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). If conceptual knowledge and 
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metaphorical mappings from concrete to abstract concepts underlie and motivate the whole 
range of metaphor processing, then gestural representation of sensory-motor information 
would affect all different components of metaphorical processing, which may vary in the 
degree of their dependence on metaphorical mappings (e.g., metaphorical explanation – high 
dependence on mappings, production of metaphors – low dependence on mappings). The 
current thesis draws upon the importance of conceptual knowledge for metaphor processing 
and investigates whether metaphor processing can be facilitated by gestures.  
(c) The Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for metaphor proposes a particular involvement 
of the right hemisphere for metaphor comprehension (Bottini et al., 1994; Jung-Beeman, 
2005), but why and whether this holds true for metaphor production is still unclear. The 
current thesis investigates the relative involvement of the right hemisphere during 
metaphorical speech production and explores if the production of content words related to 
metaphor rather than function words, which express grammatical relationships is crucial for 
this involvement.  
(d) The theories for Self-oriented Functions of gestures suggest that gestures facilitate 
cognitive processing by helping lexical access, image maintenance, working memory and 
organisation of information (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Kita, 2000; Krauss, 1998; Wesp et 
al., 2001). The current thesis investigates whether gestures with the one or the other hand, 
compared to meaningless movements or no movement may modulate conceptualisation of 
abstract meaning in the form of metaphor and content of speech in different linguistic tasks, 
which vary in the degree of relative hemispheric involvement. For the first time, it explores 
whether left and right hand gestures differ in the degree of their facilitative effect. If so, 
gestures’ self-oriented functions would be hemisphere and task specific, and using the one 
hand to gesture would enhance processing in the one or the other hemisphere. 
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In order to approach our research aims, we implemented three experiments, in which 
we manipulated hand movements and measured their effect on metaphorical speech 
production and comprehension, and one in which we measured relative hemispheric 
involvement for metaphorical speech production. In each experiment, we addressed the 
following specific questions:  
(1) Do left hand gestures enhance explanations of metaphorical phrases as opposed to 
right hand gestures or not gesturing at all? Does this left-over-right-hand gesturing 
advantage relate with the right-hemispheric involvement for speech production? 
(Chapter 3) 
(2) Do left hand gestures trigger the use of metaphor related expressions within 
abstract context as opposed to meaningless tapping movements (Chapter 4) 
(3) Does representation of action meaning through gesturing prime semantic 
categorisation of metaphorical and literal action sentences? Do priming effects 
differ among the categorisation of literal and metaphorical sentences? Does 
representation of action meaning through left hand gestures particularly prime 
categorisation of metaphorical compared to literal action sentences? (Chapter 5) 
(4) Is the right hemisphere particularly involved during production of metaphorical 
speech? If so, is semantics crucial for this involvement? Does the right-sided 
mouth asymmetry reduce during metaphorical compared to concrete speech 
production? If so, is this reduction particularly pronounced for the production of 
content compared to function words? (Chapter 6). 
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3 Hand matters: left-hand gestures enhance metaphor explanation 
 
3.1 Motivation and aims 
This study investigated whether the underlying mechanism for gestures’ self-oriented 
functions relates to the mutual influence between gesture handedness and language 
hemispheric dominance, focusing on metaphorical processing. Previous research (Kita, de 
Condappa, et al., 2007) has shown that the right-over-left hand preference for gesturing is 
reduced when speakers explain metaphorical compared to non-metaphorical phrases. The 
current study investigated the reverse directional link: does left hand gesturing improve 
metaphor explanation? It provided evidence for a “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” 
for gestures’ self-oriented functions.  
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3.2 Abstract 
Research suggests that speech-accompanying gestures influence cognitive processes, but it is 
not clear whether right- vs. left-hand gestures have differential effects. Two experiments 
tested the “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures’ self-oriented functions: 
gestures with a particular hand enhance cognitive processes in the contra-lateral hemisphere. 
Specifically, we tested whether left-hand gestures enhance metaphorical explanation, which 
involves processing in the right hemisphere. In Experiment 1, right-handers explained 
metaphorical mappings in phrases such as “to spill the beans” (e.g., beans represent pieces of 
information). Participants were instructed to gesture with their left hand or right hand or to 
not gesture at all. Speech outputs included more elaborate explanations of the metaphorical 
mappings when participants gestured with their left hand compared to when they gestured 
with the right hand or did not gesture at all. Furthermore, we measured participants’ mouth 
asymmetry during additional verbal tasks to determine individual differences in right-
hemispheric involvement for speech production. The left-side mouth dominance, indicating 
stronger right-hemispheric involvement, positively correlated with the left-over-right-hand 
advantage in the gestural facilitation of metaphor explanation. Experiment 2 ruled out an 
alternative interpretation of Experiment 1 that the observed left-hand advantage was due to 
right-hand prohibition (e.g., causing distractions). These results supported the hemisphere-
specific feedback hypothesis. 
Keywords: Metaphor; gesture handedness; brain hemispheric lateralisation; right hemisphere; 
mouth asymmetry. 
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3.3 Introduction 
 Imagine two people talking face-to-face. Now imagine a person talking on the phone. 
One thing is common: whether seen by others or not, people often spontaneously produce 
hand gestures to accompany their speech. That is, speech and gesture often co-occur and co-
express the speakers’ message as a composite signal (Engle, 1998; Kelly, Ozyurek, & Maris, 
2010; Kendon, 2004). Speech and gesture are tightly linked behaviours at various levels of 
language structure such as phonetics, syntax, semantics and pragmatics (Iverson & Thelen, 
1999; Kita & Ozyürek, 2003; McNeill, 1992). This close relationship between language, 
cognition and gesture has drawn scholars’ attention in a wide range of research topics such as 
the embodied nature of language processing (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Hostetter & 
Alibali, 2008), the role of body in understanding and representing abstract thought (Cienki & 
Müller, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; Mittelberg & Waugh, 2009), and the gestural origin 
hypothesis of language evolution (Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2003). Gestures express 
information valuable for the listener, and thus play an important role in how people 
communicate (Hostetter, 2011). Furthermore, gestures not only reflect, but also influence the 
contents of speakers’ thoughts (de Ruiter, 1995; Kita, 2000; Rauscher et al., 1996). The 
current study investigated the mechanism through which representational gestures influence 
speakers’ thoughts and determine speech output. Representational gestures iconically depict 
shape, motion and action or deictically indicate locations and directions. Speakers can also 
use gestures to express abstract content metaphorically (e.g., moving a palm-up open hand 
away from the body can express the abstract action of “conveying a message”, depicted as an 
object on the palm moving away from the body) (McNeill, 1992). 
Various theoretical accounts propose that representational gestures facilitate specific 
cognitive processes in the gesturer’s mind: lexical retrieval (R. Krauss & Hadar, 2001; Pine et 
al., 2007; Rauscher et al., 1996), imagery maintenance (de Ruiter, 1995; Wesp et al., 2001), 
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conceptualisation for speaking (Alibali & Kita, 2010; Alibali, Kita, & Young, 2000; Hostetter 
et al., 2007; Kita, 2000; Melinger & Kita, 2007), and working memory (Goldin-Meadow et 
al., 2001). However, the mechanism for such facilitative effects remains to be explored.  In 
particular, no studies have investigated whether the right- and the left-hand gestures differ in 
the degree of impact they have on language processing. 
Hand choice for gesturing is linked to hemispheric dominance for certain cognitive 
processes, in particular language processing (but see Lausberg, Zaidel, Cruz, & Ptito, 2007). 
Kimura’s research (1973a) with healthy adults showed that stronger left lateralisation for 
language (measured with a right-ear advantage in a dichotomous listening task) leads to more 
frequent right-handed gestures during speaking compared to manual activities during a silent 
task. Furthermore, infants who spontaneously choose the right hand for gesturing are more 
advanced in language development. For example, Locke, Bekken, McMinnLarson, and Wein 
(1995) showed an increase of right-hand shaking in babbling infants as compared to non-
babbling infants. Also, 10-12 month-old infants who are more strongly right-handed when 
pointing have a larger receptive vocabulary (Mumford & Kita, under review).  
 Hand choice for gesturing also reflects the right-hemisphere contribution for language 
production. Patients with complete callosal disconnection (“split-brain patients”) produced 
“batons” (repetitive up and down hand movements, equivalent to beats in McNeill, 1992) 
more with the left hand. Other studies on split-brain patients provided converging results 
(Lausberg, Davis, & Rothenaüser, 2000; McNeill, 1992; McNeill & Pedelty, 1995). As 
batons are thought to be linked to speech prosody (Krahmer & Swerts, 2007), this finding 
indicates that the right hemisphere dominance in prosody production (Lindell, 2006) led to 
the left-hand preference for this type of gestures.   
 Metaphorical language processing is another good domain for assessing the link 
between hand choice for gesturing and hemispheric dominance for cognitive processing. 
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Firstly, according to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), metaphor 
is a way of talking about an abstract concept such as “love” in terms of a more concrete, yet 
semantically distant, concept such as “journey”. Hence, understanding the metaphorical 
phrase “their relationship was a roller-coaster ride” would involve metaphorical mapping 
from the source (JOURNEY) to the target (LOVE) domain of the metaphor. These mappings 
are key parts of metaphor interpretation processes. For example, Nayak and Gibbs (1990) 
presented participants with short scenarios about emotions (e.g., anger), which were 
structured to include phrases priming a specific conceptual metaphor. An emotional scenario 
about anger would include phrases such as “Mary was tense […] made her fume […] the 
pressure was building up” to prime the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A FLUID IN A 
HEATED CONTAINER. After reading the texts participants had to select one out of two 
idioms to appropriately describe the meaning of the scenario. The related idiom was 
motivated by the primed conceptual metaphor (e.g., “blew her top”), and the unrelated one 
had the same meaning but different underlying conceptual metaphor (e.g., “bit her head off”; 
ANGRY BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR). Participants selected the related idiom, 
suggesting that congruent metaphorical mappings can prime each other. 
Secondly, according to the Right-Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor, the right-
hemisphere is particularly involved for metaphorical processing (Anaki et al., 1998; Bottini et 
al., 1994; Brownell et al., 1990; Mashal et al., 2005; Mashal et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2007; 
Winner & Gardner, 1977), though some studies failed to provide evidence for such a claim 
(Rapp et al., 2004, 2007) (see Schmidt, Kranjec, Cardillo, & Chatterjee, 2010 for a review on 
the neural correlates of metaphor). One plausible explanation for the Right-Hemisphere 
Hypothesis for Metaphor is that metaphorical mappings can be seen as distant semantic 
relations between the source and target domains, and the right hemisphere is better tuned to 
process distant semantic links (Jung-Beeman, 2005).  
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 Hand choice for gesturing is linked to hemispheric dominance for metaphor 
processing.  More specifically metaphorical processing in the right hemisphere triggers left-
hand gesturing. Kita, de Condappa, et al. (2007) investigated whether spontaneous hand 
preference is influenced by metaphorical contents of speech. Participants explained 
metaphorical mappings in phrases such as “to spill the beans”, and in the control conditions, 
they explained the meaning of concrete and abstract phrases (e.g., “to spill the marbles”, “to 
reveal something confidential”). They produced gestures spontaneously (the instruction did 
not mention gesture) during explanations and the proportion of left-hand gestures out of all 
unimanual gestures was higher in the metaphor condition than the concrete and the abstract 
condition. Similarly, a study on split-brain patients also showed a descriptive6 trend that the 
left hand is preferred for gestures depicting abstract concepts (“ideographs”) (Lausberg et al., 
2007). These results suggest that language processes in the contra-lateral hemisphere 
triggered gestures with a particular hand. However, it is not clear whether the reverse causal 
chain is at work, that is, whether left-hand gestures may trigger processing in the contra- 
lateral hemisphere. 
The present study tested whether left-hand gesturing enhances metaphorical 
explanations compared to right-hand gesturing and not gesturing at all. If the hypothesis were 
confirmed, gesture handedness would be an important part of the underlying mechanism for 
gestures’ self-oriented functions. More specifically, Experiment 1 tested whether the hand 
used for gesturing differentially affected participants’ performance in a metaphorical 
explanation task. Participants were asked to explain the metaphorical mapping underlying 
English phrases, such as “to spill the beans” (meaning “to reveal a secret”): “beans” represent 
secrets and “spilling” represents dispersion of information. Tasks using these phrases have 
been previously shown to engage metaphorical thinking, and thus are likely to involve the 																																																								
6 Lausberg et al. (2007) reported only descriptive statistics for the hand choice for each of the gesture 
types. 
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right hemisphere (Argyriou, Byfield, & Kita, 2015; Kita, de Condappa, et al., 2007). The 
explanations were rated for the level of metaphoricity, namely, how well participants 
described metaphorical mappings.  
We manipulated gesture production by encouraging subjects to gesture with their left 
or right hand only or instructing them not to gesture at all. If gestures facilitate cognitive 
processes in the contra-lateral hemisphere, then metaphorical explanations should be of 
higher quality and metaphorical mappings should be explained more elaborately when 
participants gestured with their left hand compared to the other two conditions.  
In order to better link the hand-specificity of the facilitative gesturing effect to the 
processing in the contra-lateral hemisphere, we measured behavioural indicators for the 
degree of lateralisation of speech production during explanation tasks from each participant. 
Behavioural tasks provide valid measurements of cerebral language dominance. Hunter and 
Brysbaert (2008) showed that language dominance as measured by a visual hemifield 
advantage in a word naming task positively correlated with cerebral dominance determined in 
an fMRI silent word generation task. In the current study, we collected mouth asymmetry 
measurements during speech production in a separate explanation task. Mouth asymmetry is 
sensitive to relative hemispheric involvement during different cognitive tasks. For example, 
R. Graves and Landis (1985, 1990) showed that the right side of the mouth opened wider than 
the left during propositional speech (e.g., spontaneous speech, word list generation), 
reflecting the left hemisphere cerebral involvement for speech production. In contrast, during 
automatic speech (e.g., singing, counting) or emotional expressions (e.g., spontaneous smiles) 
(Wyler et al., 1987), which are both thought to particularly involve the right-hemisphere (see 
for a review Lindell, 2006), the left side of the mouth opened wider than the right. In 
addition, Hausmann et al. (1998) showed a right-sided mouth asymmetry during discrete 
speech production tasks (i.e., utter words only once) for male and female speakers, but a 
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reduced right-sided asymmetry for females only during serial speech production tasks (i.e., 
utter the same words repeatedly). Thus, this suggests that mouth asymmetry is sensitive 
enough to reflect the existence of separate, bilateral neural systems for speech production, 
which are gender dependent. Furthermore, a study from our group (Argyriou et al., 2015) 
showed that the right-sided mouth openings reduced during explanation of metaphorical 
phrases compared to non-metaphorical phrases (same tasks as in the present study), and this 
reduction was larger for content words than for function words. This suggested that mouth 
opening asymmetry is sensitive to hemispheric differences in semantic processing involved in 
metaphorical explanation. Finally, stronger lateralisation of cognitive functions measured in 
behavioural tasks is associated with better performance in these tasks. Hirnstein, Hugdahl, 
and Hausmann (2014) showed that accuracy in performance in a dichotic listening task (e.g., 
number of correctly reported syllables) increased as the degree of the (left/right) ear 
advantage increased. In light of these findings, if the left-hand gesturing facilitates 
metaphorical processing in the right hemisphere, this facilitation effect should be stronger for 
those who show a stronger right-hemisphere involvement in speech production during 
explanation tasks. This is because when the right-hemisphere is strongly involved in speech 
production, it is easier for left-hand gestures to influence speech production processes.  
Finally, even if we obtained the predicted result that the left-hand free condition leads 
to better metaphor explanations in Experiment 1, there is a possible alternative explanation 
that prohibition of the right-hand movement, rather than left-hand gesturing, is responsible 
for the effect. We conducted Experiment 2 to rule out this possibility. 
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3.4 Experiment 1  
3.4.1 Method 
Participants  
31 right-handed, male, native English speakers and monolinguals (via self-report), at 
least until the age of 5 years (age: M = 20.35 and SD = 2.86), participated in the experiment 
for course credit or £4. Handedness was assessed with a 12-items questionnaire based on the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Two bimanual items (from Oldfield’s 
long list) were added to his recommended 10-items questionnaire to equate the number of 
unimanual and bimanual items (see Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 3 for the questionnaire). 
Each “left” answer was scored with 0, each “either” answer with 0.5 and each right answer 
with “1”. A total score of 8.5 and above determined right-handedness (M = 10.9 and SD = 
1.08). None of the participants had any previous serious injury to the face or jaw. All of them 
were recruited at the University of Birmingham. The rationale for the size and gender of our 
sample follows below.  
The current thesis did not employ a priori power analysis to calculate sample size. 
We rather followed the paradigm of similar studies in the literature, which found significant 
results and tested a comparable amount of participants (e.g., Kita, de Condappa et al., 2007 
tested 20 subjects; Rauscher et al., 1996 tested 40 subjects, therefore we tested 31 subjects 
which is the mid-point). When our design had more treatments or more groups we doubled 
the amount of people tested (e.g., in Chapter 4 we tested 60 subjects). However, results from 
G*Power 3.1 show that for one group being measured across three observations, alpha of .05, 
a power of .80, and a large treatment effect of .05, we would need to collect data from 33 
participants. Therefore, our decision was justified.  
Furthermore, we focused on male speakers because they exhibit bilateral 
representation of language processing less frequently than women (J. McGlone, 1980). In 
addition, in females cerebral asymmetries and lateralisation of cognitive functions, such as 
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language processing, can be modulated by hormones, hence are less stable than in men 
(Hausmann & Güntürkün, 2000). In a small subset of the population, language may be 
predominantly processed in the right hemisphere. Some left-handers might have right-
hemisphere language dominance (Hunter & Brysbaert, 2008), and even strong right-handers 
might have right-hemisphere language dominance, though the percentage of such cases 
should be very small (about 5%) (Knecht et al., 2000). However, future experimental studies, 
including Chapters 4 and 5 to follow in this thesis, should aim to extend findings to female 
speakers as well. 
 
Stimuli 
For the main metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation task, we used 18 English 
phrases with metaphorical meaning. We added 6 phrases to the list of metaphorical stimuli 
used in Kita, de Condappa, et al. (2007). We created 3 (plus one reserve item in case one 
phrase was unknown) additional metaphorical and concrete phrases for the mouth asymmetry 
task (see Table 3.1).  
  
Table 3.1 The stimuli for the metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation task, and the mouth 
asymmetry task. The items in parentheses are reserve items used when the participants did 
not know the main items. 
Metaphorical phrases for main explanation task for gesture elicitation 
To burst someone’s bubble 
To cross that bridge later 
To dodge the bullet 
To fall back down to earth with a bump 
To sit on the fence 
To skate on thin ice 
To spill the beans 
To stand your ground 
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To get back in the saddle 
To get hot under the collar 
To hold all the cards 
To leave a bad taste in the mouth 
To look on the bright side 
To take the bull by the horns 
To tie up loose ends 
To turn a corner 
To turn the tables 
Water under the bridge 
Metaphorical phrases for the mouth asymmetry task 
To pour oil onto the fire 
To set your sights higher 
To spin a yarn 
(To hit the nail on the head) 
Concrete phrases for the mouth asymmetry task 
To pour oil into the pan 
To put a shelf higher 
To spin a golf ball 
(To hit someone on the head) 
 
Procedure  
Participants were tested individually. They were seated on a chair, which was located 
between two tables of the same height (71 cm tall). The experimenter was facing the 
participant, and the video camera (Sanyo HD camera) was placed next to the experimenter. 
Stimuli were presented one by one on a white sheet of paper (font size 72, Times New 
Roman), which was held by the experimenter until the participant started the description. 
Participants were instructed to explain the meaning of the 18 metaphorical phrases 
(see Table 3.1) as if they were explaining it to a non-native English speaker (the task was the 
same as in the metaphorical condition in Kita, de Condappa et al., 2007). To encourage 
metaphorical thinking, participants were instructed to include an explanation as to how the 
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literal meaning can be mapped on to the metaphorical meaning of the phrase (e.g., in the 
phrase “to spill the beans”, describe that the “beans” refer to secrets, and the action of 
“spilling” refers to revealing them to everybody). During the description, participants were 
told to place one of their hands on the indicated marks (white sticky dots) on the surface of 
the table(s), and to keep it still for the whole procedure. For the total prohibition condition, 
participants were asked to place both their hands on the tables (see Figure 3.1). Differently 
from Kita, de Condappa et al. (2007) where participant were free to gesture or not, in the 
current study for the gesturing conditions, participants received gesture encouragement 
instructions (i.e., the experimenter asked them “please use your free hand to gesture while 
speaking”). Gesture encouragement has been used in a number of recent studies (Broaders, 
Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2007; Chu & Kita, 2011; Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 
2012), and allowed us to test the link between gestures and speech focusing on the direction 
“from-gesture-to-speech”. Participants were debriefed about the purpose of the hands 
immobilisation after the experiment and the permission to use the data was allowed. Order of 
stimuli (forward - reverse), and order of hand(s) prohibition were counterbalanced across 
participants in a within-subjects blocked design.  
 
	
Figure 3.1 Experimental conditions in Experiment 1: Right Hand Free (left panel), Left Hand 
Free (middle panel), No gesturing (right panel).  
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The mouth asymmetry task followed the metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation 
task. In the mouth asymmetry task, participants were instructed to explain the 3 metaphorical 
phrases (see Table 1) (e.g., explain the mapping of the literal meaning to the metaphorical 
meaning), just as in the main metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation task. They also 
explained the meaning of 3 concrete phrases (see Table 1) and were instructed to be as 
elaborate as possible. During the explanations both hands were prohibited. Hand prohibition 
was necessary in order to collect a pure measurement of participants’ hemispheric 
involvement for metaphorical processing without any influence from hand movement. The 
order of the tasks (concrete – metaphorical) was counterbalanced across participants. Video-
recording zoomed-in on the face area. 
 
Coding  
The verbal responses from the main task were transcribed and coded for level of 
metaphoricity. The level of metaphoricity was measured based on whether the explanations 
included an explicit link between the literal and metaphorical meanings, and whether 
participants explicitly referred to the mapping and correspondences between the source and 
target domains of the conceptual metaphor underlying each phrase (following the Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; Nayak & Gibbs, 1990). The stimulus phrases 
were idiomatic, which may not always activate the right-hemisphere. For example, Papagno, 
Oliveri, and Romero (2002) used repetitive transcranial stimulation while participants 
matched the meaning of an idiom to a picture. They found no evidence that right, temporal 
lobe stimulation affected response times and accuracy. However, the task in the current study 
required participants to actively analyse the literal and metaphorical meaning, and establish a 
metaphorical mapping between distant semantic relations. Such a process is considered 
crucial for the right-hemispheric involvement for metaphorical processing (Jung-Beeman, 
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2005). More specifically, a ‘‘0’’ rating indicated that the explanation did not contain words or 
phrases referring to the source domain of the relevant conceptual metaphor, therefore there 
was no metaphorical cross-domain mapping; a rating of ‘‘1’’ indicated that the explanation 
contained words or phrases that might be construed as references to the source domain, but 
the references were ambiguous, and the mapping between the two domains implicit; a rating 
of ‘‘2’’ indicated that the explanation contained words or phrases that clearly referred to the 
source and target domains, and the mapping was explicit. Text S2 in Appendix Chapter 3 
presents examples and the coding manual in detail.  
Video recordings from the two gesturing conditions in the main task were analysed 
using ELAN software (developed by the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguists, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands). They were coded on a trial-by-trial basis to locate the existence of at least 
one gesture type, using the coding scheme by Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, and Kita (2014). That is 
representational gestures (e.g., hand movements depicting shape, motion and action or 
deictically indicate location), palm-revealing gestures (e.g., palm rotates to show uncertainty 
or that speaker has nothing to say or), conduit gestures (e.g., hand moves towards listener as 
if speaker is conveying a clear message), and other (e.g., small biphasic movements/ beats). 
See the supplementary material in Chu et al. (2014) for more details. The rationale for this 
‘rough’ coding (instead, for example, of coding all gestures for their type) is twofold. Firstly, 
full coding would be useful if gesture rate was part of the research hypothesis and analysis, 
which is not the case in the current study. Secondly, participants in the current study were 
encouraged to gesture, hence the amount of gestures produced would not reflect the 
spontaneous gesture rate usually calculated in gesture studies. Therefore, we believe that the 
current gesture coding (i.e., presence of at least one gesture type per trial) is sufficient to 
ensure that participants produced meaningful representational gestures and validate the 
success of the gesture encouragement instruction.  
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Video recordings from the mouth asymmetry task were analysed on a frame-by-frame 
basis using ELAN software to identify the maximum mouth openings in each phrase 
explanation. One maximum opening was defined as the widest point the mouth opens, from 
the lips opening to the lips resting or the lips meeting completely. We coded the laterality at 
each maximum mouth opening. The options for laterality classification were right-side 
dominant (the right side of the mouth opens wider than the left), left-side dominant (the left 
side of the mouth opens wider than the right) or sides equally open (see Figure 3.2 for 
examples). Maximum openings for filled-pauses were coded, but not the ones for non-
speaking purposes (e.g., smile) or the ones whilst participants were repeating the phrase to be 
explained. We coded the first 30 mouth openings per condition (metaphorical – concrete), per 
participant (the first ten mouth openings from each explanation) (following Graves, 
Goodglass & Landis, 1982 who also coded the first ten successive lip openings with word 
production). In total, we coded 930 mouth openings in the metaphorical task and 915 in the 
concrete task (few participants gave short explanations in the concrete task and thus we could 
only obtain less than 30 mouth openings per condition). Text S3 in Appendix Chapter 3 
presents the coding manual in detail. 
 
	
Figure 3.2 Examples of maximum mouth opening asymmetry in Experiment 1. Right-sided 
asymmetry (left panel), Left-sided asymmetry (middle panel), Both sides equally open (right 
panel) (“Left-sided” and “right-sided” refer to participants’ left and right).  
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Inter-coder reliability for coding 
An additional coder, “blind” to the hypothesis under test and conditions, 
independently coded 32% of the total verbal responses in terms of metaphoricity. All answers 
from 10 randomly selected participants were coded (in total 180 trials were double coded). 
Coding of metaphoricity matched between the two coders 76% of the time (Cohen’s 
weighted kappa κw = .68, p < .001, kappa maximum κmax = .91).  
An additional coder, “blind” to the hypothesis under test and conditions, 
independently coded 24% of the video recordings from the two gesturing conditions in terms 
of the existence (or absence) of at least one gesture type. All answers from 7 randomly 
selected participants were coded (in total 84 trials were double coded). Coding matched 
between the two coders 98% of the time for the coding of trials with at least one 
representational gesture; 85% of the time for palm-revealing gesture; 96% of the time for 
conduit gesture; 81% of the time for other gesture. Note that measurement of agreement 
(kappa statistics) was not calculated because the random selection of cases for second coding 
led to a constant value (= either absence or existence of particular gesture type for all 84 
trials) for a variable upon which kappa is calculated. 
An additional coder independently coded 22% of the data in terms of right, left or 
equal dominance of mouth openings. All mouth openings from 7 randomly selected 
participants were coded (in total 414 maximum mouth openings were double coded). Coding 
of mouth opening dominance matched between the two coders 91% of the time (Cohen’s 
kappa κ = .854, p < .001).  
Note, that partial double coding of gesture and speech is used in other studies (e.g., in 
Kita, de Condappa, et al. 2007, 8.3% of all responses was double coded). In addition, we 
double coded all verbal responses and mouth openings from random participants instead of 
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coding some random verbal responses and mouth openings from all participants. For the 
verbal responses, the latter option would mean that the second coder reads no more than 5 
examples of the same phrase explanation, while with our strategy the second coder read and 
coded 10 examples of the same phrase explanation. This way the second coder had more 
chances to see the variability of responses and made good use of the whole range of the scale 
more than once or twice. Similarly, for the mouth openings double coding all mouth openings 
from a specific amount of participants ensured an adequate probability of all types of 
openings (left, right, equal) to be double coded (instead of selecting more equals for 
example). Finally, for all analyses, the first coder’s original coding was used, because the 
partial coding does not allow calculation of means, however the substantial agreement (kappa 
above .61) between the coders proves the validity of the first coding.  
 
3.4.2 Design and measurements 
The dependent variable from the main metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation 
task was the level of metaphoricity in participants’ explanations. The independent variable 
(within-subjects manipulation) “hand free” had three levels (left, right, no hand).  
Next, we calculated a left-over-right-hand gesturing advantage index from the main 
metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation task: the average level of metaphoricity when 
gesturing with the left hand minus the average level of metaphoricity when gesturing with the 
right hand. Thus, a high and positive mean score indicated that participants were more 
metaphoric when gesturing with their left hand compared to the right (= left-over-right-hand 
gesturing advantage on metaphoricity). We argue that the difference score is a better 
measurement to test our hypothesis compared to the metaphoricity scores in the single 
gesturing conditions. This is because single condition scores may be influenced by many 
other factors (e.g., general intelligence of participants, their linguistic knowledge or how 
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focused they were at the time of the experiment), which all add noise to the analysis of 
interest, while the difference score is not influenced by these factors. In addition, the 
differences are not the same for all participants (e.g., some participants were better in the left 
hand free condition, some in the right hand free), hence the difference score makes sense (for 
a review on difference scores see Edwards, 2001).  
Finally, we measured the mouth asymmetry during speaking in a task additional to the 
main metaphorical explanation gesture elicitation task, in which participants explained 
concrete and metaphorical phrases. We computed a left-sided dominance in mouth openings 
using the following formula: (L-R)/(L+R+E), where L, R and E are the numbers of left-side-
dominant, right-side dominant, and equal mouth openings, respectively (Argyriou et al., 
2015; Holowka & Petitto, 2002). Thus, a positive mean score indicated more instances of 
left-side dominant mouth openings (right-hemispheric involvement) and a negative mean 
score indicated more instances of right-side dominant mouth openings (left-hemispheric 
involvement).  
 
3.4.3 Note for mixed effect models 
We used linear mixed effects models (LME) with subject and item as random factors, 
and the packages lme4 and multcomp in the R Project for Statistical Computing environment, 
version 3.1.1 (Bates & Sarkar, 2012; Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2012; R Development Core 
Team, 2011). All mixed effects regressions were carried out with “lmer()” function 
specifying that Maximum Likelihood (rather than Restricted Maximum Likelihood) is used 
(needed to get a more valid likelihood ratio test of the full against the null model). Random 
effects structure was kept maximal as long as model convergence was reached (for a 
discussion about random effects structure and simplification see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & 
Tily, 2013). We obtained p-values for fixed effects following the likelihood ratio test 
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approach for model comparison and we always reported the maximal model following a 
design-driven approach for confirmatory analyses. Tests of further contrasts of our interests 
were carried out based on a priori predictions using the generalised linear hypothesis test with 
correction for multiple comparisons of means, (Tukey Contrasts) using the “glht()” function. 
 
3.4.4 Results 
Out of the 558 trials in the main task, 4% were excluded as failed trials; that is when 
the participants did not follow the instruction (e.g., no gesture production when encouraged to 
gesture with the right or left hand) or when they did not know the phrases.  
Out of the 354 gesturing trials, 99% included at least one representational gesture; 
23% included at least one palm-revealing gesture; 7% included at least one conduit gesture; 
18% included at least one “other” gesture – comprising mainly beat and metacognitive 
gestures. Thus, the instruction to produce gestures was effective and gestures were 
predominantly representational gestures.  
On average, participants produced explanations with higher levels of metaphoricity 
(measured on a 3-points scale from 0-2) in the following order: when gesturing with the left 
hand (M = 1.44, SEM = .06), the right hand (M = 1.30, SEM = .06) and not gesturing at all (M 
= 1.16, SEM = .06) (see Figure 3.3).   
We fit LME7 model to the measurement of the level of the metaphoricity (see Figure 
3.3 for the means). The model included one fixed effect factor: hand free (left, right, no hand; 
“no hand” was the reference category). We selected “no hand” as the reference category so 
that the model produces the comparisons between the experimental conditions and the 
																																																								7	We ran the analysis treating the dependent variable as ordinal and results remained the same. See 
Text S4 in Appendix Chapter 3 for the results in detail.   
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baseline of no movement. We included random intercepts and slopes by subjects and items 
(phrases) for the fixed effect factor.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 3.2. We compared the model with the null 
model with no fixed effect factors (same random effect structure). Adding the effect of hand 
free for gesturing (left, right, none) improved the model fit: χ2 (2) = 16.36, p < .001 (see 
Figure 3.3). Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) (see Table 
3.3) revealed that gestures with the left hand increased the level of metaphoricity in 
metaphorical explanations as compared to the right hand and not gesturing at all.  
 
Table 3.2 Parameters estimates for the model with the effect of hand free on levels of 
metaphoricity. “No hand” condition was the reference category. 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept)  1.159 .078 14.700 
Left Hand .277 .061 4.509 
Right Hand .133 .062 2.126 
 
Table 3.3 Tukey contrasts for the model with the effect of Hand Free on levels of 
metaphoricity. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
No – Left Hand  -.277 .061 -4.509 < .001 
Right – Left Hand -.143 .061 -2.345 .049 
No – Right Hand -.133 .062 -2.126 .084 
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Figure 3.3 Mean levels of metaphoricity (measured on a 3-points scale from 0-2) in speech in 
the three gesturing conditions (Experiment 1). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the 
means.  
 
One may argue that the observed effects of hand gestures may relate to the verbosity 
of speakers (i.e., how many words they produced to explain the phrases; length of 
explanation). To our knowledge, there is no theory suggesting that ‘the more you speak the 
more metaphorical explanations you may produce’, and such an effect is not predicted by our 
hypothesis. However, we ran the analysis of the gesturing effect on length of explanations 
(i.e., word count) and we found no effect (see Text S5 in Appendix Chapter 3 for details). 
Next, we investigated how mouth asymmetry during speaking (as described in section 
3.3.2 “Design and measurements”) related to the left-over-right-hand gesturing advantage. 
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Though the left-side dominance in mouth opening was stronger for metaphorical phrases than 
concrete phrases (see Text S6 in Appendix Chapter 3), the degrees of the left-side dominance 
in the two types of phrases were highly correlated (r (29) = .829, p < .001, 95% CI [.672, 
.914]) indicating the overall right-side dominance. Thus, we used the average of the left-side 
dominance scores in the two types of phrases as a general indicator of right-hemispheric 
involvement in speech production (due to the high correlation, using the left-side dominance 
score from the metaphorical or the concrete phrases only yielded the same results). Crucially, 
the averaged left-side dominance in mouth openings for speech production (range = -.95 to 
.67) positively correlated with the left-over-right-hand gesturing advantage in metaphoricity 
(range = -.30 to .83) (r (29) = .365, p = .043, 95% CI [.013, .637]) (see Figure 3.4). Thus, the 
participants who had a stronger right-hemispheric involvement for speech production tended 
to have a larger left-hand gesturing advantage in metaphoricity.  
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Figure 3.4 Scatterplot for the positive correlation between the averaged index of left-sided 
mouth asymmetry during speech and the left-hand gesturing advantage in metaphorical 
explanation (Experiment 1). The grey area represents 95% confidence intervals.  
 
3.4.5 Discussion  
We examined whether gesturing with a particular hand affected cognitive processing 
involving the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand. We found that gesturing with 
the left hand increased the level of metaphoricity in explanations compared to gesturing with 
the right hand or not gesturing at all. We also found that this left-over-right hand advantage 
on metaphorical explanations was higher for those people who also had a stronger right-
hemisphere involvement during speech production as measured through the mouth 
asymmetry technique. These findings indicate that representing meaning through left-hand 
gestures enhances the mapping from concrete, conceptual domains on to more abstract ones, 
that is, the processing of distant semantic links that strongly involves the right hemisphere 
(Jung-Beeman, 2005).  
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While our results supported our hypothesis, one open question is whether the 
observed effects were due to gesturing with one hand or inhibiting the impact of the other 
hand. That is, did participants perform well in the left-hand free condition because they 
produced gestures with the left hand or because their right hand was immobilised? There are 
two reasons for which the current results are likely to be due to gesturing advantage, rather 
than prohibition disadvantage. Firstly, the participants were all right handed; thus, the right-
hand prohibition (left-hand gesturing) should have led to greater distraction or discomfort 
than left-hand prohibition. Secondly, the correlation with the mouth asymmetry is difficult to 
explain based on the distraction or discomfort due to prohibition of movement with the 
dominant hand. However, to further support our hypothesis, we conducted a control study 
(Experiment 2) to show that prohibition of right hand movements is not sufficient to explain 
the results of Experiment 1.  
 
3.5 Experiment 2 
We examined (a) whether spontaneous left-hand gestures increased levels of 
metaphoricity compared to spontaneous absence of left-hand gestures, and (b) whether 
absence of gestures with a particular hand by choice vs. by instruction had comparable effects 
on the level of metaphoricity in speech. A different group of participants completed the same 
metaphorical explanation task as in Experiment 1. They were asked not to move one hand 
(right or left), but they were not instructed to produce gestures with the free hand. They 
nevertheless spontaneously produced gestures with their free hand in some trials but not in 
others. We predicted levels of metaphoricity would be higher when participants produced 
left-hand gestures by choice than when they did not produce left-hand gestures by choice. 
Furthermore, as participants sometimes spontaneously chose not to produce a gesture when a 
given hand was free, we investigated the difference between not gesturing by choice vs. by 
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instruction. We predicted that levels of metaphoricity would not differ between situations in 
which participants did not produce gestures by choice vs. by instruction. If the predicted 
results were obtained, then we could conclude that left-hand gesturing (rather than right-hand 
prohibition) was responsible for the increase in metaphoricity. 
 
3.5.1 Method 
Participants 
32 right-handed, male (age: M = 22.35 and SD = 4.82), native English speakers and 
monolinguals at least until the age of 5 years (via self-report), participated in the experiment 
for course credit. Handedness was assessed as in Experiment 1 (M = 11.12 and SD = 1.16) 
(see Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 3 for the questionnaire). All of them were recruited and 
tested at the University of Bristol8. 
 
Stimuli 
We used 12 English phrases with metaphorical meaning similar to the list of stimuli 
used in Experiment 1 (see Table 3.4). The phrases were identical to the ones used in Kita, de 
Condappa, et al. (2007) for the metaphorical condition.  
 
 
																																																								
8 We would like to thank Prof Christine Mohr for agreeing to let us use video data collected by her 
and Prof Sotaro Kita for a project in the University of Bristol. This was a different project from the 
current study, which compared gesture rates with the left and right hand in three conditions (i.e., 
abstract, concrete, metaphorical explanation). We coded speech data (while the Bristol project did 
not) and analysed them for different hypothesis testing, which tests the effect of gestures to language 
(and not the other way around).  
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Table 3.4 The stimuli for the gesture elicitation task. 
Metaphorical phrases for explanation task for gesture elicitation 
To dodge the bullet 
To fall back down to earth with a bump 
To get back in the saddle 
To lead someone up to the garden path 
To set your sights higher 
To sit on the fence 
To spill the beans 
To spin a yarn 
To swim against the tide 
To tie up loose ends 
To turn a corner 
To turn the tables 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was essentially the same as in Experiment 1 with few alterations. 
There was no total hand prohibition condition. Participants had their left or right hand free, 
but the instruction did not mention gesture; that is, they were not explicitly encouraged to 
gesture (see Figure 3.5). When they produced gestures with their free hand, these were 
spontaneous gestures. The metaphorical explanation task was exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1. The order of the stimuli and the order of which hand was free first were 
counterbalanced across participants in a within-subjects blocked design. There were two 
practice trials preceding the main trials. 
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Figure 3.5 Experimental conditions in Experiment 2: Right Hand Free (left panel), Left Hand 
Free (right panel).  
 
Coding 
The verbal responses from the task were transcribed and coded for level of 
metaphoricity exactly as in Experiment 1. 
Video recordings from the two gesturing conditions were analysed using ELAN 
software (developed by the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguists, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands). Each trial was classified into two types: spontaneous gesture present vs. absent. 
For the purposes of the current study, we did not include self-adaptors and beat gestures, 
because they do not represent semantic information related to speech (Lavergne & Kimura, 
1987). That is, trials including at least one representational or conduit or palm-revealing 
gesture were coded as “spontaneous gesture present”. 
 
Inter-coder reliability for coding 
An additional coder independently coded 32% of the total verbal responses for 
metaphoricity. All answers from 10 randomly selected participants were coded (in total 120 
trials were double coded). Coding of metaphoricity matched between the two coders 75% of 
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the time (Cohen’s weighted kappa κw = .77, p < .001, kappa maximum κmax = .82). For all 
analyses, the first coder’s original coding was used. We made the same decisions regarding 
inter-coding as in Experiment 1 (see Section 3.4.1).  
 
3.5.2 Design 
The dependent variable was the level of metaphoricity in participants’ explanations. 
The experiment had a 2 x 2 factorial design with two independent variables (within-subjects 
manipulation): hand free (left, right) and presence/absence of spontaneous gesture.  
 
3.5.3 Results  
Out of the 384 trials in total in the task, 8% were excluded as failed trials; that is when 
the participants did not follow the instruction (e.g., they moved the prohibited hand) or when 
they did not know the phrases. 
On average, participants produced explanations with the levels of metaphoricity 
(measured on a 3-points scale from 0-2) descending in the following order: when their left 
hand was free and they spontaneously produced gestures (M = 1.22, SEM = .08), when their 
right hand was free and they spontaneously produced gestures (M = 1.08, SEM = .10), when 
their right hand was free and did not produce gestures with it (M = .91, SEM = .13) and when 
their left hand was free and did not produce gestures with it (M = .78, SEM = .10) (see Figure 
3.6).  
We ran linear mixed effect models following the same specifications as in Experiment 
1 (see section 3.3.3). We fit LME 9  model to the measurement of the level of the 
metaphoricity (see Figure 6 for the means). The model included two fixed effect factors and 																																																								9	We ran the analysis treating the dependent variable as ordinal and results remained the same. See 
Text S7 in Appendix Chapter 3 for the results in detail. 
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the interaction between the two. The one fixed factor was the hand free (left, right; dummy 
coded; “right” was the reference category). The model automatically selected “right” as the 
reference category against which the comparisons are made. The second fixed factor was 
presence/absence of spontaneous gestures (dummy coded; “absence” was the reference 
category). We included random intercepts and slopes by subjects and items (phrases) for the 
main effects and interaction of the fixed effect factors.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 3.5. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main effects only (same random effect structure). Adding the 
interaction did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 (1) = 1.506, p = .219 (see Figure 
3.6). Though the interaction was not significant we further explored the contrasts for two 
reasons. Firstly, we had a priori predictions for the comparison of the spontaneous 
presence/absence of gestures within each hand condition. Secondly, a large number of 
missing values in the data made the test of interaction less powerful. Only 12 out of 32 
participants had cells in all four conditions and fully contributed data for estimating the 
interaction effect. This was, mainly, because many participants did not have any trials 
without right-hand gestures (e.g., they spontaneously gestured in all right-hand free trials) 
and some participants did not have any trials with spontaneous left-hand gesture. In contrast, 
more participants could be included if we analysed the effect of presence/absence of 
spontaneous gestures for the left hand and for the right hand separately (e.g., 19 participants 
for the left hand and 18 participants for the right hand), which would lead to more reliable 
results. Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) revealed that the 
contrast between presence and absence of spontaneous gestures was significant for the left 
hand, but not for the right hand (the rest of the contrasts were not significant) (see Table 3.6). 
Thus, spontaneously gesturing with the left hand increased the level of metaphoricity in 
metaphorical explanation compared to not gesturing with it by choice.  
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Table 3.5 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction between 
Hand Free and Presence/Absence of Spontaneous Gesture on metaphoricity in Experiment 2. 
“Right hand” and “Gesture Absent” were the reference categories.  
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) .924 .165 5.519 
Left Hand -.136 .206 -.663 
Gesture Present .156 .161 .966 
Left Hand : Gesture Present  .280 .176 1.596 
	
 
Table 3.6 Tukey contrasts for the model with the main effects and interaction between Hand 
Free and Presence/Absence of Spontaneous Gesture on metaphoricity for the left hand and 
the right hand (Experiment 2).   
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Left Hand Gesture Present vs. 
Absent 
.417 .129 3.224 .006 
Right Hand Gesture Present vs. 
Absent 
.156 .161 .966 .753 
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Figure 3.6 Mean levels of metaphoricity in speech (measured on a 3-points scale from 0-2) in 
the four gesturing conditions (Experiment 2). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the 
means.  
 
 
Finally, we investigated whether metaphoricity differed when gestures were absent by 
choice vs. by instruction.  More specifically, did gesture prohibition by instruction have a 
negative impact on metaphoricity in the responses? To this end, we conducted two analyses, 
each focusing on a subset of data from Experiment 2. In the first analysis, we focused on the 
trials where the left-hand was immobilised (e.g., the right hand was free), and thus left-hand 
gestures were absent by instruction vs. the trials where the left hand was free but the 
participants chose not to gesture, and thus left-hand gestures were absent by choice. In other 
words, we collapsed data from the conditions “Right Hand Free and Gesture Present” and 
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“Right Hand Free and Gesture Absent” into the new condition “Left Hand Gesture Absent by 
Instruction” (a total of 175 trials from 32 participants). We compared it with the condition 
“Left Hand Gesture Absent by Choice” (a total of 49 trials from 21 participants). In the 
second analysis, by the same token, we collapsed data from the conditions “Left Hand Free – 
Gesture Present” and “Left Hand Free – Gesture Absent” into the new condition “Right Hand 
Gesture Absent by Instruction” (a total of 179 trials from 32 participants). We compared it 
with the condition “Right Hand Gesture Absent by Choice” (a total of 43 trials from 18 
participants). For both analyses, we fit LME models to the measurement level of the 
metaphoricity. The models included one fixed effect factor: the type of gesture absence (by 
choice, by instruction; dummy coded; “by instruction” was the reference category). We 
included random intercepts and slopes by subjects and items (phrases) for the main effect of 
the fixed factor.  
The mean metaphoricity is reported in Figure 3.7. Error bars in the by-choice 
conditions are larger than in the by-instruction due to smaller number of trials (SDs are 
comparable in by-choice and by-instruction conditions). The model estimates are reported in 
Table 3.7. We compared the models with the null models with no fixed effect (same random 
effect structure). Adding the effect of the type of gesture absence did not significantly 
improve the models fit: (a) for left hand gesture absence χ2 (1) = 2.420, p = .119, and (b) for 
right hand gesture absence χ2 (1) = .902, p = .342. Simultaneous tests for general linear 
hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) revealed non-significant contrasts (see Table 3.8). Therefore, 
we have no evidence that levels of metaphoricity in the metaphorical explanation task 
differed when participants did not gesture (regardless of the hand) by instruction or by 
choice.  
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Table 3.7 Parameters estimates for the model of the effect of type of gesture absence on 
metaphoricity for the left hand and the right hand. “Absent by Instruction” was the reference 
category (Experiment 2). 
 Estimate SE t-value 
Left Hand, Gesture Absent by Choice  -.219 .133 -1.637 
Right Hand, Gesture Absent by 
Choice  
-.173 .168 -1.027 
 
Table 3.8 Tukey contrasts for the model with the main effect of type of gesture absence on 
metaphoricity for the left hand and the right hand (Experiment 2). 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
Left Hand Gesture Absent by 
Choice vs. by Instruction 
-.219 .133 -1.637 .102 
Right Hand Gesture Absent 
by Choice vs. by Instruction 
-.173 .168 -1.027 .305 
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Figure 3.7 Mean levels of metaphoricity in speech (measured on a 3-points scale from 0-2) 
when left- and right-hand gestures were absent by choice or by instruction. Error bars 
represent 1 standard error of the means.  
 
3.5.4 Discussion 
In the left-hand free condition, metaphoricity was higher in trials with spontaneous 
left-hand gestures than in trials without left-hand gestures (by choice). This difference cannot 
be attributed to the right-hand gesture prohibition as the right-hand gesture was prohibited in 
both types of trials.  We also found that, for both right hand and left hand gesture production, 
metaphoricity was comparable when not gesturing by choice vs. by instruction. These two 
findings combined support that left-hand gestures (and not prohibition of right-hand 
movements) facilitated metaphorical explanation in Experiment 1.  
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3.6 General discussion 
The present study investigated a “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for 
gestures’ self-oriented functions. We hypothesised that gestures enhance cognitive processes 
in the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand. The first and most important finding 
(Experiment 1) is that when encouraged to gesture with one hand, while the other hand is 
prohibited from gesturing, speakers produced explanations with higher levels of 
metaphoricity when they gestured with the left hand, compared to the right hand or not 
gesturing at all. This indicates that left-hand gestures led to higher metaphoricity in the 
explanation task because they activated metaphorical processing in the contra-lateral right 
hemisphere. Experiment 2 ruled out the possible alternative explanation that the left-hand 
gesturing advantage is solely due to distraction or discomfort due to prohibition of right-hand 
gesturing. In Experiment 2, participants were asked not to move one of the hands during 
metaphorical explanation, just like in Experiment 1, but were not told anything about gestures 
in the instruction (they sometimes spontaneously produced gestures). Spontaneous hand 
gestures increased levels of metaphoricity compared to not gesturing with it by choice within 
the left-hand free condition. In addition, not gesturing by choice vs. by instruction did not 
influence the level of metaphoricity (in line with Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001 and Goldin-
Meadow & Wagner, 2005).  
 The second finding (from Experiment 1) strengthened our argument about gestures 
enhancing cognitive processes in the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand. The 
left-over-right-hand gesturing advantage on metaphorical explanation positively correlated 
with the left-side mouth dominance during speaking. When the right-hemisphere is more 
strongly involved in speech production, left-hand gestures can more readily influence 
processes in the right hemisphere, such as metaphorical mappings and explanation. Although 
a control, non-metaphoric task would provide more direct evidence about the specificity of 
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the left-hand gestures’ effect, we believe this correlational result cannot be explained 
alternatively and further supports that the left-over-right-hand gesturing advantage is 
metaphor specific. Taken together, producing left-hand representational gestures enhances 
the metaphorical mapping from concrete conceptual domains on to more abstract ones, which 
depends on processes in the right-hemisphere. 
 This study goes beyond the previous literature in an important way. Several studies 
manipulated gesturing in order to assess gestures’ effect on speaking (Alibali & Kita, 2010; 
Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Rauscher et al., 1996). However, they did not investigate 
differential effects of right- vs. left-hand gestures. Several studies showed that cognitive 
processes in a particular hemisphere trigger gestures in the contra-lateral hemisphere 
(Kimura, 1973a; Kita, de Condappa, et al., 2007; Lausberg et al., 2007; Mumford & Kita, 
under review). However, these studies did not investigate the reverse causality. Thus, the 
present study demonstrated, for the first time, that gestures by a particular hand facilitate 
cognitive processes in the contra-lateral hemisphere.  
 In addition, the present findings are in line with the Information Packaging 
Hypothesis for self-oriented functions of co-speech gestures (Alibali et al., 2000; Hostetter et 
al., 2007; Kita, 2000; Melinger & Kita, 2007), which states that gestures help conceptual 
planning of the speech. We showed that left hand gestures help the conceptual mapping from 
the source domain to the target domain of metaphor, thereby influencing the course of 
thinking (Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011) and the content of verbal output (Alibali & 
Kita, 2010; Rime et al., 1984).  
How exactly does this mechanism work? Metaphor requires speakers to map two 
semantically distant concepts: a concrete concept from the “source domain” on to a more 
abstract one in the “target domain” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). In the phrase, “to spill the 
beans”, participants had to represent the abstract concept of IDEAS (target) in terms of the 
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distant concrete concept of OBJECTS (source). The right hemisphere is crucially involved in 
processing of coarse-grained semantic information and thus more distant semantic 
relationships (Jung-Beeman, 2005). Producing gestures activates spatio-motoric information 
(Alibali & Kita, 2010; Alibali et al., 2011; de Ruiter, 1995; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Wing 
Chee So, Ching, Lim, Cheng, & Ip, 2014; Wesp et al., 2001), and producing left-hand 
gestures should do so in the right hemisphere. This helps generating a distant semantic 
relationship between target and source domains of the metaphor. This allows speakers to 
represent the metaphorical mapping in speech more easily. That is, gestures with a particular 
hand can modulate content of speech when the linguistic task particularly involves the 
hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand (= “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” 
for self-oriented functions of gestures). 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
The present study has, for the first time, provided evidence for a hemisphere-specific 
feedback hypothesis for gestures’ self-oriented functions. Left-hand gestures enhanced 
metaphorical explanations compared to right-hand gestures or not gesturing at all. This left-
hand gesturing advantage was stronger for people with strong right-hemispheric involvement 
for speaking as inferred from mouth opening asymmetry during speaking. In addition, 
spontaneous left-hand gestures enhanced metaphorical thinking in comparison to not 
gesturing with the left hand by choice. We propose that gestures enhance cognitive process in 
the contra-lateral hemisphere. Thus, gestures are not merely hand waving. They rather shape 
our thoughts and can modulate the content of what we say: speech-accompanying gestures 
help speakers understand abstract concepts in the form of metaphor by mapping concrete 
physical events on to abstract concepts. 
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However, the current study raised two new questions: (a) whether gestures enhance 
cognitive processing because of their motoric properties or their depictive nature, and (b) 
whether gesturing with the left hand might determine the use of metaphorical language even 
when not needed (e.g., within abstract context). We will explore both prospects in the next 
study.  
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4 Gesturing vs. Tapping: do all types of hand movement enhance 
metaphorical processing? 
 
4.1 Motivation and aims 
This study investigated whether gestures facilitate cognitive processes because of 
their motoric properties or their depictive nature (i.e., their ability to convey meaning). We 
compared the effect that meaningless tapping hand movements and meaningful gestures 
might have on spontaneous use of metaphorical language. In addition, we examined whether 
the proposed “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures’ self-oriented functions 
can be reflected in an explanation task other than metaphorical explanation, such that left 
hand gestures (as opposed to left hand taps) trigger metaphorical language use even when not 
needed.  
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4.2 Abstract 
Research suggests that speech-accompanying gestures with a particular hand may influence 
cognitive processes involving the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand, such that 
gesturing with the left compared to the right hand enhances metaphorical explanation, which 
involves the right hemisphere. Additionally, gestures are thought to facilitate cognitive 
processing because of their depictive nature rather than their motoric properties. In the 
current study, we tested the “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures’ self-
oriented functions in a task that does not particularly involve the right hemisphere. We also 
investigated whether gestures can trigger metaphorical language use because of their 
depictive or motoric nature. Right-handers explained abstract phrases (e.g., “to disclose 
something confidential”). Half of the participants were instructed to gesture with the left or 
right hand or to not gesture at all. The other half were instructed to tap their left or right hand 
or to not tap at all. We measured the likelihood for use of metaphorical language. We 
hypothesised that meaningful gestures compared to meaningless tapping movements, and in 
particular gestures with the left hand, would increase the use of metaphorical language while 
explaining the meaning of abstract phrases. We found no evidence that type of hand 
movement and hand choice for gesturing affects spontaneous use of metaphorical language.  
Keywords: Spontaneous metaphorical language use; abstract meaning; representational 
gestures; tapping. 
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4.3 Introduction 
Gestures have self-oriented functions facilitating cognitive processes (Alibali & Kita, 
2010; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Kita, 2000; R. Krauss & Hadar, 2001). In Chapter 3 we 
showed that left hand gestures modulated content of speech leading to enhanced metaphorical 
explanations compared to right hand gestures or not gesturing. We proposed that the 
mechanism underlying this effect relates to the mutual influence between hand choice for 
gesturing and hemispheric involvement during linguistic processing. In particular, gestures 
may enhance processing in the hemisphere contra-lateral to the hand used. However, it is 
unclear why gestures have this effect: is it the motoric (i.e., hand movement per se) or the 
depictive nature (i.e., gestural representation of meaning) of the hand movement that 
enhances cognitive processes? In addition, would left hand gestures have this effect when the 
right hemisphere is not necessarily involved, and metaphorical language processing is not 
encouraged? The current study investigated these questions by directly comparing 
meaningful gestures with meaningless hand movements in an abstract phrase explanation 
task: do gestures with the left hand, rather than tapping movements, increase the likelihood of 
metaphorical language use within abstract context? 
To our knowledge, there are few studies, which suggested that non-iconic movements 
might have an effect on working memory. Firstly, Ravizza (2003) investigated whether 
production of non-iconic movements facilitates the retrieval of words in two different tasks 
varying the level of activation of the words to be retrieved. Findings from two experiments on 
tip-of-the-tongue states during lexical retrieval suggested that participants who tapped their 
index fingers of both hands retrieved more words from their definition compared to those 
who kept still. However, in a letter fluency task (i.e., generate words starting with the letter 
Q), participants who tapped performed worse compared to the ones kept still. These findings 
suggested that non-iconic movements may facilitate lexical retrieval when items have already 
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been selected and are weakly activated, but not when strategic search in the lexicon is 
required. Secondly, W. C. So, Chen-Hui, and Wei-Shan (2012) compared the effect that 
perception of (a) meaningful, (b) meaningless beat gestures and (c) no movement might have 
on memory recall in adults and children. Participants listened to audio input of verbs while 
watching a video of an actor representing the verb with a meaningful iconic gesture or 
producing a beat gesture or did not gesture at all. They had to remember as many verbs as 
they could. Proportion of verbs recalled was at a comparable level for iconic and beat 
gestures, and higher than the absence of gesture. Thus, even meaningless, beat gestures had a 
mnemonic effect on adults (however this effect was not found in children). Findings indicated 
that beat gestures have meta-cognitive functions to emphasise speech or modulate auditory 
activity during speech processing.  
In contrast, Cook et al. (2012) did not provide evidence for a facilitative effect of 
meaningless hand movement on working memory. The authors directly compared the effect 
that (a) meaningful, (b) meaningless (e.g., rhythmic circular movement) and (c) no movement 
might have on working memory in a math explanation task. Participants explained a math 
problem in the three conditions and had to recall a string of six letters appeared in each trial. 
Findings suggested that meaningful gestures as opposed to meaningless movements or no 
movements at all lightened up working memory load and improved recall of the letters. Thus, 
gestures’ facilitative role on working memory is due to their depictive nature and their ability 
to convey meaning rather than their motoric properties.  
The studies reviewed above provide somewhat contradicting evidence.  The use of 
different types of meaningless hand movements (e.g., index tapping vs. beat gestures vs. 
rhythmic rotation of hand) might account for inconsistent results of whether non-iconic, 
meaningless hand movements might aid or hinder performance in memory tasks. More 
importantly, none of the studies has measured the differential effect that meaningless and 
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meaningful hand movements might have on modulating speech content. Therefore, it is still 
unknown whether gestural representation of meaning, rather than hand movement per se, may 
modulate content of speech. If so, gestures would not only facilitate cognitive processes, but 
also change the way we speak.  
Several studies investigated the effect of gestures on properties of verbal outcomes by 
comparing gesture allowance with gesture prohibition conditions. For example, Rime et al. 
(1984) showed that the level of vivid imagery in conversations, measured with content 
analysis, decreased when gestures were not allowed. In addition, Alibali and Kita (2010) 
found that gesture prohibition affected the nature of information children (6 years old) 
verbally expressed in a Piagetian conversation task (i.e., children judges and explain their 
judgment of whether two transformed objects contain the same quantities before and after 
transformation). More specifically, when prohibited from gesturing, children focused more 
on information that was not perceptually present compared to present. Furthermore, Bos and 
Cienki (2011) showed that inhibition of gesture also inhibited the use of metaphorical spatial 
language in a free speech production task. Finally, in Chapter 3 we showed that left hand 
gestures particularly facilitated the explanation of metaphorical mappings in a metaphor 
explanation task indicating that left-hand gestures have a special role for the representation 
and verbalisation of abstract concepts in the form of metaphor. This may be because gestures 
highlight visual-spatial information (Alibali & Kita, 2010; Alibali et al., 2011), and 
metaphors use visual-spatial source domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). Hence, gestures 
represent the concrete visual-spatial properties of the source domain of the metaphor and aid 
the mapping to the abstract target domain. However, all of these studies compared gesturing 
to not moving at all, rather than meaningless movement. In addition, the study in Chapter 3 
encouraged metaphorical thinking. Therefore, it is still unknown whether gestural 
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representation of meaning with a particular hand, rather than hand movement per se, can 
trigger spontaneous use of metaphorical language.  
The present study investigated whether speech-accompanying, meaningful gestures 
with a particular hand (the left hand), as opposed to meaningless movements, may activate 
metaphorical thinking and increase the likelihood of metaphorical language use within 
abstract context. Unlike previous studies we used an abstract explanation task (instead of 
memory tasks or metaphor specific task). This was critical to assess the modulating effect of 
gestures on content of speech, and to measure spontaneous use of metaphorical language 
when not needed10 or instructed. In addition, we investigated the role of hand choice for 
gesturing. This was critical to provide evidence for the generality of the proposed 
“hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures’ self-oriented functions across 
different tasks.  
To this end, we manipulated type of hand movement, hand choice, and assessed 
speakers’ performance in an abstract phrase explanation task. More specifically, participants 
were asked to explain the meaning of English phrases with abstract meaning (e.g., “to 
disclose something confidential”). Type of hand movement was manipulated between-
participants by asking half of the subjects to gesture and half of them to tap their whole arm. 
Hand choice was manipulated within-participants by asking subjects to gesture or tap with 
their left hand only or right only or to not move their hands at all. The explanations were 
coded for the presence or absence of at least one metaphor related expression. If meaningful 
gestures rather than meaningless tapping movements help participants to strategically search 
between semantic fields, represent visual-spatial information, and map concrete concepts on 
																																																								
10 There have been arguments (Giora, 1997; Keysar & Bly, 1999) suggesting that it would be useful to 
show “under which circumstances a literal meaning may have a metaphorical interpretation”. Even 
more, under which circumstances metaphorical language is used when not instructed as in Chapter 3. 	
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more abstract ones in the form of metaphor, then the gesturing group should be more likely to 
produce explanations including metaphor related expressions than the tapping group. In 
addition, if left hand gestures activate cognitive processes in the contra-lateral hemisphere, 
then gesturing, rather than tapping, with the left hand should increase the likelihood of 
metaphorical language use. In contrast, we should expect no differences between the hands 
used for the tapping movement. This is because the left hemisphere is specialised for the 
bilateral control of repetitive movements of the hands, such as tapping (Kimura & Archibald, 
1974; Wyke, 1971). Hence a tapping movement, regardless of the hand used, should not 
affect processes involving the right hemisphere.  
 
4.4 Method 
Participants  
60 (age: M = 21.03, SD = 2.84), native English speakers (46 females11) and 
monolinguals before the age of 5 years (via self-report) participated in the experiment for 
course credit or £4. Handedness was assessed with a 12-items questionnaire based on the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Two bimanual items (from Oldfield’s 
long list) were added to this recommended 10-items questionnaire to equate the number of 
unimanual and bimanual items (see Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 3 for the questionnaire). 
Each “left” answer was scored with 0, each “either” answer with 0.5, and each “right” answer 
with 1. A total score of 8.5 and above determined right-handedness (handedness: M = 11.33, 
SD = .79). All of them were recruited at the University of Birmingham.  
 																																																								11	In the current study, we included females, because we wanted to extend findings from the study in 
Chapter 3, which used males only. However, due to recruiting limitations we could not test a 
proportionate sample of males and females. This limitation is further discussed in Discussion, Section 
7.3. 
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Stimuli 
For the explanation task, we used eighteen English phrases with abstract meaning (see 
Table 4.1). Twelve of the phrases were identical to the ones used in Kita, de Condappa et al. 
(2007) for the abstract condition and have been proved effective for producing elaborate 
explanations, free of ‘metaphor bias’ (i.e., participants were free to spontaneously produce 
metaphors whilst explaining them). We created six more on the same vein, and made them 
semantically paired with the metaphorical phrases used in Chapter 3 (e.g., “to spill the beans” 
– metaphorical, “to disclose something confidential” – abstract).  
 
Table 4.1 The stimuli for the explanation task. 
Abstract phrases for explanation task  
To conform 
To intervene 
A catastrophe 
To tell a fairy tale 
To purposely mislead someone 
To be persistent 
To finalise details 
A change of circumstances 
To be indecisive 
To disclose something confidential 
To discuss 
To be angry 
To control 
To forgive 
To announce 
To be liberated 
To be moody 
To plan for the future 
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Procedure  
Participants were tested individually. They were seated on a chair, which was located 
between two tables of the same height (71 cm tall). The experimenter was facing the 
participant, and the video camera (Sanyo HD camera) was placed next to the experimenter. 
Stimuli were presented one by one on a white sheet of paper (font size 72, Times New 
Roman), which was held by the experimenter until the participant started the description. 
Participants were instructed to explain the meaning of stimuli as if they were 
explaining it to a non-native English speaker, and they were asked to elaborate as much as 
possible. During the task, participants were told to place one of their hands on the indicated 
marks (white sticky dots) on the surface of the table(s), and to keep it still for the whole 
procedure. For the total prohibition condition, participants were asked to place both their 
hands on the tables (see Figure 4.1). The gesturing group received gesture encouragement 
instructions (e.g., the experimenter asked them “please use your free hand to gesture while 
speaking”). Gesture encouragement instruction has been used in a number of recent studies 
(Broaders et al., 2007; Chu & Kita, 2011; Cook et al., 2012). The tapping group was 
instructed to tap their arm from their thigh and up to mid-torso, at a comfortable pace, and to 
use the same pace for left and right hand. Participants were debriefed about the purpose of the 
hands immobilisation and manipulation of hand movement after the experiment and the 
permission to use the data was allowed. Order of stimuli (forward - reverse) and order of 
hand(s) prohibition was counterbalanced across participants in a within-participants blocked 
design. 29 participants produced gesturing hand movements and 31 participants produced 
tapping hand movements in a between-participants design. 
 
  
111 
	
Figure 4.1 Experimental conditions (from top left and clockwise): Right Hand Gesturing, Left 
Hand Gesturing, No Gesturing, No Tapping, Right Hand Tapping, Left Hand Tapping.  
 
Coding 
The verbal responses from the abstract task were transcribed and coded for the 
absence or presence of at least one metaphor related expression. The responses were coded 
with a “1” (presence of at least one metaphor related expression) or a “0” (absence of 
metaphor related expression). A unit of speech was identified as metaphor related (and thus 
was given a code of “1”) in the following cases: (a) if it was an idiomatic metaphorical 
expression (e.g., “to forgive means to let someone off the hook”; “to finalise details is to tie 
up loose ends”), (b) if the coder could detect an underlying conceptual metaphor (e.g., “to 
finalise details means to focus on all important aspects” 
[UNDERSTANDING/CONCENTRATING IS SEEING]), and (c) if there was a physically 
or spatially related concrete equivalent expression that could act as the source domain of a 
metaphor (e.g., “to forgive is to let a memory go”, where memories are seen as objects 
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[MEMORIES ARE OBJECTS] that are usually let go). Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 4 
presents examples and the coding manual in detail.  
An additional coder independently coded all the verbal responses in terms of the 
absence or presence of at least one metaphor related expression. Coding matched between the 
coders 81% of the times (Cohen’s kappa κ = .623, N = 1080, p < .001). For all analyses, the 
first coder’s original coding was used (see Section 3.4.1 for informed decisions regarding 
inter-coding reliability). 
In addition, verbal responses with at least one metaphor related expression were 
coded for the familiarity of each metaphor related expression by an independent coder. A 7-
point scale was used where “1” indicated that the metaphorical expression was totally novel 
to the coder, that is they had never heard, read or used the metaphorical expression, and “7” 
indicated that the metaphorical expression was very familiar to them and they often hear, read 
and use it. For each trial and explanation, the average familiarity was calculated (overall M = 
5.71, SD = 1.14). For example, the explanation “to disclose something confidential might be 
going against what you are supposed to do […] you are giving the information of something 
that is secret […]” was initially coded with “1” as including at least one metaphor related 
expression. “Going against” and “giving information” were highlighted as metaphor related 
expressions because they are motivated by underlying conceptual metaphors: [DISTRUST IS 
A WAR] and [INFORMATION IS AN OBJECT] respectively. In turn, each of the two 
expressions were given a familiarity rating of “6” and “7” respectively because the coder felt 
they are highly familiar with these metaphorical expressions. The whole trial was given a 
familiarity rating of “6.5”. Note that we recoded all trials rated with average familiarity of 7 
(= highly familiar), that is 1 SD above the mean, as trials without metaphor related 
expressions. That led to the recoding of 111 trials (10% of the total of trials) from trials with 
presence of metaphors to trials with absence of metaphors. We initially included highly 
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conventional metaphors in order to develop a valid coding scheme between two coders. 
However, there are studies (Mashal et al., 2005; Schmidt & Seger, 2009; Stringaris et al., 
2006) highlighting the role of novelty rather than figurativeness per se on metaphorical 
processing. Therefore, the recoded dataset did not include highly conventional metaphors.   
Video recordings from the two gesturing conditions (left hand gesture, right hand 
gesture) were analysed using ELAN software (developed by the Max Planck Institute for 
Psycholinguists, Nijmegen, the Netherlands). They were coded on a trial-by-trial basis for 
gesture classification (following the typology in Chu & Kita, 2011); that is representational 
gestures (e.g., hand movements depicting shape, motion and action or deictically indicate 
location), representational unclear (e.g., hand movements which could not clearly be 
classified as representational including ones that were abandoned because the gesturer 
interrupted a gesture before the stroke was completed or moved to the next gesture and those 
resembling emblems which conveyed some known meaning such as “maybe” with the hand 
flat, palm down and wavering), palm-revealing gestures (e.g., palm rotates to show 
uncertainty or that speaker has nothing to say or), conduit gestures (e.g., hand moves towards 
listener as if speaker is conveying a clear message), and other (e.g., small biphasic 
movements/ beats, metacognitive gestures). We then calculated the gesture rate (= number of 
gestures per minute). Note that gesture data were not double coded.  
Video recordings from the two tapping conditions (left hand tapping, right hand 
tapping) were coded on a trial-by-trial basis to calculate the tapping rate (= number of tapping 
movements per minute). One tapping movement was defined at the moment the hand touched 
the thigh.  
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4.5 Design  
The dependent variable was the presence or absence of metaphor related expressions 
in participants’ explanations. The experiment had a 2 x 3 factorial design with two 
independent variables: type of hand movement (gesture, tap; between-subjects manipulation) 
and hand free (left, right, no hand; within-subjects manipulation).  
 
4.6 Results 
Exclusion of trials and gesture/tap rate 
Out of the 1080 verbal responses in total, 3% was excluded as failed trials; that is, 
when the participants did not follow the instruction (e.g., participant in tapping group 
produced meaningful gesture during a trial) or if expression was unknown. Out of 4137 
gestures that participants produced in total, 62.68% of gestures were representational, 13.32% 
representational unclear, 19.72% of gestures were classified as “other” (comprising mainly of 
beat and metacognitive gestures), 0.89% were palm revealing gestures, 0.12% were conduit 
gestures and finally 3.26% of gestures were classified as “unclear”. Thus, the instruction to 
produce gesture given to the gesturing group was effective and gestures were predominantly 
representational gestures. 
We compared the gesture rate between left and right hand and the tapping rate 
between left and right hand. Participants in the gesturing group produced comparable amount 
of gestures with the left and the right hand, and participants in the tapping group kept the 
same tapping pace with both hands. A Paired Samples t-test showed that there was no 
significant difference in the gesture rate (i.e., the number of gestures per minute) between the 
left hand (M = 26.85, SE = 2.18) and the right hand (M = 25.68, SE = 1.66); t (28) = .889, 
95% CI [-1.51, 3.84], p = .381. A Paired Samples t-test showed that there was no significant 
difference in the tapping rate (= the number of taps per minute) between the left hand (M = 
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56.26, SE = 17.53) and the right hand (M = 56.59, SE = 16.42); t (30) = -.221, 95% CI [-3.43, 
2.76], p = .826. Therefore, we have no evidence for a specific pattern for the gesturing and 
tapping rate depending on the hand used (left or right).   
 
Note for mixed effect models 
The dependent variable was binary (i.e., presence or absence of at least one metaphor 
related expression), and the data were analysed using generalised linear mixed effects 
(GLME) models. We used the packages lme4 and multcomp in the R Project for Statistical 
Computing environment, version 3.1.1 (Bates & Sarkar, 2012; Hothorn et al., 2012; R 
Development Core Team, 2011). All mixed effect logistic regressions were carried out with 
“glmer()” function, using the “Laplace” approximation and the “binomial” family. Random 
effects structure was kept maximal as long as model convergence was reached (for a 
discussion about random effects structure and simplification see Barr et al., 2013). We 
obtained p-values for fixed effects and interactions following the likelihood ratio test 
approach for model comparison, and we always reported the maximal model following a 
design-driven approach for confirmatory analyses. Tests of further contrasts of our interests 
were carried out based on a priori predictions using the generalised linear hypothesis test 
(correction for multiple comparisons of means, Tukey Contrasts) and the “glht()” function. 
 
Spontaneous use of metaphorical language (= presence/absence of at least one metaphor 
related expression) 
On average, participants’ likelihood of using metaphors (i.e., proportion of trials 
which included at least one metaphor related expression per total amount of trials) decreased 
in the following order for each group: for the tapping group, right hand (M = .35, SEM = .04), 
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no hand (M = .33, SEM = .04) and left hand (M = .29, SEM = .04). For the gesturing group, 
right hand (M = .45, SEM = .04), left hand (M = .40, SEM = .04), and no hand (M = .39, SEM 
= .04) (see Figure 4.2 top panel). 
We fit GLME model to the measurement presence or absence of at least one metaphor 
related expression (see Figure 4.2 for means and means accounting for the covariate). The 
model included two fixed effect factors and the interaction between the two. The one fixed 
factor was the type of hand movement (tap, gesture; dummy coded; “tapping group” was the 
reference category against which the comparison with the gesturing group was made). The 
second fixed factor was the hand free (left, right, no hand; “no hand” was the reference, 
baseline category against which the comparisons with the two experimental conditions were 
made). Note, we found a significant positive correlation between the length of the 
explanations (i.e., number of words produced) and the use of metaphorical language, r (58) = 
.444, 95% CI [.213, .626], p < .001. Thus, it seems that the more the participants spoke (long 
explanations), the more likely they were to produce metaphor related expressions within 
abstract context. We accounted for the effect of the length of explanations (i.e., number of 
words produced) on the likelihood to use metaphors by including it as a covariate in all 
models (for a detailed analysis on the length of explanations see Text S2 in Appendix 
Chapter 4). Note, that the assumption of homogeneous regression slopes is satisfied (G. A. 
Miller & Chapman, 2001), and the interaction between hand free, hand movement and word 
count was not significant (F < 1, p > .05). For the random effects structure we had to use a 
data-driven approach and simplify the model to reach convergence. The maximal model to 
include (a) random intercept and slope by subjects for hand free (type of hand movement is 
between-subjects hence a random slope by subjects is not necessary), and (b) random 
intercept and slope by items for the interaction between hand free and type of hand 
movement did not converge. Similarly, the model to include (a) random intercepts and slopes 
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by subjects for hand free, and (b) random intercepts and slopes by items for the interaction 
between hand free and type of movement but not the correlations between random slopes and 
intercepts did not converge. Thus, we included (a) random intercepts only by subjects 
assuming that the effect of hand free was invariant across subjects, (b) random intercepts only 
by items for hand free and its interaction with hand movement assuming that their effects 
were invariant across items, and (c) random intercept and slope by items for type of hand 
movement.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 4.2. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model with the main effects only (same random effect structure and covariate 
included). Adding the interaction between the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) and hand 
free (left, right, none) did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 (2) = .807, p = .667 (see 
Figure 4.2). Though the interaction was not significant, we had a priori predictions for the 
main effect contrasts. Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) 
revealed most of the contrasts non-significant. Only, participants who gestured with the right 
hand were more likely to use metaphor related expression compared to participants who 
tapped with the left hand (see Table 4.3). Thus, we have no evidence that the interaction 
between type of hand movement and hand free affected the spontaneous use of metaphors.  
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Figure 4.2 Likelihood of metaphorical language use (i.e., trials with metaphor presence per 
total amount of trials) for the gesturing and tapping groups in the three hand conditions (left, 
right, no hand). Bottom panel accounts for the covariate length of explanations.  
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Table 4.2 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction between 
type of hand movement and hand free on metaphorical language use. “No hand” and “Tap” 
were the reference categories. Length of explanations (i.e., number of words produced) was a 
covariate.  
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) -1.766 .380 -4.642 < .001 
Left Hand -.246 .257 -.957 .338 
Right Hand .135 .248 .543 .587 
Gesture .137 .295 .464 .643 
Left Hand:Gesture .321 .357 .899 .369 
Right Hand:Gesture .188 .351 .537 .592 
Explanations’ Length .017 .003 4.287 < .001 
 
Table 4.3 Significant Tukey contrasts for the model with the main effects and interaction 
between type of movement and hand free on metaphorical language use. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Left Tap – Right Gesture -.870 .305 -2.848 .048 
 
Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of type of hand movement. We compared the model with the main effects of type of 
hand movement and hands free with the model with the main effect of hands free only. 
Adding the effect of the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) did not significantly improve 
model fit: χ2 (1) = 2.025, p = .154. Thus, we have no evidence that the type of hand 
movement affected the spontaneous use of metaphorical language in abstract context.  
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4.7 Supplementary results 
Block order effect  
In this section, we investigated whether the block-order in which participants 
performed the experimental conditions might have affected metaphorical language use. Some 
participants experienced the no movement condition in the first block (16 participants; 277 
trials) and others in the second/third blocks (44 participants; 767 trials). The nature of the 
dependent variable, which captures the way speakers spontaneously choose to express 
meaning by using metaphors, can be influenced by gestures and in turn this influence can 
continue into parts of the experiments that do not involve gesturing. For example, once the 
gestures with one hand enhance activations in the contra-lateral hemisphere and affect 
metaphorical language use, it is possible that this effect and activations extend to, and are 
“carried-over” to the no gesturing condition. To this end, we fit exactly the same models as in 
the main analysis (see section “Note for mixed effect models”) investigating the 2 x 3 
interaction between type of hand movement and hand free for the two sub-groups. Any 
potential difference between the two sub-groups might have affected the critical comparisons 
between the baseline and experimental conditions. Our research questions did not predict 
such an effect. However, this exploration may explain absence of expected findings.  
 
No movement in the first block 
Model estimates are reported in Table 4.4. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect structure; covariate 
included). Adding the interaction between the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) and hand 
free (left, right, none) did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 (2) = 2.063, p = .356 (see 
Figure 4.3). Though the interaction was not significant, we had a priori predictions for the 
main effect contrasts. Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) 
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revealed non-significant contrasts (p > .05). Thus, we have no evidence that the interaction 
between type of hand movement and hand free affected the spontaneous use of metaphors for 
the participants who were immobilised in the first block. However, descriptively (Figure 4.3) 
gesturing (in particular with the left hand) seems to increase likelihood of language use while 
tapping to decrease it.  
 
Table 4.4 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction between 
type of hand movement and hand free on metaphorical language use for the group who did 
the immobilisation condition in the first block. “No hand” and “tap” were the reference 
categories. Length of explanations (i.e., number of words produced) was a covariate. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) -1.880 .610 -3.083 < .001 
Left Hand -.772 .563 -1.371 .170 
Right Hand -.239 .522 -.459 .646 
Gesture -.093 .559 -.168 .866 
Left Hand:Gesture 1.027 .719 1.428 .153 
Right Hand:Gesture .392 .692 .567 .570 
Explanations’ Length .020 .008 2.397 .016 
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Figure 4.3 Likelihood of metaphorical language use (i.e., trials with metaphor presence per 
total amount of trials) for the gesturing and tapping groups in the three hand conditions (left, 
right, no hand) for participants who experienced the no movement condition in the first block. 
The bottom panel accounts for the covariate length of explanations.  
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Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of type of hand movement. We compared the model with the main effects of the type 
of hand movement and hand free with the model with the main effect of hand free only. 
Adding the effect of the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) did not significantly improve 
model fit: χ2 (1) = .767, p = .381. Thus, we have no evidence that the type of hand movement 
affected the spontaneous use of metaphorical language for the participants who were 
immobilised in the first block.  
 
No movement in the second/third blocks 
Model estimates are reported in Table 4.5. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect structure; covariate 
included). Adding the interaction between the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) and hand 
free (left, right, none) did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 (2) = .116, p = .943 (see 
Figure 4.4). Though the interaction was not significant, we had a priori predictions for the 
main effect contrasts. Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) 
revealed non-significant contrasts (p > .05). Thus, we have no evidence that the interaction 
between the type of hand movement and hand free affected the spontaneous use of 
metaphorical language for the participants who were immobilised in the second/third blocks.  
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Table 4.5 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction between 
the type of hand movement and hand free on metaphorical language use for the group who 
did the immobilisation condition in the second/third blocks. “No hand” and “Tapping” were 
the reference categories. Length of explanations (i.e., number of words produced) was a 
covariate. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) -1.666 .421 -3.950 < .001 
Left Hand -.132 .295 -.450 .652 
Right Hand .196 .286 .687 .492 
Gesture .205 .348 .590 .555 
Left Hand:Gesture .076 .417 .184 .854 
Right Hand:Gesture .140 .409 .344 .730 
Explanations’ Length .015 .004 3.455 < .001 
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Figure 4.4 Likelihood of metaphorical language use (i.e., trials with metaphor presence per 
total amount of trials) for the gesturing and tapping groups in the three hand conditions (left, 
right, no hand) for participants who experienced the no movement condition in the 
second/third blocks. The bottom panel accounts for the covariate length of explanations. 
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Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of type of hand movement. We compared the model with the main effects of the type 
of hand movement and hand free with the model with the main effect of hand free only. 
Adding the effect of the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) did not significantly improve 
model fit: χ2 (1) = 1.164, p = .280. Thus, we have no evidence that the type of hand 
movement affected the spontaneous use of metaphorical language for the participants who 
were immobilised in the second/third blocks.  
To sum up, the “no movement” condition did not differ from the conditions of left and 
the right hand movement (regardless of tapping or gesturing) for both sub-groups, but the 
pattern was different. For participants who performed the immobilisation condition in the 
first block: gesturing (regardless of the hand) increased the likelihood for metaphorical 
language use compared to no gesturing. However, tapping (regardless of the hand) reduced 
metaphorical language use compared to no tapping. Descriptively the difference between 
gesturing and tapping seems more apparent within the left hand free condition, as expected. 
Importantly, the “no movement” conditions for the gesturing and tapping groups largely 
overlapped; that is, the baseline conditions yielded the expected result. For participants who 
performed the immobilisation condition in the second/third blocks: the right hand movement 
(regardless of tapping or gesturing) increased the likelihood for metaphorical language use. 
However, the “no movement” conditions for the gesturing and tapping groups did not largely 
overlap, hence they might not be comparable (i.e., possibly contaminated baseline 
conditions). Descriptively and when focusing on the baseline trials only (i.e., no movement) 
for both gesturing and tapping groups, an order effect for gestures was revealed (see Figure 
4.5). It seems that gesture production increased the likelihood for metaphorical language use 
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and this effect lingered on to the subsequent baseline condition. This does not seem to be the 
case for the tapping group, hence indicating a “sustained beneficial” effect of gestures on 
metaphorical language use.  
 
	
Figure 4.5 Likelihood of metaphorical language use (i.e., trials with metaphor presence per 
total amount of trials) in baseline blocks (no movement) when performed first and 
second/third.  
 
4.8 Discussion 
The present study investigated the effect that meaningful gestures and meaningless 
tapping movements might have on the spontaneous use of metaphorical language within 
abstract context. We hypothesised that producing meaningful gestures (as opposed to 
meaningless tapping movements), and in particular gestures with the left hand, would activate 
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metaphorical thinking in the contra-lateral right hemisphere, and lead to metaphor related 
speech production during the explanations of abstract phrases. We found no evidence that the 
type of hand movement and the hand choice for gesturing may determine the use of metaphor 
related expressions during abstract explanations.  
The present findings provided no evidence that the type of hand movement affects the 
spontaneous use of metaphorical language. We were expecting that gestures as opposed to 
tapping movements would increase the likelihood for metaphorical language use, because 
they activate visuo-spatial information (Alibali & Kita, 2010; Alibali et al., 2011), which is 
crucial to metaphorical processing (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). Our study was the first one to 
directly compare the effect that meaningless movements and meaningful gestures might have 
on spontaneous metaphorical language use. However, it did not extend previous findings 
suggesting that gesture production as opposed to not gesturing leads to metaphorical speech 
production (Bos & Cienki, 2011). Given the null result, we cannot suggest that gestures 
compared to tapping help the conceptualisation and verbalisation of metaphors. In addition, 
the present findings provided no evidence to support our proposed “hemisphere-specific 
feedback hypothesis” that gesturing with the left hand activates metaphorical thinking in the 
contra-lateral right hemisphere, thus increases metaphorical language use compared to left-
hand tapping. Chapter 3 showed that left-hand gestures enhanced participants’ metaphorical 
explanations compared to right-hand gestures or not gesturing at all. In the current study, we 
further explored this effect by extending our investigation to explanations of abstract phrases 
when metaphorical language is not needed or encouraged. The observed discrepancy may 
relate to different levels of hemispheric involvement during different tasks. Maybe left-hand 
gestures enhance metaphorical thinking when the right hemisphere is already activated and 
particularly engaged (i.e., when speakers explain metaphorical mappings), but not when 
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metaphorical thinking should be activated (i.e., when speakers spontaneously use metaphors). 
However, given the null result we do not strongly suggest that this is the case. 
One possible explanation for the null result relates to the open-endedness of the task. 
The specific explanation task was an informed choice to capture the spontaneous use of 
metaphorical language when speakers explain abstract phrases. However, we found that the 
length of explanations predicted metaphorical language use and it was affected by the 
experimental manipulations (see Text S2 in Appendix Chapter 4 for results). In particular, the 
more words participants produced, the more likely they were to produce metaphor related 
expressions. In addition, the gesturing group seems to produce more wordy explanations as 
opposed to the tapping group. Further research is needed to directly investigate the 
relationship between “verbosity” and metaphorical language use, and the effect of gestures on 
quantitative and qualitative properties of speech outcomes (e.g., how does gesturing as 
opposed to tapping affect the amount of new information and different words uttered). In 
addition, future research could experimentally control for the amount of information uttered 
(e.g., instruct participants to explain the phrases in specific number of words).  
Furthermore, we may speculate why we did not observe the expected hand choice 
differences based on the observed block-order effect. Chu and Kita (2011) showed that the 
beneficial effect of co-thought gestures in a mental rotation task could be extended even in 
trials when gesturing is prohibited. Our data showed a similar descriptive pattern. The 
baseline (no gesture condition) elicited more trials with metaphorical expressions when it was 
in the second or third block than when it was in the first block. This pattern suggests that 
gesturing in the beginning of the experiment may activate metaphorical thinking and lead to 
metaphorical language use. This effect may linger on to next parts of the experiment when 
gestures are not produced. Therefore, it is possible that the baseline condition was 
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contaminated, not statistically distinguishable from the other conditions, and hence not 
sensitive enough to reveal a particular facilitative effect of left-hand gesturing.  
Finally, an important note is the number of female and male participants in the 
sample. The studies in Chapter 3, which successfully showed the facilitative effect of left-
hand gestures on metaphorical thinking, tested male participants only. In contrast, the present 
study tested 46 females (N = 60). Maybe it is harder to observe the expected left-hand 
gesturing advantage in our female participants, but the effect it is more prominent in male 
participants, because language is more bilaterally represented in females than in males (J. 
McGlone, 1980). Future research should control for gender by testing proportionate samples 
and/or directly accounting for gender effects.  
 
4.9 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the current study provided no evidence that the depictive nature of 
gestures, rather than the hand movement per se, increases the likelihood for using 
metaphorical language within abstract context. In addition, there was no evidence that left-
hand gestures may activate metaphorical thinking in the right hemisphere, such that left-hand 
gestures compared to left-hand taps increase metaphorical language use. Unexpectedly, it was 
found that lengthy explanations increase the likelihood of metaphorical language use. Future 
research could further explore the effect of gestures and meaningless hand movements on 
linguistic properties of verbal outcomes (such as speech rate, production of new information), 
and/or experimentally control for these effects in order to directly assess gestures’ effect on 
the content of speech.  
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5 Priming effect of gestures on the comprehension of action sentences 
 
5.1 Motivation and aims 
This study investigated whether action gestures when produced alone, without 
concurrent speech, may prime comprehension of metaphorical and literal action sentences at 
a similar degree. Building upon the previous studies, it also investigated the role of the link 
between hand choice for gesturing and hemispheric involvement during a linguistic task on 
the potential priming effect. It aimed to provide evidence for the embodied accounts of 
meaning, the relationship between higher order conceptual processing and sensory-motor 
representations through gesturing, and the proposed “hemisphere-specific feedback 
hypothesis” for gestures’ self-oriented functions, when gestures do not accompany speech.  
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5.2 Abstract 
Action: first do it and then understand it? If so, do it right or do it left? If so, do we “grasp” 
abstract and concrete action the same way? Visually presented iconic gestures prime 
comprehension of semantically related words. In addition, according to strong embodied 
theories, concrete and abstract meaning is understood through simulation of our physical 
experience with the world. The current study investigated whether production of action 
gestures with a particular hand primes comprehension of metaphorical and literal action in 
the same way. Right-handers produced a gesture representing an action verb (e.g., grasp). 
Next, they read a target sentence representing an action (e.g., “the student grasped the 
concept”; “the student grasped the flower”). They had to semantically categorise if the 
sentence had a metaphorical or literal meaning. We manipulated within-subjects the type of 
action sentences (metaphorical, literal), the relationship between prime and target (congruent, 
incongruent), and the hand used for gesturing (left, right). All participants performed a 
baseline no-prime condition as well. We measured response time and accuracy of the 
semantic categorisation. We hypothesised that congruent gestures compared to incongruent 
and no gesture condition, and in particular gestures with the left hand would facilitate 
performance in the semantic categorisation of metaphorical compared to literal action 
sentences. We found no evidence for such effects.  
Keywords: Action sentence comprehension; metaphor; gesture; cross-modal priming; 
semantic categorisation 
  
133 
5.3 Introduction 
The interaction between speech-accompanying gestures and language in shaping 
thought is well documented. Within gesture research and embodied cognition research, 
several empirical studies have investigated the facilitative effect of speech-accompanying 
gestures on cognitive processing. For example, we know that speech-accompanying gestures 
facilitate lexical retrieval (R. Krauss & Hadar, 2001), working memory (Goldin-Meadow et 
al., 2001) and the conceptual planning of the speech to be uttered (Kita, 2000). In previous 
chapters of the thesis, we investigated a “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for these 
facilitative effects, and we showed that left hand gestures enhanced metaphorical explanation, 
which involves the right hemisphere. Thus, when speech-accompanying gestures represent 
meaning, they facilitate several aspects of high order cognitive processing. However, little is 
known about the facilitative effect that gestures when produced alone might have on high 
order cognitive processing. The current study investigated these effects and the proposed 
“hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures when produced alone by using cross-
modal priming in a semantic categorisation task: does action meaning representation through 
gesturing with the left hand prime the categorisation of matching metaphorical action 
sentences? 
The semantic priming paradigm is one way to investigate the facilitation in cognitive 
processing as a function of other factors. Semantic priming refers to the facilitation of 
processing of information after recent exposure to related information (Neely, 1991). The 
robust semantic priming effect means that words preceded by semantically related primes are 
responded to faster than words preceded by semantically unrelated primes. Cross-modal 
semantic priming is a version of semantic priming where gestures act as primes to test the 
hypothesis that gesturing primes semantically related words (see Tabossi, 1996 for an 
evaluation of cross-modal priming). The theoretical basis for this lies in McNeill (1985) 
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arguments that language and gestures are tightly interlinked, and the assumption that 
encoding meaning in gestures activates semantically related words. In the next paragraphs, 
we review studies, which have used cross-modal priming to investigate the effects that 
gestures when presented alone might have on linguistic processing.  
Firstly, watching videos of iconic gestures alone may facilitate a subsequent lexical 
decision task, when gestures and words match. Yap, So, Yap, Tan, and Teoh (2011) reported 
two cross-modal semantic priming experiments where participants performed a lexical 
decision task. Word targets (e.g., bird) were preceded by video recorded iconic gestures 
either semantically related (e.g., pair of hands flapping) or unrelated (e.g., drawing a square). 
They manipulated the video duration from 3,500ms in Experiment 1 to 1,000ms in 
Experiment 2. They reported significant priming effects in both experiments: participants 
were faster for related pairs of video gestures and words than unrelated. Importantly, the 
priming effect was stronger when exposure to iconic gestures was longer than shorter 
suggesting that the observed effect could have been because of some type of verbal recoding. 
The study has three limitations. It is possible that the mismatching pairs of gesture videos and 
words interfered rather than the matching ones facilitated the lexical decision. There was no 
baseline condition to rule out this interpretation. In addition, it focused on priming through 
gesture perception rather than real gesture production. Finally, the lexical decision task does 
not heavily rely on semantic processing and its focus is on word processing rather than higher 
order cognitive processing. More specifically, in the lexical decision task, participants 
discriminate real words from similar strings of letters. While semantic features of the words 
(e.g., valence, concreteness) may affect responses, the focus is placed more on the form 
rather than the meaning of the word. Similarly, W. C. So, Yi-Feng, Yap, Kheng, and Yap 
(2013) investigated whether clips with iconic gestures presented alone and with concurrent 
speech prime lexical decision at a comparable level. They showed an overall priming effect 
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(i.e., related combinations faster than unrelated), but when gestures and speech were 
concurrent the effect was weaker than gestures-only and comparable to the speech-only 
condition. They suggested that the facilitative effect of iconic gestures when presented alone 
might be stronger for tasks that do not rely heavily on semantic processing (e.g., lexical 
decision). 
Secondly, watching videos of iconic gestures alone may interfere with a subsequent 
reading time task, when gestures and words do not match in meaning, but not necessarily 
facilitate when gestures and words match. In Bernardis, Salillas, and Caramelli (2008) 
participants watched a gesture clip with a pantomime referring to an object or action. Next, 
they saw a word, which would match or mismatch with the preceding video, and they 
performed a speeded naming task (i.e., read the word as soon as possible). They recorded 
reading times. Participants had slower reading times in the mismatching conditions compared 
to baseline, but did not differ in the matching and baseline conditions. The authors suggested 
an inhibition rather than a facilitation effect. In particular, they stated, “[…] the meaning of 
iconic gestures did not prime the same-meaning words” (p.1125). The study raises some 
issues. Firstly, they collected data for the baseline condition (i.e., plain reading times of 
words) from different participants from the ones participated in the priming conditions. In 
addition, the study focused on priming through gesture perception rather than real gesture 
production, and it did not control for the duration of exposure to the iconic gestures (e.g., the 
clips lasted up to 4,680ms, hence verbal recoding is possible). Finally, statistics were not 
always consistent with the authors’ claims. For example, they suggested absence of priming 
effect, while on p.1118 they reported, “[…] targets preceded by a related gesture, compared 
with targets preceded by an unrelated gesture, were named 39ms faster, p < .001”.  
Finally, watching videos of iconic gestures alone may enhance performance in 
semantic relatedness and reading times tasks, when gestures and words match in meaning. 
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Wu and Coulson (2007) investigated the cross-modal priming effect while speakers watched 
soundless videos of iconic gestures clips followed by related or unrelated words. ERPs were 
recorded for a semantic relatedness task (i.e., classify word targets as related or unrelated to 
the prime) and a passive task (i.e., silently attend stimuli; surprise memory task to recognise 
words from the experiment followed). The N400 component showed larger negative 
deflection for unrelated than related combinations in both tasks, thus suggesting that, even 
without an explicit task, the visuo-spatial cues provided by gestures facilitate the 
comprehension of related words. This study focused on priming through the visuo-semantic 
properties of gesture rather than real gesture production, and it did not include a baseline 
condition to rule out that unrelated gestures may hinder word processing.  
The studies reviewed above indicate that gestures when presented alone may activate 
meaning-based representations and affect linguistic processing such as reading times, lexical 
decision or relatedness judgment. The current study builds on these interpretations with the 
aim to extend them by adding a baseline condition. In addition, none of the studies used real 
gesture execution as a prime or a task focusing on sentence meaning. More importantly, all of 
the studies used concrete target stimuli (e.g., concrete nouns such as “bird”). Therefore, it is 
still unknown whether encoding sensory-motor information in gestures may affect the 
processing of abstract meaning. If so, the whole “abstract-to-concrete” continuum of 
knowledge would be grounded in sensory-motor representations (following the strong 
embodied accounts of meaning; for a review see Meteyard et al., 2012).  
To our knowledge only one12 study has investigated whether producing gestures 
alone, outside linguistic context, may modulate processing of abstract meaning. Wilson and 
																																																								
12 Santana and de Vega (2011) investigated the meaning-to-action directional link. They found that 
reading an upward metaphor (e.g., “rise to victory”) compared to a downward (e.g., “fall to 
depression”) reduced the time for eliciting a concurrent upward hand movement, thus suggesting that 
metaphorical action meaning is grounded to bodily experiences. 
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Gibbs (2007) suggested that people ordinarily understand abstract concepts in terms of 
physical entities in the form of metaphors, and that bodily action may modulate the 
comprehension of verbal expressions that represent action in an embodied manner (i.e., 
strong embodiment). Their study showed that real and imagined hand movements congruent 
to metaphorical phrases facilitate people’s immediate processing of these phrases in a reading 
time task. For example, when participants executed or imagined the execution of a “grasping” 
hand movement, they read the action metaphor “to grasp a concept” faster than when they 
executed or imagined a mismatching movement or when they did not move. However, this 
study had a limited set of stimuli (9 sentences), it lacked a control set (e.g., literal action 
sentences), thus could not establish whether the effect was specific for metaphorical meaning 
or for both abstract and concrete action meaning, and it used a passive task (reading times).  
In the current study, we re-examined the cross-modal priming effect from gesture to 
meaning comprehension addressing some of the limitations of previous research as discussed 
above. Additionally, we examined the proposed “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” 
for gestures’ self-oriented functions using a different task, which focused on comprehension, 
and a different experimental setting, which focused on gestures when produced alone. Unlike 
previous studies, we used sentences (instead of words) and a semantic categorisation task 
(instead of passive reading times or lexical decision), which weighs semantic information 
heavily. This was critical to account for the role of semantics in metaphorical processing, and 
provide evidence for the generality of the priming effect and the “hemisphere-specific 
feedback hypothesis” across different tasks. In addition, we used a literal, matched set of 
sentences as a control to the metaphorical ones (unlike Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). This was 
critical to compare the influence of gestures on comprehension of concrete and abstract 
action sentences. Finally, we used real gesture production as prime (instead of visual 
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presentation of gesture videos). This was critical to disentangle the potential priming effect 
from other visuo-semantic activations prompted by perceiving video recorded gesture primes.   
To this end, we manipulated sentence type, prime type and hand used for gesturing in 
a semantic categorisation task using the cross-modal priming paradigm. More specifically, 
participants were asked to categorise if an action sentence (e.g., “the employee bashed the 
proposal”) had a metaphorical or literal meaning after producing a matching or mismatching 
action gesture with their left or the right hand or after not gesturing at all. Sentence type 
(literal, metaphorical), prime type (congruent, incongruent, no prime) and hand used for 
gesturing (left, right) were manipulated within-participants. Response times and accuracy of 
semantic categorisation were recorded. If action meaning activated by gesturing facilitates 
comprehension of action sentences, there should be a main effect of prime type. Participants 
should be faster and more accurate when categorising the congruent sentences than the 
incongruent and the sentences with no prime (i.e., matching action gestures would facilitate 
the comprehension of action sentences rather than mismatching gestures interfere). In 
addition, if strong embodied accounts are true, and comprehension of the whole concrete-to-
abstract meaning continuum is tied to bodily experience, there would be no interaction 
between prime type and sentence type. Participants would categorise congruent metaphorical 
and literal action sentences at a comparable level. Alternatively, if weak embodied accounts 
are true, and comprehension of abstract action does not necessarily rely on sensory-motor 
information encoded in gestures, there would be an interaction between prime and sentence 
type. Priming effects would be stronger for literal than metaphorical action sentences. 
Finally, if the “hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures’ self-oriented functions 
is true for gestures when produced alone, and gestures with one hand enhance cognitive 
processes involving the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand, there should be a 
significant three-way interaction between sentence type, prime type and hand used for 
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gesturing. Participants should categorise metaphorical sentences faster and more accurately 
than literal after producing congruent gestures with the left than the right hand.  
 
5.4 Method 
Participants 
38 subjects (all females13; age: M = 19 years, SD = .70) took part in the experiment 
for credits upon completion of the tasks. All participants were right-handed, English native 
speakers and students at the University of Birmingham. Handedness was assessed with a 12-
items questionnaire based on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Two 
bimanual items (from Oldfield’s long list) were added to his recommended 10-items 
questionnaire to equate the number of uni-manual and bimanual items. Each “left” answer 
was scored with 0, each “either” answer with 0.5, and each “right” answer with 1. A total 
score of 8.5 and above determined right-handedness (M = 11.58, SD = .65). Text S1 in 
Appendix Chapter 3 includes the questionnaire.  
 
Stimuli 
Stimuli pre-test 
A pre-test was conducted to ensure (a) matching of the target sentences in terms of 
familiarity and predictability of the verb phrase, and (b) clear differentiation of the target 
sentences in terms of figurativeness. It also informed the design of the mismatching 
																																																								13	In the current study, we included females, because we wanted to extend findings from the study in 
Chapter 3, which used males only. However, due to recruiting limitations we could not test a 
proportionate sample of males and females. This limitation is further discussed in Discussion, Section 
7.3.	
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combinations between the meaning of the prime gesture and that of the target sentence. See 
Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 5 for details of pre-test.  
 
Prime gestures  
We used 11 abstract symbols, which were visually presented to prompt participants to 
recall and produce the respective action gesture or do not move (see Table 5.1). Text S2 in 
Appendix Chapter 5 includes detailed description of the hand movements’ motoric properties.   
 
Table 5.1 Symbols corresponding to action gestures. 
Gesture Symbol Gesture Symbol 
bash ^ raise : 
bend § shake @ 
grasp / spin √ 
pull ≠ stir ≈ 
push ∞ twist # 
no action * 
 
Target sentences  
We used the 20 metaphorical and 20 literal sentences (see Table 5.2). The properties 
of two types of sentences were examined by information from CELEX database and by pre-
tests (participants who did not take part in the main experiment completed the pre-test; Text 
S1 in Appendix Chapter 5 includes details about the matching and pre-testing of stimuli. The 
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pairs of metaphorical and literal sentences were matched for (a) frequency of the object noun 
phrase (O-NP hereafter) (using the CELEX database) (t (19) = .272, p = .788), (b) familiarity 
of the verb phrase, t (19) = -1.056 p = .304, and they were clearly differentiated in terms of 
figurativeness (t (19) = 27.075, p < .001). The literal sentences (M = -1.07, SD = .622) had a 
more surprising verb phrase following the subject noun phrase (S-NP hereafter) than the 
metaphorical sentences (M = -.56, SD = .634) (t (19) = 2.284, p = .034). However, the 
difference was small (.51) given that the degree of surprise was judged on a scale of -3 to +3. 
Moreover, both types of sentences were rated as “moderately unsurprising”. Hence, we think 
this difference would not have substantial influence on processing.   
The sentences were in a congruent, incongruent or no prime relation with the 
preceding symbol and gesture (e.g., for a congruent condition, participants would see the 
symbol “/”, perform a grasping gesture, and then read the sentence “The boy grasped the 
meaning” or “The boy grasped the bottle”). See Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 5 for details 
about the matching and pre-testing of stimuli.  
 
Table 5.2 Sentences used in the main semantic categorisation task. 
Metaphorical Action Sentences Literal Action Sentences 
The employee bashed the idea The employee bashed the door 
The reporter bashed the decision The reporter bashed the window 
The worker bent the rule The worker bent the wire 
The technician bent the facts The technician bent the stick 
The boy grasped the meaning The boy grasped the bottle 
The daughter grasped the concept The daughter grasped the handle 
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The leader pulled the financing The leader pulled the lever 
The performer pulled the audience The performer pulled the handle 
The leader pushed the reforms The leader pushed the button 
The workers pushed the scheme The workers pushed the handle 
The mother raised the income The mother raised the bottle 
The decorator raised the price The decorator raised the box 
The terrorist shook the authority The terrorist shook the weapons 
The thief shook the borough The thief shook the matchbox 
The lady spun the tale The lady spun the thread 
The presenter spun the news The presenter spun the wheel 
The artist stirred the emotions The artist stirred the paint 
The magician stirred the crowd The magician stirred the liquid 
The man twisted the plot The man twisted the wire 
The designer twisted the truth The designer twisted the hair 
 
Procedure 
The whole session had three parts: (a) training for gesture execution, (b) computer-
based semantic categorisation task, and (c) computer-based rating of the stimuli.  
For part (a) the experimenter trained the participants for gesture execution. 
Participants were seated in front of a laptop screen (MacBook Pro, 13 inches). They watched 
the 10 gesture videos, each of them paired with their corresponding symbol (see Table 5.1). 
Participants watched each gesture and its corresponding icon four and more times according 
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to their request. The verbal label of the gestures was not given to them to avoid verbal 
recoding that would act as lexical instead of action prime in the main task. Participants had to 
closely produce the gestures as shown in the videos and recall the symbols linked to them. 
The procedure went on until they demonstrated perfect performance.  
Following the training session, participants completed the computer-based semantic 
categorisation task (see Figure 5.1). Each trial began with a fixation point in the middle of the 
screen (a red dot). Then the cue icon appeared on the screen. Participants had to enact the 
gesture corresponding to the icon with one hand. The hand to be used for the gesturing trials 
was indicated on the screen with the letter L for left hand and R for right hand presented on 
top of the cue icon in a blocked design. Participants had both hands on the keyboard pressing 
keys according to each block and following instructions from the experimenter. For the 
gesturing blocks, they were pressing the control key with the index finger of one hand (right 
or left) and the space bar with the other (left or right). When they were ready for gesture 
execution they released the hand (left or right) from the space bar, produced the gesture 
indicated by the cue and returned it on the space bar. For the no prime blocks, they were 
pressing the two control keys on the right and left bottom of the keyboard with their right and 
left index finger respectively. In the gesturing blocks, participants had 2.5 sec interval to 
produce action, and in the no prime blocks, they would stay still for 2.5 sec. Note, in the 
gesturing blocks, participants had unlimited time to recall and execute the gesture after 
presentation of the cue symbol. In addition, the no prime condition was “a no movement at 
all” condition instead of an automatic or meaningless gesture for example. The rationale for 
this decision was that we could not create totally meaningless movement (e.g., there was a 
risk that participants would attribute some meaning in the production of meaningless 
movements). Furthermore, in this experiment the meaningless condition could be considered 
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having the same effect as the incongruent condition. We needed a clear-cut baseline condition 
when there would be no priming from meaning through gesture production. 
Next, a sentence appeared on the screen. It was either a metaphorical or a literal 
action sentence, and congruent or incongruent to the preceding gesture. They were told to 
attend the meaning of each sentence and complete a semantic categorisation task. That is, 
they said the word “metaphor” if they thought the sentence had a metaphorical meaning or 
the word “concrete” if they thought the sentence had a concrete meaning. Also, they 
responded to test questions probing their comprehension of the sentences. They orally 
answered “yes” or “no” to simple “yes/no” questions, randomly interspersed between trials 
(after 15% of the critical trials; in total they answered 36 questions). For example, for the 
probe sentence “The employee bashed the idea”, the questions were either “Did the employee 
criticise the idea?” (“yes” was the correct answer) or “Did the employee praise the idea?”  
(“no” was the correct answer). Note that participants did not know which sentences would be 
followed by a question. All responses were given through a vocal response key, which 
recorded the response time. The experimenter recorded accuracy. 
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Figure 5.1 The time sequence of a trial with a question probing comprehension. 
 
Presentation of sentence stimuli was as follows: first the subject noun phrase (S-NP 
hereafter)  (e.g., “The artist”) appeared on the centre of the screen for 700 msec. It stayed on 
the screen and then the verb and the O-NP (e.g., “bashed the proposal”) was displayed a bit 
lower on the screen but still on the centre until a response was given. The rationale behind 
this presentation was twofold: (a) some of the sentences were too long and might need 
smaller font to be presented in one line, and (b) we avoided a division of the visual field into 
left side (for S-NP) and right (for rest of the sentence); thus we decreased eye movements 
(see Figure 5.1).  
Each of the 20 literal sentences and 20 metaphorical sentences was repeated six times 
(see Text S4 in Appendix Chapter 5 for example): (1) congruent condition with the left hand, 
(2) congruent condition with the right hand, (3) incongruent condition with the left hand, (4) 
incongruent condition with the left hand, (5) no prime condition, (6) no prime condition. In 
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total each participant experienced 240 trials. Order of stimuli and prime-target relationship 
(congruent/incongruent) was random. Order of hands used (left, right, no hand) was blocked 
and counterbalanced across participants.  
After the semantic categorisation participants took a break and next they completed 
computer-based rating tasks for the target sentences in terms of: (a) predictability of the verb 
phrase, (b) figurativeness, and (c) familiarity of the verb phrase. For task (a) participants 
rated on a scale from -3 to +3 “how surprising was the second part of the sentence you read” 
(“-3” being “extremely unsurprising”, “-2” being “very unsurprising”, “-1” being 
“moderately unsurprising”, “0” being “difficult to say if unsurprising or surprising”, “+1” 
being “moderately surprising”, “+2” being “very surprising”, “+3” being “extremely 
surprising”). For task (b) participants rated on a scale from -3 to +3 “how metaphorical was 
the sentence you read” (“-3” being “extremely literal”, “-2” being “very literal”, “-1” being 
“moderately literal”, “0” being “difficult to say if literal or metaphorical”, “+1” being 
“moderately metaphorical”, “+2” being “very metaphorical”, “+3” being “extremely 
metaphorical”). For tasks (a) and (b) stimuli presentation was the same as in the main task. 
For task (c) participants saw the verb phrases in one part (e.g., “bash the proposal”; “bash the 
painting”) and rated on a scale from -3 to +3 “how familiar to you was the phrase you read” 
(“-3” being “extremely unfamiliar”, “-2” being “very unfamiliar”, “-1” being “moderately 
unfamiliar”, “0” being “difficult to say if unfamiliar or familiar”, “+1” being “moderately 
familiar”, “+2” being “very familiar”, “+3” being “extremely familiar”). Order of trials 
(literal – metaphorical) was random. They also rated the similarity between the meanings in 
the gestures in the videos and the sentences. Participants were presented with the gesture 
videos and then the written sentences. The combinations were exactly the same as in the main 
task, but they were not repeated more than once. They rated on a scale from -3 to +3 “how 
well did the meaning of the gesture you watched match the meaning of the sentence you 
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read” (“-3” being “extremely bad match”, “-2” being very bad match”, “-1” being 
“moderately bad match”, “0” being “neither bad nor good match/ difficult to say if bad or 
good match”, “+1” being “moderately good match”, “+2” being “very good match”, “+3” 
being “extremely good match”). Response was given through keyboard by pressing the 
respective key from 1 to 7 with their right hand. Note these tasks were identical to the pre-test 
tasks. 
Finally, they rated the ease of recalling the gestures from their respective symbols in a 
pen and paper task. They used a scale from -3 to +3 to rate “how easy it was for you to recall 
which gesture was linked to which symbol” (“-3” being “extremely difficult”, “-2” being very 
difficult”, “-1” being “moderately difficult”, “0” being “neither difficult nor easy”, “+1” 
being “moderately easy”, “+2” being “very easy”, “+3” being “extremely easy”). 
 
5.5 Design  
The dependent variables14 were time for response (for accurate responses only) and 
accuracy of categorisation The experiment had a 2 x 3 x 2 within-subjects factorial design 
with three independent variables: sentence type (metaphorical, literal), prime type (congruent, 
incongruent, no prime), and hand used for gesturing (left, right). Firstly, we assessed the 
effect of the prime type (congruent, incongruent, no prime) and the interaction between the 
sentence and prime type. Next, we excluded the baseline, no prime trials and examined the 
three-way interaction between sentence type (metaphorical, literal), prime type (congruent, 
incongruent), and hand used for gesturing (left, right).  
																																																								14	Unlike Chapter 4, here we did not report block-order effect analysis. It is not possible for carry-
over effects from gesturing to manifest at response time and accuracy level in this design. For 
example, why would prime-gestures with the left hand influence response times and this influence be 
carried over to next blocks that do not involve gesture? If anything, and as usual in experiments 
measuring response times, participants would become faster towards the final parts of the experiment.  
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Paired mean comparisons from the rating tasks were performed, to confirm the 
matching of the stimuli.  
 
5.6 Results  
5.6.1 Rating tasks 
We compared the ratings between the literal and metaphorical sentences to ensure that 
the target stimuli were carefully controlled (see Text S5 in Appendix Chapter 5 for the results 
in detail). 
Participants rated the metaphorical (M = 1.08, SE = .11) and literal (M = .99, SE = 
.14) sentences as “moderately familiar” at a comparable level. Participants clearly 
differentiated the metaphorical (M = 2.01, SE = .08) and literal (M = -2.08, SE = .08) 
sentences for figurativeness levels. Participants rated the literal sentences as having a more 
surprising verb phrase (M = -.44, SE = .12) than the metaphorical sentences (M = -.77, SE = 
.09). However, overall they rated both of them as “moderately unsurprising”, and the 
difference was small (.33) given that the degree of surprise was judged on a scale of -3 to +3, 
therefore we do not think this difference could modulate participants’ performance in the 
main task. In the video-sentence similarity task, participants rated the congruent 
combinations as “very good matches” (M = 1.99, SE = .075) and the incongruent ones as 
“very bad matches” (M = -1.98, SE = .101). However, they were less confident when rating 
the congruent metaphorical (M = 1.84, SE = .085) than the literal congruent combinations (M 
= 2.14, SE = .075) (see Figure 5.2). We believe this difference could not account for any 
observed differences in the main task, where the videos were not used. Finally, participants 
rated the symbols as “moderately easy” (M = .83, SE = .37) to remind them of each gesture 
after the training session. The gestures “bend” and “twist” were the most difficult to recall 
from their respective symbols, but still “moderately difficult” (see Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.2 Rating for the similarity between the meaning of the gestures and the meaning of 
sentences. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the means.  
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Figure 5.3 Rating of the ease to recall gesture from cue symbol. Negative numbers represent 
difficulty to recall.  
 
5.6.2 Response time for gesture initiation  
We compared the response time for gesture initiation in the three critical experimental 
conditions, to ensure they are all comparable.  
Paired Samples t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between the 
gesture initiation time for the left (M = 1501.70ms, SD = 928.81) and the right (M = 
1494.58ms, SD = 988.70) hand (t (37) = .230 p = .818), for literal (M = 1511.88ms, SD = 
912.43) and metaphorical (M = 1484.22ms, SD = 1004.29) sentences (t (37) = .736 p = .466), 
and for congruent (M = 1500.62ms, SD = 944.20) and incongruent (M = 1495.65ms, SD = 
974.07) condition (t (37) = -.893 p = .378). Therefore, there is no evidence that the time for 
gesture initiation (which could have affected the relation between the prime and the target) 
could account for any observed differences.  
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5.6.3 Semantic categorisation task 
Exclusion of trials  
In total, we collected responses from 9120 trials. Out of this, 6% was excluded from 
all analyses for the following reasons: (a) inaccurate gesture production as prime; participants 
produced the wrong gesture (1% of total), (b) inaccurate recording of vocal response through 
voice key; voice key recorded filled pause, breath, other noise instead of response or did not 
record the response and participants had to respond again (= delayed response) (1% of total), 
and (c) delayed response time for gesture initiation; values more than 3SDs from an 
individual subject’s mean in each condition were excluded (2% of total). For the response 
time analysis, trials of inaccurate semantic categorisation were excluded (= participants 
categorised a metaphorical sentence as literal and vice-versa) (3% of total). Note, that 
accuracy of responses to probe questions was high (94%), thus we did not exclude any trials 
based on this criterion.  
 
Notes for mixed effect models 
For the continuous dependent variable (= response time) data were analysed using 
linear mixed effects models (LME). For the binary dependent variable (= accuracy) data were 
analysed using generalised linear mixed effects (GLME) models. We used the packages lme4 
and multcomp in the R Project for Statistical Computing environment, version 3.1.1 (Bates & 
Sarkar, 2012; Hothorn et al., 2012; R Development Core Team, 2011). All mixed effects 
regressions were carried out with “lmer()” function specifying that Maximum Likelihood 
(rather than Restricted Maximum Likelihood) is used (needed to get a more valid likelihood 
ratio test of the full against the null model). All mixed effect logistic regressions were carried 
out with “glmer()” function, using the “Laplace” approximation and the “binomial” family. 
Random effects structure was kept maximal as long as model convergence was reached (for a 
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discussion about random effects structure and simplification see Barr et al., 2013). We 
obtained p-values for fixed effects and interactions following the likelihood ratio test 
approach for model comparison and we always report the maximal model following a design-
driven approach for confirmatory analyses. Tests of further contrasts of our interests were 
carried out based on a priori predictions using the generalized linear hypothesis test 
(correction for multiple comparisons of means, Tukey Contrasts) and the “glht()” function. 
 
Response time 
On average, participants’ response times for the semantic categorisation task in the 
increased in the following order of conditions (i.e., from fastest to slowest): no prime before 
metaphorical sentence (M = 1684.45ms, SEM = 71.11), incongruent left hand gesture before 
metaphorical sentence (M = 1716.16, SEM = 72.45), congruent left hand gesture before 
metaphorical sentence (M = 1726.48, SEM = 74.03), no prime before literal sentence (M = 
1749.41ms, SEM = 75.98), incongruent right hand gesture before metaphorical sentence (M = 
1767.03ms, SEM = 91.05), incongruent left hand gesture before literal sentence (M = 
1767.85ms, SEM = 70.34), congruent right hand gesture before metaphorical sentence (M = 
1810.09ms, SEM = 85.06), congruent left hand gesture before literal sentence (M = 
1812.82ms, SEM = 75.51), congruent right hand gesture before literal sentence (M = 
1819.93ms, SEM = 86.62), incongruent right hand gesture before literal sentence (M = 
1821.75ms, SEM = 82.51). 
Firstly, we assessed the 2 x 3 interaction between sentence type and prime type. The 
factor, hand used for gesturing was not included in this analysis because the no prime 
condition had no “left” and “right” levels. We fit LME model to the measurement of vocal 
response time. The model included two fixed effect factors and the interaction between the 
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two. The one fixed factor was the sentence type (metaphorical, literal; dummy coded; 
“literal” was the reference category against which comparison was made). The second fixed 
factor was the prime type (congruent incongruent, no prime; “no prime” was the baseline, 
reference category against which critical comparisons with the experimental conditions were 
made). The model with maximal random effects structure (as recommended by Barr et al., 
2013) did not converge, so we had to use a data-driven approach and simplify the model to 
reach convergence. The maximal model to include (a) random intercepts and slopes by 
subjects for the interaction of the fixed effect factors, and (b) random intercept and slope by 
items (phrases) for the factor prime type (sentence type was a between-items manipulation) 
did not converge. Thus we included (a) random intercept and slope by subjects for the main 
effect of sentence type, and thus we had to assume that the main effect of prime type and the 
interaction between sentence and prime type were invariant across subjects, and (b) random 
intercept and slope by items (phrases) for the main effect of prime type. 
Model estimates are reported in Table 5.3. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect structure). Adding 
the interaction between sentence and prime type did not significantly improve the model fit: 
χ2 (2) = .695, p = .706 (see Figure 5.4). Thus, there is no evidence that the interaction between 
type of action sentences (metaphorical or literal) and prime type (congruent, incongruent, no 
prime) modulated participants’ response time in the semantic categorisation task. 
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Table 5.3 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction between 
sentence and prime type on response times. “Literal” sentences and “No prime” were the 
reference categories. 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 1754.49 65.23 26.898 
Metaphorical -70.06 40.26 -1.740 
Congruent 62.22 27.28 2.281 
Incongruent 40.96 29.12 1.407 
Metaphorical:Congruent 32.13 38.65 .831 
Metaphorical:Incongruent 15.19 41.12 .369 
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Figure 5.4 Mean response times for the semantic categorisation of literal and metaphorical 
sentences in each priming condition. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the means.  
 
Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of prime type. We compared the model including the main effects of sentence and 
prime type with the model including the main effect of sentence type only. Adding the effect 
of prime type (congruent, incongruent, no prime) improved model fit: χ2 (2) = 16.01, p < 
.001. Estimates of the model with the main effect of prime type are reported in Table 5.4. 
Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) revealed some significant 
contrasts (see Table 5.5). In particular, participants categorised the sentences faster in the 
baseline condition where no gesture primes were produced than the congruent and 
incongruent conditions. However, there was no significant difference between the congruent 
and incongruent conditions.  
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Table 5.4 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effect of prime type on response 
times. “No prime” was the reference category. 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 1726.56 63.25 27.296 
Congruent 78.33 19.30 4.060 
Incongruent 408.64 20.48 2.375 
 
Table 5.5 Tukey contrasts for the model with the main effect of prime type on response times. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Incongruent – Congruent -29.70 22.79 -1.303 .391 
No Prime – Congruent  -78.33 19.30 -4.060 < .001 
No Prime – Incongruent -48.64 20.48 -2.375 .045 
 
Secondly, we assessed the 2 x 2 x 2 interaction between sentence type (metaphorical, 
literal), prime type (congruent, incongruent) and hand (left, right). We excluded “no prime” 
trials (trials reduced to 5555). We fit LME model to the measurement of vocal response time. 
The model included three fixed effect factors and the interaction between the three. The one 
fixed factor was the sentence type (metaphorical, literal; dummy coded; “literal” was the 
reference category). The second fixed factor was the prime type (congruent incongruent; 
“incongruent” was the reference category). The third fixed factor was the hand used for 
gesturing (left, right; “right” was the reference category). The model with the maximal 
random effects structure did not converge, so we had to use a data-driven approach and 
simplify the model to reach convergence. The maximal model to include (a) random intercept 
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and slope by subjects for the interaction of the three factors, and (b) random intercept and 
slope by items for the interaction between prime type and hand used for gesturing did not 
converge. Thus we included (a) random intercept and slope by subjects for the main effect of 
sentence type, and we had to assume that the main effects of prime type and hand used for 
gesturing and the interaction between sentence, prime type and hand were invariant across 
subjects, and (b) random intercept and slope by items (phrases) for the main effect of prime 
type assuming that the main effect of hand used for gesturing and the interaction between 
prime type and hand were invariant across items. 
Model estimates are reported in Table 5.6. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect structure). Adding 
the three way interaction between sentence, prime type and hand did not significantly 
improve the model fit: χ2 (4) = .991, p = .911 (see Figure 5.5). Thus, there is no evidence that 
the interaction between the type of action sentences (metaphorical or literal), prime type 
(congruent, incongruent) and hand used for gesturing (left, right) modulated participants’ 
response time in the semantic categorisation task.  
 
Table 5.6 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and three-way interaction 
between sentence type, prime type and hand used for gesturing on response times. “Literal” 
sentences, “Incongruent” condition and “Right Hand” were the reference categories. 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 1825.50 74.43 24.523 
Metaphorical -50.86 54.96 -.925 
Congruent 4.90 40.91 .120 
Left Hand -60.43 36.92 -1.637 
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Metaphorical:Congruent 31.72 57.52 .552 
Metaphorical:Left Hand -5.61 52.19 -.108 
Congruent:Left Hand 37.44 52.01 .720 
Metaphorical:Congruent:Left Hand -30.21 73.83 -.409 
 
	
Figure 5.5 Mean response times for the semantic categorisation of literal and metaphorical 
sentences, in congruent and incongruent priming conditions with left and right hand. Error 
bars represent 1 standard error of the means.  
 
Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the two-way 
interaction between sentence and prime type. We compared the model including the two-way 
interaction with the reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect 
structure). Adding the interaction did not significantly improve model fit: χ2 (1) = .153, p = 
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.695. Thus, there is no evidence that the interaction between type of action sentences 
(metaphorical or literal) and prime type (congruent, incongruent) modulated participants’ 
response time in the semantic categorisation task 
Finally, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of prime type. We compared the model including the main effects of sentence and 
prime type with the model including the main effect of sentence type only. Adding the effect 
of prime type did not improve model fit: χ2 (1) = 2.116, p = .145. Thus, there is no evidence 
that the prime type (congruent, incongruent) affected participants’ response time in the 
semantic categorisation task.  
 
Accuracy  
Overall, participants showed highly accurate performance and accuracy levels were at 
ceiling (97%). In addition, there was no indication of speed-accuracy trade-off (i.e., 
descriptively faster response times and more accurate responses for metaphorical than literal 
sentences)  (see Text S6 in Appendix Chapter 5 for results).  
 
5.7 Discussion  
The present study investigated whether production of action gestures primes 
comprehension of action sentences. More specifically, we hypothesised that (a) producing an 
action gesture matching with the meaning of a proceeding action sentence would facilitate the 
semantic categorisation of the sentences compared to producing a mismatching gesture or not 
gesturing at all, (b) producing an action gesture matching with the meaning of a proceeding 
action sentence could facilitate the semantic categorisation of the sentences at a similar or 
different degree for metaphorical and literal sentences (depending on strong or week 
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embodied accounts, respectively), and (c) producing an action gesture with the left (rather 
than the right) hand and matching with the meaning of the proceeding action sentence would 
facilitate the semantic categorisation of metaphorical than literal action sentences. We 
measured response time and accuracy of the semantic categorisation as a function of the type 
of action meaning (metaphorical, literal), the relation between gesture prime and target 
sentence (congruent, incongruent, no prime), and the hand used for gesturing (left, right). 
There were no significant findings related to our research questions. However, we found that 
participants categorised the sentences faster after the baseline, no gesture prime condition, 
than after experiencing incongruent and congruent gesture prime-sentence combinations. 
Note, that the congruent and incongruent conditions did not differ from the each other. 
Hence, there is no evidence that action gestures facilitate or hinder the semantic 
categorisation of proceeding sentences when the action meaning in gesture and sentence 
matches or mismatches, respectively. In addition, we found no evidence that (a) priming 
effects were stronger or weaker for metaphorical than literal sentences, and (b) congruent 
gestures with the left rather than the right hand lead to faster categorisation of the 
metaphorical than literal sentences. Note, that because of the null results there is no evidence 
in favour or against (a) the embodied accounts of meaning, and (b) the “hemisphere-specific 
feedback hypothesis” for gestures when presented alone. In the next paragraphs we discuss 
the results, possible interpretations, which are tenuous, and possible limitations in more 
detail.  
Participants semantically categorised the sentences faster after experiencing the 
baseline condition compared to the congruent and incongruent conditions. This finding is not 
in line with Wilson and Gibbs (2007) where comprehension times were slower in the baseline 
than the matching condition, and did not differ from the mismatching condition. However, it 
is in line with Bernardis et al. (2008) where reading times in the baseline condition were 
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descriptively faster than both matching and mismatching conditions. This result may relate to 
the inherently low difficulty of a “neutral” baseline condition in priming paradigms (Jonides 
& Mack, 1984; Yap et al., 2011). The processing demands associated with semantically 
categorising isolated sentences versus sentences preceded by a gesture (matching or 
mismatching to the sentence) are not identical. It seems that the gesture primes are not fully 
processed by the time the sentence target appears, and this increases the processing time. 
Future research could use more comparable baseline and priming conditions in terms of the 
cognitive load they add and their processing demands.  
We found no evidence for facilitation or inhibition of semantic categorisation by 
matching or mismatching gestures, and no differences between the type of action sentences 
and the hand used for gesturing. Absence of expected results may relate to properties of the 
task. The purpose of the study was to investigate semantic priming effects from gesture 
production to sentence comprehension. Semantic priming occurs only when semantic 
processing is required, and the semantic categorisation tasks guarantee that the participants 
process semantically the target to be classified (Bowers & Turner, 2003). In addition, 
Schmidt et al. (2007) and Faust and Lavidor (2003) have suggested that semantic 
categorisation tasks may require a complex bipolar response, however they do not distort 
reaction times. Therefore, selection of the specific task was justified. However, absence of 
expected results may relate to task’s properties, and we discuss them in the following 
paragraph.  
Firstly, a possible reason for no priming effects could be that the category labels 
(metaphorical vs. literal) were very specific. This could have led to the development and use 
of explicit strategies (e.g., if abstract O-NP, then the sentence is metaphorical) or maybe 
participants could anticipate sentences from the target list. Other studies, which have also 
failed to observe an effect of semantic similarity between prime and target on behavioural 
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responses (Light, Prull, & Kennison, 2000; Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000), have also used a 
semantic classification task with narrow categories (e.g., is a word a fruit or not). Bowers and 
Turner (2003) suggested that, in semantic priming studies, it might be useful to reduce 
potential strategic effects by including semantic categorisation tasks that refer to general 
categories (e.g., does a sentence make sense or not). Secondly, the categorisation task is a 
multifaceted task, which requires more than one level of processing: conceptual 
representation of the sentence meaning, comprehension and then categorisation as a response. 
It is possible that strong priming effects and interaction with the sentence type would appear 
during the stage of meaning representation of the sentence rather than when categorising the 
sentences. Activating meaning by gesturing and the relation of this meaning (congruent-
incongruent) with the target might be irrelevant at the stage of categorising the sentence as 
metaphorical or literal. Hence, the response time for categorisation might have not been the 
most sensitive measurement.  
In addition, absence of effects may have been an artefact of statistical power. It is 
possible that an increased sample size could reveal significant differences between the 
congruent and incongruent conditions, and a significant three-way interaction between prime, 
sentence type and hand used for gesturing.  
Finally, the use of alternative designs and/or methods could reveal the expected 
significant effects. In future studies, the prime type could be blocked (no prime, congruent, 
incongruent) and the order of left and right hand could be randomised within the congruent 
and incongruent blocks. However, a pilot study using this design showed that participants 
were confused with the random switch from left to right gesture, and there were many failed 
trials (i.e., participants would use the right hand when they should use the left). Hence, 
although the current design may have made the results prone to artefacts, its selection was 
informed. In addition, there are cross-modal priming studies suggesting that behavioural 
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paradigms are not sensitive enough to capture priming effects. For example, in Wu and 
Coulson (2007), priming effects (from iconic gesture video to word) were indexed by the 
N400, but not by the response times in a relatedness judgment task. In addition, in an fMRI 
study, Mashal et al. (2005) used an explicit semantic judgment task (e.g., silently decide if a 
word pair is metaphorically or literally related) and showed right hemispheric involvement 
for metaphorical sentences. Our study is the first one to use a similar task in a behavioural 
paradigm. Therefore, it is possible that using the current design and task in a brain imaging 
study would reveal expected results, when measuring BOLD activations. Future research is 
essential to further explore this possibility.  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the current study provided no evidence for priming effects of gestures 
when produced alone on sentence comprehension. It was only found that producing gestures 
(matching or mismatching) slows down the categorisation of proceeding sentences compared 
to producing no gestures. There is no evidence for different priming effects between 
metaphorical and literal action sentences, and no evidence that matching left hand gestures 
facilitate the semantic categorisation of metaphorical rather than literal sentences. However, 
findings were based on null results, therefore, future research is essential to investigate the 
effect that gestures when produced alone might have on semantic processing, and the 
underlying mechanism for this effect.  
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6 Reduced right-sided mouth asymmetry during metaphorical 
explanations: semantics is crucial 
 
6.1 Motivation and aims 
This study investigated the role of metaphorical representation of meaning in content 
words (as opposed to expression of grammatical relationships in function words) for the 
right-hemispheric involvement during metaphorical speech production using the mouth 
asymmetry technique. Mouth asymmetry can give an indirect measurement of which 
hemisphere is predominantly involved for speech production during different linguistic tasks. 
For example, right-sided mouth asymmetry is associated with left-hemispheric dominance for 
speech production (e.g., Graves & Landis, 1990). In addition, studies on the hemispheric 
involvement during metaphorical processing have identified the crucial role of the right 
hemisphere (e.g., Bottini et al., 1994). However, it is still unclear what aspect of metaphor 
processing is crucial for this right-hemispheric involvement during production of 
metaphorical speech.  
The current study aimed to extend previous research by investigating the role of 
semantics for the particular involvement of the right hemisphere for metaphor processing 
focusing on metaphorical speech production. In addition, it validated the use of the mouth 
asymmetry technique as a measurement of the differential hemispheric involvement during 
different linguistic tasks.  
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6.2 Abstract 
Research on the neural basis of metaphor provides contradicting evidence about the role of 
right and left hemispheres. We used the mouth opening asymmetry technique to investigate 
the relative involvement of the two hemispheres whilst twenty-eight right-handed healthy 
male participants explained the meaning of English phrases. This technique is based on the 
contra-lateral cortical control of the facial musculature and reflects the relative hemispheric 
involvement during different cognitive tasks. In particular, right-handers show a right-sided 
mouth asymmetry (right side of the mouth opens wider than the left) during linguistic tasks, 
thus reflecting the left hemisphere specialisation for language (R. Graves, & Landis, T, 
1990). In the current study, we compared the right-sided mouth asymmetry during metaphor 
explanation (e.g., explain the meaning of the phrase “to spin a yarn”) and concrete 
explanation (e.g., explain the meaning of the phrase “to spin a golf ball”), and during the 
production of content and function words. The expected right-sided mouth asymmetry 
reduced during metaphorical compared to concrete explanations suggesting the relative right-
hemispheric involvement for metaphorical processing. Crucially, this right-sided mouth 
asymmetry reduction was particularly pronounced for the production of content words. Thus, 
we concluded that semantics is crucial to the right-hemispheric involvement for metaphorical 
speech production.  
Keywords: Metaphorical speech production; word-class; mouth asymmetry; right-hemisphere  
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6.3 Introduction  
There are many studies investigating what determines the neural recruitment of 
metaphorical language processing, and several theoretical accounts have been proposed about 
the hemispheric lateralisation of metaphor (for a review see Schmidt et al., 2010). However, 
there is contradicting evidence for the involvement of the right hemisphere in metaphorical 
processing (e.g., Right Hemisphere Hypothesis, Brownell et al., 1990; for alternative views 
see Rapp et al., 2007). Furthermore, most of the studies have been focusing on metaphorical 
processing in comprehension tasks rather than metaphorical speech production. In this study, 
we used the mouth asymmetry technique during speech production, which reflects relative 
hemispheric involvement during verbal tasks (for a review see Graves and Landis, 1990). We 
provided evidence that the right hemisphere is involved during metaphorical speech 
production and in particular during production of content words related to metaphor.  
According to the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor (Brownell et al., 1990) 
the right hemisphere has a privileged role in lexical-semantic processes related to metaphor 
comprehension. There are several empirical studies providing evidence in favour of this 
hypothesis. However, the overall conclusion remains somewhat vague mainly because the 
studies used different populations (e.g., patients vs. healthy participants), tasks (e.g., 
metaphor judgment vs. plausibility judgment vs. lexical decision) and stimuli (e.g., sentences 
vs. single words; novel vs. familiar metaphors).  
The first evidence for the right hemispheric involvement for metaphorical processing 
came mainly from studies of patients with brain damage. For example, Winner and Gardner 
(1977) have shown a deficit in appreciation of metaphorical meanings in patients with right 
hemisphere lesions compared to those with left hemisphere lesions in a sentence-picture 
matching task. However, the pattern was reversed when patients were asked to verbally 
explain the meanings of the metaphorical phrases in the sentences; that is patients with right 
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hemisphere lesions offered appropriate metaphorical explanations of the phrases while 
patients with left hemisphere lesions produced literal verbal explanations. They proposed that 
both hemispheres contribute to metaphorical competence, but the right hemisphere is 
crucially engaged in the conceptualisation and “visualisation” of metaphors.  
In addition, studies with healthy participants have found stronger right-hemispheric 
engagement whilst processing metaphorical compared to literal stimuli. For example, Anaki 
et al. (1998) used the divided visual field technique and the word-priming paradigm, and 
showed that initial activation for metaphorical meanings involves both right and left 
hemispheres and maintenance particularly involves the right hemisphere only. Initial 
activation and maintenance of literal meanings involved the left hemisphere only. The 
findings, though limited to single words, highlight the importance of time course of each 
hemisphere’s involvement in processing semantic links between words. Moreover, a positron 
emission tomography neuroimaging study (Bottini et al., 1994) found right-hemispheric 
activation during judgment of the plausibility of metaphorical sentences compared to literal 
ones. Bottini et al. (1994) also highlighted the importance of the task’s semantic load for the 
relative hemispheric involvement during metaphor processing. For example, a lexical 
decision task where subjects had to identify non-words embedded within metaphorical and 
literal sentences reveals greater right-hemispheric activation than a metaphorical sentence 
comprehension task. Furthermore, some studies suggest that it is not metaphoricity per se 
which determines the involvement of each brain hemisphere. It is rather the degree of 
saliency. An expression is considered as salient when its meaning is familiar, conventional, 
highly frequent and predictable (Giora et al., 2000). Jung-Beeman (2005) suggests there is a 
core, bilateral, neural network which is involved in the semantic processing of metaphors. 
Specifically, the right hemisphere is predominantly involved for the processing of novel 
metaphors compared to conventional ones (Ahrens et al., 2007; Cardillo, Schmidt, Kranjec, 
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& Chatterjee, 2010; Cardillo et al., 2012; Faust & Mashal, 2007; Mashal et al., 2005; Schmidt 
et al., 2007), for the processing of non-salient meanings compared to salient ones (Giora et 
al., 2000), and for the processing of distant semantic relationships compared to closely 
related word meanings (Mashal et al., 2007).  
Some fMRI studies failed to fully support the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for 
Metaphor. For example, Stringaris et al. (2007) provided neuro-imaging data while 
participants judged the plausibility of metaphorical and literal sentences and failed to show a 
differential activation of the right-inferior frontal gyrus for the comparison literal vs. 
metaphorical. Also, Rapp et al. (2004; 2007) used metaphorical judgment (“is the sentence 
metaphorical or literal”) and connotation judgment (“does the sentence have positive or 
negative connotations”) of sentences, and they did not find any activation in the right-
hemispheric structures for the metaphorical sentences. Benedek et al. (2014) investigated 
production of metaphor using a paraphrase task. Participants were presented with a short 
sentence (e.g., “the lamp is glaring”) and asked to provide either a literal (“bright”) or a 
metaphorical (“a supernova”) word that replaces the adjective without changing the meaning 
very much. The regions more activated for the metaphorical condition than for the literal 
condition are activated either bilaterally or only in the left hemisphere. 
Mixed results regarding the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor may relate to 
various factors. First, different methodologies reveal different aspects of metaphorical 
processing. For example, the cognitive activity measured in behavioural experiments (as in 
reaction times in Anaki et al., 1998) differs from the neural correlates of the activity captured 
in brain-imaging studies (as in BOLD signal in regions of interest in Rapp et al., 2004 and 
Stringaris, et al., 2007). Although equivalence in findings would clearly support a certain 
hypothesis about how the two hemispheres contribute to metaphorical and literal 
interpretations of linguistic stimuli, different findings from different methodologies are not 
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necessarily contradictory. If two cognitive tasks (metaphorical vs. literal processing) result in 
different reaction times, this does not necessarily mean that they will be sub-served by 
different neural pathways. Second, the nature of stimuli differs greatly across studies. For 
example, in some studies (e.g., Stringaris et al., 2007), the degree of saliency or novelty of 
the linguistic expressions has not been accounted for, whereas it is controlled in others (e.g., 
Mashal et al., 2005). Similarly, some studies focus on metaphorical comprehension for single 
words (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998) as opposed to sentences (e.g., Rapp et al., 2004; 2007). 
Finally, the involvement of each hemisphere during metaphorical processing is task sensitive. 
For example, plausibility judgment (e.g., in Stringaris et al., 2007) may involve too many 
cognitive processes that it has washed out the critical difference between literal and 
metaphorical stimuli thus failing to reveal any metaphor specific activations. To sum up, any 
study focusing on the hemispheric involvement during metaphorical processing and using 
any type of methodologies needs to carefully account for the role of semantics so that the 
involvement of the right hemisphere is neither masked nor marked due to non-metaphor 
specific processing demands or other linguistic variables.  
As the above literature review reveals, the role of the two hemispheres and that of 
semantics in metaphorical processing remains controversial. In addition, most of the studies 
investigated metaphorical comprehension, rather than production (as far as we know, 
Benedek et al., 2014 is the only production study). Thus, it still remains unresolved if the 
right hemisphere is involved in metaphorical processing during speech production and if 
semantic processing is crucial for this particular involvement. 
The contributions of the two hemispheres during cognitive processes (e.g., linguistic, 
visual imagery, and emotional tasks) have been investigated using measurement of mouth 
asymmetry. The foundational assumption of this measurement is that each side of the lower 
facial areal is controlled by the contra-lateral cortex (Adams et al., 1997; Gardner, 1969). 
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Therefore, if one hemisphere is particularly involved in a task that requires mouth opening, 
there will be greater opening on the contra-lateral side of the mouth. 
Several studies validated asymmetries in mouth openings during speech production as 
an indicator of the role of the two hemispheres in various speech production tasks. For 
example, Graves and Landis (1985; 1990) indicated that healthy, right-handed speakers open 
the right side of their mouth wider than the left during propositional speech (e.g., spontaneous 
speech, word list generation, repetition), thus suggesting the left hemisphere control over 
speech production. This pattern is reversed (left side opens wider than the right) during 
automatic speech (e.g., singing, counting, reciting the days of the week), which is considered 
to be processed by the right hemisphere (see for a review Lindell, 2006). In addition, Code, 
Lincoln, and Dredge (2005) compared the mouth asymmetry patterns during propositional 
speech production by right-handed stuttering and non-stuttering speakers. They found a 
bilateral pattern for stutterers compared to a clear right-sided mouth asymmetry for the non-
stutterers. This finding supports models about a distinct hemispheric control of speech 
production in stutters and non-stutters, thus further highlighting the sensitivity of the mouth 
asymmetry technique.  
The mouth asymmetry as an indicator of hemispheric specialisation has also been 
validated in studies of emotional expressions (e.g. smile). Graves, Goodglass, and Landis 
(1982) showed that healthy, right-handed participants open the right side of the mouth more 
widely than the left during propositional speech linguistic tasks compared to spontaneous 
smiles. This reflects the left hemisphere cerebral specialization for language and the right 
hemisphere involvement for emotion processing during smiles. Similarly, Wyler et al. (1987) 
showed a clear left-sided mouth asymmetry during smiles, which is particularly apparent 
during spontaneous compared to posed smiles (Wylie & Goodale, 1988). Developmental 
studies with infants have also successfully used the mouth asymmetry technique to 
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investigate the lateralisation of emotional expressions. For example, Holowka and Petitto 
(2002) showed that infants (5-12 months old) open the right side of their mouth wider than 
the left when they are babbling (a precursor to speech) compared to smiling. Interestingly, 
Schuetze and Reid (2005) showed a right-hemispheric control for negative emotional 
expressions (left-sided bias in mouth movements of sadness) which strengthens with age 
(from 12 to 24 months old), while this pattern was absent for the control of positive 
emotional expressions.  
The above studies show that the mouth asymmetry technique is sensitive to 
differential hemispheric involvement across tasks. In addition, it is a non-invasive, 
inexpensive and safe technique inferring relative involvement of the hemispheres in real time, 
during actual speech production. However, this technique has not been used to investigate the 
hemispheric involvement for metaphorical speech production, which is still a very much-
unresolved question.  
 Argyriou and Kita (2013) tested right-handed speakers (different participants from the 
current study) and showed that right-sided mouth asymmetry reduced when they explained 
metaphorical phrases compared to concrete ones (e.g., “to spin a yarn” vs. “to spin a golf 
ball”). This finding is in line with the relative right-hemispheric involvement during 
metaphor compared to concrete explanations. However, what is not clear from this study is 
whether semantic processing during metaphorical speech production particularly involved the 
right-hemisphere. This is an important limitation as semantics is a crucial component of 
metaphor theories (e.g., Giora et al., 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
The key aim of the present study is to shed light on lateralisation of metaphor 
processing during speech production rather than comprehension, using the mouth asymmetry 
technique, and to investigate the role of semantics in the involvement of the right hemisphere. 
More specifically, we investigated whether metaphorical processing particularly involves the 
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right hemisphere such that it reduces the right-sided mouth asymmetry during metaphorical 
compared to concrete speech production. In addition, we investigated whether semantics is 
crucial to the right-hemispheric involvement for metaphorical speech production such that the 
decrease of the right-sided mouth asymmetry during metaphorical compared to concrete 
speech production is particularly pronounced for production of content words, which carry 
meaning.   
In order to test the first research question, we manipulated the content of speech 
production. That is, participants explained English phrases with either metaphorical or 
concrete meanings (e.g., “to spin a yarn”, “to spin a golf ball” respectively). We compared 
the laterality of maximum mouth openings (mouth opened wider at the right or left side or 
equally opened) in right-handed, male participants during metaphorical and concrete 
explanations. In line with previous research (Graves et al., 1982; Graves & Landis, 1985), we 
expect an overall right-side bias of maximum mouth openings in the explanation of phrases 
suggesting the role of the language dominant left hemisphere during speech production. 
Crucially, we hypothesised that, if metaphor production particularly involves the right 
hemisphere, the right-side bias of maximum mouth openings will be reduced when 
participants explain metaphorical compared to concrete phrases.  
In addition, we investigated whether the relative right-hemispheric involvement 
during the metaphorical task is particularly pronounced for the production of content words 
(e.g., verbs, nouns) compared to function words (e.g., conjunctions, determiners). This is 
plausible, firstly, because content words carry relatively more semantic information, thus 
presumably the meaning related to metaphor, while function words are less semantically rich, 
and sub-serve structural functions (Bradley & Garrett, 1983; Hinojosa et al., 2001). In 
addition, content words are less lateralized than function words. For example, Mohr, 
Pulvermüller, and Zaidel (1994) used the divided visual field technique in a lexical decision 
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task (content and function words, non-words). They showed that function words presented in 
the right-visual field were processed faster than when presented in the left. This finding 
suggested that the processing of function words relies heavily on the left-hemisphere. On the 
contrary, a clear visual field advantage was not found for the processing of content words. In 
addition, Bradley and Garrett (1983) showed that content and function words are identified 
equally accurately when presented in the right visual field. However, function words 
presented in the left visual field were identified less accurately than content words presented 
in the same field. These findings suggest that content words are bilaterally processed in left 
and right hemispheres, while function words seem to be strongly left hemispheric lateralized. 
The present study tested whether the relative involvement of the right hemisphere during 
metaphorical production and, thus, the expected reduction in the right-sided mouth 
asymmetry during metaphorical compared to concrete explanations is driven by semantically 
rich content words. Crucially, we hypothesised that if semantics is central for the right-
hemispheric involvement for metaphorical speech production, the reduced right-sided mouth 
asymmetry in the metaphorical task compared to the concrete task will be particularly 
pronounced for the production of content words.  
 
6.4 Method 
Participants 
28 subjects (age: M = 19.5 years, SD = 1.9) took part in the experiment for a course 
credit or payment of £2. All participants were male, right-handed, native English speakers, 
monolinguals before the age of 5 years (via self-report), and students at the University of 
Birmingham. We focused on males only because their bilateral representation of language 
processing is less frequent compared to females (J. McGlone, 1980). Handedness was 
assessed with a 12-items questionnaire based on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
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(Oldfield, 1971). Two bimanual items (from Oldfield’s long list) were added to his 
recommended 10-items questionnaire to equate the number of unimanual and bimanual 
items. Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 3 includes the questionnaire. Each “left” answer was 
scored with 0, each “either” answer with 0.5, and each “right” answer with 1. A total score of 
8.5 and above determined right-handedness (M = 10.98, SD = .97). None of the participants 
had any previous serious injury to the face or jaw. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were three phrases for the metaphorical and three for the concrete 
condition. There was one “backup” phrase for each condition, in case participants could not 
recognize one of the main stimuli. The metaphorical stimuli were English idiomatic 
expressions with metaphorical meanings (e.g., “to pour oil onto the fire”). The concrete 
stimuli were matched to the metaphorical ones to refer to a physical event similar to the 
literal meaning of the metaphorical phrases (e.g., “to pour oil into the pan”). See Table 6.1 for 
the complete list of stimuli. Ten participants explained the reserve item for the metaphorical 
and concrete conditions.  
 
Table 6.1 Complete list of stimuli for the metaphorical and concrete conditions. The first 
three items in each column are the main items. The items in parentheses are reserve items 
used when the participants did not know the main items.  
Metaphorical phrases 
To pour oil onto the fire 
To set your sights higher 
To spin a yarn 
Concrete phrases 
To pour oil into a pan 
To put a shelf higher 
To spin a golf ball 
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(To hit the nail on the head) (To hit someone on the head) 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. They were seated on a chair, which was located 
between two tables of the same height (71 cm tall), and were asked to keep both hands still 
on specified marks (white sticky dots) on the tables throughout the task. Hand prohibition 
was a necessary experimental control, in order to collect a laterality measurement without the 
influence of gestural hand movements as gestures are sensitive to the division of labour 
between the two hemispheres in speaking tasks (Kita, de Condappa, et al., 2007). The 
experimenter was standing and facing the participant, and the video camera recording 
participants’ responses (Sanyo HD camera) was placed in front of the experimenter. Video-
recording zoomed-in on the face area. Stimuli were presented one by one on a white sheet of 
paper (72 Times New Roman), which was held by the experimenter until the participant 
started giving their response.  
Participants were instructed to explain the meaning of the phrases as if they were 
explaining it to a non-native English speaker. To encourage metaphorical thinking in the 
metaphor condition, participants were instructed to include an explanation as to how the 
literal meaning can be mapped on to the metaphorical meaning of the phrase and to give as 
much detail as possible (e.g., in the expression “to spin a yarn”, “yarn” refers to a long, 
complicated story, and “spinning” refers to creating this story). For the concrete phrases, 
participants were instructed to paraphrase the phrase using synonyms and give as much detail 
as possible (see Table 6.2 for examples of the explanations participants produced). The order 
of the conditions (metaphorical – concrete) was counterbalanced across participants. At the 
end of the task, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
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Table 6.2 Examples of produced explanations for each linguistic task.  
Concrete Explanations Metaphorical Explanations 
“To spin a golf ball, the golf ball is a ball you 
hit and try and get it in the hole, it is a small 
ball normally white and to spin it is to rotate 
it round”  
“To spin a yarn, that is to tell a story, the 
spinning implies you are making it up as you 
go along as if you are spinning cotton and the 
yarn is the story that you are making up” 
“To pour oil into a pan would mean that you 
take a bottle of liquid that originated from a 
kind of plant or fuel source and you tip the 
container into a pan which is a cooking 
utensil” 
“To pour oil onto the fire, if you pour oil into 
the fire it’s going to make it spark up so if 
there is a situation where your anger is firing, 
to pour oil into the fire would be to stir things 
up and make it even more ferocious”.   
 
Maximum mouth openings coding 
The video recordings were analysed using ELAN software (developed by the Max 
Planck Institute for Psycholinguists, Nijmegen, the Netherlands). Each video was analysed on 
a frame-by-frame basis to identify the maximum mouth openings in each phrase explanation. 
One maximum opening was defined as the widest point the mouth opens since the lips open 
to the lips resting or the lips meeting completely. We coded the laterality at each maximum 
mouth opening. The options for laterality classification were: right-side dominant (the right 
side of the mouth opens wider than the left), left-side dominant (the left side of the mouth 
opens wider than the right), or sides equally open (see Figure 6.1 for examples). Maximum 
openings for filled pauses (e.g. “eerm”) were coded but not included in the analysis, neither 
were the ones whilst participants were repeating the phrase to be explained in the beginning 
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of each trial. We coded 60 maximum mouth openings (or as many as possible if less than 60 
were available for coding because verbal responses were short) per condition per participants 
(in total we coded 1549 mouth openings in the concrete task and 1517 in the metaphorical 
task). We followed Graves et al. (1982) who coded the first ten successive lip openings per 
participant, and we coded double the amount because we had two factors in the analysis. Text 
S3 in Appendix Chapter 3 presents the coding manual.   
One individual “blind” coder was trained and coded 26% of the data. Mouth openings 
from 7 randomly selected participants were coded in terms of right, left or equal sided mouth 
asymmetry (in total 798 maximum openings were double coded). Coding of mouth laterality 
matched between the two coders 84% of the time (Cohen’s κ = .705, p < .001).  
For all analyses, the first coder’s original coding was used. See Chapter 3, Section 
3.4.1 for informed decisions regarding inter-coding.  
 
	
Figure 6.1 (From left to right) Examples of equal, right-side dominant, left-side dominant  
maximum mouth openings. “Right” and “Left” refer to the speakers’ right and left.  
 
Word-class coding 
The word produced during each maximum mouth opening was coded as being 
“content” or a “function” word. The following grammatical classes were used to determine a 
content word: verbs (excluding auxiliary verbs), nouns, adjectives and adverbs. The 
following grammatical classes were used to determine a function word: determiners, 
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conjunctions, auxiliary verbs and pronouns (see Table 6.3 for examples). Note that we did not 
include openings produced with prepositions in the analysis, because of their dual role as 
both function and content words (e.g., “want to achieve”, the preposition “to” does not carry 
meaning thus is a function word; “add to a situation”, the preposition “to” is a content word 
which carries spatial meaning).  
 
Table 6.3 Examples of words classified as content or function words. 
Word type Examples 
Content Words  
 
Function Words 
Aim, Keep, Structure, Higher, Constantly 
 
Determiners: A(n), Another, Any, Some, The 
Conjunctions: And, If, Or, So                       
Auxiliary Verbs: Are, Be, Being, Could, Do 
Prounouns: I, It, That (is), Those, Yourself 
 
6.5 Design and measurements 
A right-sided mouth asymmetry index was computed for each participant in each 
linguistic task based on the laterality (right-R, left-L, equal-E) of participants’ first twenty  
maximum mouth openings per trial: (R-L)/(R+L+E) (adopted from Holowka and Petitto, 
2002). Mean scores were calculated for each task (metaphorical vs. concrete), and for each 
word-class (content vs. function). Thus, a positive mean score indicated more instances of 
right-side dominant mouth openings (left-hemispheric lateralisation), and a negative mean 
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score indicated more instances of left-side dominant mouth openings (right-hemispheric 
lateralisation).  
The dependent variable was the right-sided mouth asymmetry index. The experiment 
had a 2 x 2 factorial design with two independent variables: type of task (metaphorical, 
concrete; within-subjects manipulation) and word-class (content, function; within-subjects 
manipulation).  
 
6.6 Results  
We coded 3066 maximum mouth openings across participants (1549 in concrete and 
1517 in metaphorical task). On average, for each participant we coded 55.32 (SD = 7.66) 
mouth openings in the concrete task and 54.18 (SD = 10.61) in the metaphorical task. Though 
we aimed to code 60 mouth openings per condition per participant, the means were less than 
60 because some participants gave short explanations and thus we could only obtain less than 
60 mouth opening per condition. Furthermore, some mouth openings were excluded from the 
analysis because of low visual clarity of the recording (i.e., 33 mouth openings in the 
concrete task and 49 in the metaphorical task were coded as “unclear”). Out of the 3066 
mouth openings which were coded we further excluded from the analysis 253 openings 
produced with filler pauses (e.g., “eerm”) and 240 openings produced with prepositions (e.g., 
up, to). Out of 1248 maximum openings, which were included in the analysis from the 
concrete task, 65% were produced with content and 35% with function words. Similarly, out 
of the 1325 maximum mouth openings in the metaphorical task, 67% were produced with 
content and 33% with function words (see Table 6.4 for means). The proportion of content 
words in the concrete task did not differ significantly compared to the proportion of content 
words in the metaphorical task, t (27) = -1.425, p = .166. Therefore, the proportion of each 
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word class (content vs. function) is comparable for each linguistic task (concrete vs. 
metaphorical).   
 
Table 6.4 Mean number of words coded in each linguistic task and word-class, the mean 
word lengths (e.g., the number of letters) for the coded words, and the mean word count per 
explanation (e.g., the length of explanation) in each linguistic task. The means are all across 
participants. The numbers in brackets represent the standard deviation.  
 Concrete Task Metaphorical Task 
 Content Words Function Words Content Words Function Words 
Number of 
words coded 
 
20.07 (6.90) 
 
15.5 (4.09) 
 
31.85 (7.77) 
 
15.46 (5.85) 
Word length 5.19 (.59) 3.18 (.57) 6.14 (.61) 3.59 (.76) 
Length of 
explanation  
(word count) 
 
37.31 (9.93) 
 
44.04 (12.0) 
 
First, we compared the number of mouth openings included in the analyses to follow. 
The number of mouth openings is comparable for each linguistic task (concrete vs. 
metaphorical), t (27) = -1.662, p = .108. See Table 6.5 for average proportion of mouth 
openings coded (equal, left-dominant, right-dominant) and included for the calculation of the 
laterality index for each condition (concrete, metaphorical) and type of word (content, 
function). 
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Table 6.5 Mean proportion of coded mouth openings (equal, left-dominant, right-dominant) 
and included in the analyses for each linguistic task (concrete, metaphorical) and word type 
(content, function). The means are all across participants. The numbers in brackets represent 
the standard deviation.  
  Concrete Task Metaphorical Task 
Content Words Equal 0.13 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 
 Left-dominant 0.06 (0.07) 0.18 (0.09) 
 Right-dominant 0.47 (0.12) 0.38 (0.14) 
Function Words Equal 0.07 (0.07) 0.06 (0.04) 
 Left-dominant 0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 
 Right-dominant 0.25 (0.09) 0.20 (0.07) 
 
In addition, we compared the mean length of the explanations in each condition (see 
Table 6.4 for means). Explanations produced in the concrete task were significantly shorter 
than metaphorical explanations, t (27) = -2.79, p < .05. However, there was no significant 
correlation (p > .05) between the right-sided mouth asymmetry and the length of explanations 
in either task (concrete and metaphorical). Therefore, there is no evidence that any mouth 
asymmetry difference between the two tasks could be caused by the length of explanations.  
We also compared the mean word length (e.g., the number of letters) in each word 
class (see Table 6.4 for means). As expected (Gordon & Caramazza, 1982) function words 
were significantly shorter than content words, t (27) = -16.054, p < .001. However, there was 
no significant correlation (p > .05) between the right-sided mouth asymmetry and the word 
length in either task (concrete and metaphorical). Therefore, there is no evidence that any 
mouth asymmetry difference between the two word classes could be caused by word lengths. 
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Then, we analysed whether mouth openings were right-side dominant. The right-sided 
mouth asymmetry index (as described in section 6.4 “Design and Measurement”) was 
significantly larger than zero in the concrete condition for content (t (27) = 12.726, p < .001) 
and function words (t (27) = 11.890, p < .001), and in the metaphorical condition for content 
(t (27) = 5.089, p < .001) and function words (t (27) = 7.081, p < .001) (see Figure 6.2 for the 
means). Thus, speech production, in general, relies on left-hemisphere processing. 
Next, we analysed whether mouth-opening asymmetry differed between the two 
linguistic tasks and during the production of the two different word-classes. A 2 x 2 repeated 
measures within subjects ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of linguistic task 
(concrete vs. metaphorical), F (1, 27) = 34.638, p < .001, ηp2 = .562. As predicted, 
participants demonstrated a significantly lower right-side bias in mouth openings during 
metaphorical explanations compared to the concrete ones (see Figure 6.2). In addition, there 
was a significant main effect of word-class (content vs. function), F (1, 27) = 4.994, p = .034, 
ηp2 = .156. In particular, participants demonstrated a significantly lower right-side bias in 
mouth openings when they produced content compared to function words (see Figure 6.2). 
Finally, there was significant interaction between linguistic task and word-class, F (1, 27) = 
5.322, p = .029, ηp2 = .165. This indicates that the linguistic task had different effect on right-
sided mouth asymmetry depending on what class of word (content vs. function) people 
produced. Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrected alpha level (p = .0125) between 
conditions indicated that right-sided mouth asymmetry was significantly lower in the 
metaphorical task than the concrete task for content words (t (27) = -6.679, p < .001), and for 
function words (t (27) = -3.306, p = .003); right-sided mouth asymmetry was lower for 
content words than function words during the metaphorical task (t (27) = -2.791, p = .010), 
but not during the concrete task (t (27) = -.181, p = .857) (see Figure 6.2). Thus, the 
interaction is because the task effect (i.e., reduced right-sided mouth asymmetry in the 
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metaphorical task) is larger for content words than for function words. As evident in Table 
6.5, the right-sided mouth asymmetry is lower in the metaphorical task because the right-side 
dominant openings decrease and the left-side dominant openings increase. 
 
	
Figure 6.2 Mean right-sided mouth asymmetry index (R-L)/(R+L+E) per linguistic task and 
word-class produced, where R = right-side dominant mouth opening, L = left-side dominant, 
E = lips equally opened. The larger value indicates stronger right-side dominance in mouth 
openings, thus stronger left-hemispheric specialization. Error bars represent 1 standard error 
of the means.  
 
The next analysis aimed to further support that the differences in mouth asymmetry 
were resulting from the manipulation of the variable in interest (metaphor vs. concrete) rather 
than the words produced. Thus, we focused on words that appeared in both concrete and 
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metaphorical conditions at least once. The analysis included 613 content word tokens (49% 
of all content word tokens produced) and 777 function word tokens (59% of all function word 
tokens produced) (see Text S1 in Appendix Chapter 6 for a full list of the words and their 
token frequencies in each condition). The analysis was limited to 682 maximum mouth 
openings in the concrete task and 708 in the metaphorical task. Results remained the same 
(see Figure 6.3). The 2 x 2 repeated measures within subjects ANOVA yielded a significant 
main effect of linguistic task (concrete vs. metaphorical), F (1, 27) = 24.175, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.472. Participants demonstrated a significantly lower right-side bias in mouth openings during 
metaphorical explanations compared to the concrete ones. In addition, there was a marginally 
significant main effect of word-class (content vs. function), F (1, 27) = 4.015, p = .050, ηp2 = 
.129. Participants demonstrated a significantly lower right-side bias in mouth openings when 
they produced content compared to function words. Finally, there was a significant 
interaction between linguistic task and word-class, F (1, 27) = 5.947, p = .022, ηp2 = .181. In 
summary, the pattern of results remained the same as in the previous analysis. Thus, there is 
no evidence that the effects are driven by the words spoken uniquely in the metaphorical or 
concrete condition.  
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Figure 6.3 This analysis included only the words produced at least once in both concrete and 
metaphorical task. Mean right-sided mouth asymmetry index (R-L)/(R+L+E) per linguistic 
task and word-class produced, where R = right-side dominant mouth opening, L = left-side 
dominant, E = lips equally opened. The larger value indicates stronger right-side dominance 
in mouth openings, thus stronger left-hemispheric specialization. Error bars represent 1 
standard error.  
 
6.7 Discussion 
The present study investigated whether metaphorical processing particularly involves 
the right hemisphere such that it reduces the right-side bias in mouth openings during 
metaphorical speech production. First, we compared speakers’ mouth asymmetry during 
explanation of phrases with metaphorical and concrete meanings. The mouth opened more 
widely on the right side during speaking in both the metaphorical and concrete conditions 
suggesting the involvement of the left hemisphere during speech production. However, the 
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right-sided mouth asymmetry significantly reduced in the metaphor compared to the concrete 
task. In addition, we crucially showed that the reduced right-sided mouth asymmetry during 
metaphorical explanation, as compared to concrete explanations, is particularly pronounced 
during the production of content words than that of function words. We propose that 
semantics is crucial for the right-hemispheric involvement in metaphorical speech 
production.  
The present findings are in line with the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor 
(e.g., Brownell et al., 1990) according to which the right hemisphere is predominantly 
involved in metaphor processing. Although several studies manipulated linguistic content 
(literal vs. non-literal stimuli) to assess the neural basis for metaphor processing (e.g., 
Brownell et al., 1990; Anaki, et al., 1998), only one study  (Benedek et al. (2014) has 
explored the involvement of the right hemisphere during metaphorical speech production. 
The “open-endedness” and the description of the metaphorical mapping in the current task 
was effective as it revealed the differential hemispheric involvement between metaphorical 
and literal explanations. Participants in this task were free to choose from a wide range of 
possible responses. This “semantic exploration” between possible meanings is crucial for 
metaphorical processing, which entails the creation of a semantic link between otherwise 
distant concepts (Jung-Beeman, 2005). Therefore, this task was able to capture the crucial 
element for the right-hemispheric involvement for metaphor processing. Furthermore, the 
study of metaphor production during an on-line task (as opposed to passive tasks of covert 
reading and comprehension) offers a new approach to how speakers develop new ideas, 
which is important to communication per se and theories about creative cognition (e.g., 
Benedek et al., 2014; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).   
Moreover, the present study is in accordance with research on the involvement of 
each hemisphere for the representation of content and function words (Mohr et al., 1994). For 
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example, the present study found that for content words, the right-sided mouth asymmetry 
was significantly smaller during metaphorical explanations than concrete explanations. This 
finding suggested that the hemispheric involvement for the production of content words can 
be determined by the semantic meaning they carry. When content words are produced to 
represent concepts related to metaphorical concepts, as opposed to concrete and literal 
concepts, the right hemisphere is particularly involved. Firstly, this finding validates our 
initial hypothesis that semantics is crucial for the reduced right-sided mouth asymmetry in 
metaphorical as compared to literal speech production. In addition, it is compatible with 
observations that content words are bilaterally represented, thus do not demonstrate a 
processing advantage when presented in either (left or right) visual field (e.g., Bradley & 
Garrett, 1983; Mohr et al., 1994) .  
Not only for content words, but also for function words, the right-sided mouth 
asymmetry reduced for metaphor explanation. This may be because function words also carry 
semantic information related to metaphor, albeit less substantially than content words. For 
example, pronouns classified as function words may refer to content words in preceding 
discourse. If the content words’ meaning has been processed in the right hemisphere, the 
right hemisphere may also play an important role in producing a subsequent co-referential 
pronoun. In addition, it is possible that left-hemisphere involvement by content words during 
metaphor explanations was carried over to the production of function words as well. For 
example, when a function word is produced in a sequence of content words within an 
utterance, it is possible that the right hemisphere involvement may be carried over to the 
function word. This is possible if it incurs a processing cost to switch on and off the right-
hemisphere’s involvement in speech production. Then, even if it is not efficient to process a 
function word with the right-hemisphere’s involvement, it may sometimes be overall more 
efficient to keep the right-hemisphere’s involvement (not to switch it on and off too often).  
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In addition, present results are compatible with previous studies on task-dependent 
mouth asymmetry. Mouth asymmetry studies have shown that tasks involving right 
hemisphere processes (e.g., emotional tasks, automatic speech) lead to reduced right-sided 
asymmetry in mouth opening. For example, right-sided asymmetry was reduced when 
spontaneously smiling compared to generating word lists (Graves et al., 1982) and it was also 
smaller when singing and counting (serial speech) than naming pictures and spontaneously 
speaking (propositional speech) (Graves & Landis, 1985). The present study is the first study 
to show the same effect for metaphor. Thus, this study further validated mouth asymmetry as 
an indicator of lateralisation of processes underlying various communication behaviours. 
But what exactly is happening in the two brain hemispheres during metaphorical 
explanation? We may speculate what in light of metaphor theories. Metaphor is a way of 
speaking about one conceptual domain in terms of another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b). In 
particular, during metaphorical explanation speakers explain the metaphorical mapping of a 
concrete concept (source domain of metaphor) onto a more abstract one (target domain of 
metaphor) (e.g., when explaining the phrase “to spin a yarn”, the spinning represents the 
elaborate creation and narration of a story). This specific process of mapping during 
metaphorical processing is essentially the speaker’s effort to bring closer two semantically 
distant concepts (e.g., the action of spinning and the action of narrating). Such semantic 
processes are an instance of the processing of coarse semantic links, which is more strongly 
represented in the right hemisphere than the left (following the Fine-Coarse Coding Theory; 
Jung-Beeman, 2005). Crucially, the current study found a significant interaction between 
linguistic task and word-class. That is, the right-sided mouth asymmetry was significantly 
lower when participants explained metaphorical phrases than concrete phrases and this 
difference was particularly pronounced for production of content words. Presumably, when 
speakers produced content words for the explanation of metaphors, they produced words 
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which carry semantic information related to the metaphorical mapping. For example, in the 
phrase “to spin a yarn”, a source domain concept, “objects (yarn)”, maps to a target domain 
concept, “story”. Through the metaphorical mapping, some attributes can also be mapped 
from the source to the target domain. So, “a complicated (content word) object like a yarn is 
used to represent a complicated story”. This mapping is lexically encoded more often with 
content words compared to function ones, because function words do not carry enough 
semantic content to allow for the representation of abstract concepts in the form of concrete 
senses (Gonzálvez-García, Peña-Cervel, & Pérez-Hernández, 2013). Therefore, we propose 
that during metaphorical speech production semantics might be what determines the relative 
involvement of the right hemisphere. 
The current study used so-called frozen metaphors in idiomatic phrases, which in 
some studies did not involve the right hemisphere as well as novel metaphors (Cardillo et al., 
2012; Mashal et al., 2005). We argue that how much the right hemisphere is involved in 
metaphor processing depends not only on the type of stimulus materials but also on the task. 
The current study showed that, with frozen metaphors, if the participants were required to 
explicitly think about the metaphorical mapping between source and target domains (e.g., in 
the phrase “to spin a yarn”, the yarn represents a long complicated story), the right 
hemisphere got involved in the process.  
In general, in the discussion of the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor (e.g., 
Brownell et al., 1990), it may be important to carefully examine the nature of task used in 
each study. For example, the fMRI study by Rapp et al. (2007) failed to show activation of 
the right hemisphere whilst participants silently read sentences (literal and non-literal) and 
performed metaphorical judgments (“is it a metaphor or not?”) and connotation judgments 
(“does it have a positive or negative connotation?”). The task did not require processing of 
the mapping between source and target domains. For example, the metaphorical judgment 
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could have been made based on semantic anomaly in the literal interpretation. In sentences 
such as “the director was a bulldozer” participants could judge if the sentence is literally 
plausible or not, without thinking about the metaphorical mapping. If so, these tasks probably 
did not strongly activate metaphorical thinking, thus failed to activate the right hemisphere. 
The present study validates the effectiveness of the mouth asymmetry technique and 
opens new doors for future research. For example, it would be interesting to observe the 
sequence of mouth asymmetries as this might reveal how the two hemispheres 
collaboratively produce an utterance. Mouth asymmetry is a suitable technique for such 
questions, which would be difficult to answer with functional imaging techniques due to low 
time-resolution (fMRI) or articulatory movement artefacts (EEG). Finally, calculating the 
mouth asymmetry index during metaphorical tasks could supplement future studies with an 
individual-subjects localization approach and lead to a clearer picture of the neural basis of 
metaphorical processing. 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the reduced right-sided mouth asymmetry during metaphorical 
compared to concrete explanations is particularly driven by the production of content words 
related to metaphor. Thus, indicating that semantic processing and metaphorical 
representation of meaning is crucial for the relative involvement of the right hemisphere for 
metaphorical speech production. The study also validated the sensitivity of the mouth 
asymmetry technique to capture the differential hemispheric involvement for different verbal 
tasks, and also for different word-classes.  
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7 General discussion 
 
The current thesis focused on understanding the interactions among gesture 
production and language processing. We investigated how the way we gesture interacts with 
and perhaps determines our spoken utterances. More specifically, we tried to understand the 
mechanism underlying gestures’ self-oriented functions, by investigating its relation to 
gesture handedness and hemispheric involvement for cognitive processing, that is by 
investigating the different impact that right- and left-hand gestures have on several types of 
metaphor processing. In addition, we collected individual, indirect measurements for the 
hemispheric involvement for speech production tasks. This way we investigated whether left-
hand gestures’ facilitative effect on metaphor processing relates to the right-hemispheric 
involvement for speech production. Finally, we investigated if semantic processing is 
important for the relative involvement of the right hemisphere for metaphor processing. The 
current section summarises the key findings from each experimental chapter, discusses the 
theoretical and practical implications, and outlines the limitations of the thesis. Suggestions 
for future research are also considered. 
 
7.1 Summary of main findings and conclusions 
Chapter 3 investigated whether co-speech gestures with a particular hand enhance 
cognitive processing involving the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand, such that 
left-hand gestures enhance metaphor processing which particularly involves the right 
hemisphere. The study found that left-hand gestures enhanced explanations of metaphorical 
phrases compared to right-hand gestures or not gesturing at all. Importantly, this left-over-
right-hand gesturing advantage was higher for people with stronger right-hemispheric 
involvement for speech production as measured by asymmetric mouth movements during 
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speaking. In addition, a control experiment ruled out the possibility that the observed effect 
was due to prohibiting the one hand rather than gesturing with the other. Producing left-hand 
representational gestures by choice, compared to choosing not to gesture with the left hand, 
enhanced the metaphorical mapping from concrete conceptual domains on to more abstract 
ones, which depends on processes in the right-hemisphere (while this was not the case for the 
right hand). We concluded that co-speech gestures with a particular hand give feedback to, 
enhance cognitive processes involving the hemisphere contra-lateral to the gesturing hand 
(“hemisphere-specific feedback hypothesis”), and in turn modulate the content of speech.  
Chapter 4 investigated whether co-speech gestures with a particular hand trigger 
processing involving the contra-lateral hemisphere, and if gestures facilitate cognitive 
processes because of their motoric or depictive properties. This study used a different 
dependent variable from Chapter 3; that is, we measured the spontaneous use of metaphor 
related expressions during explanation of abstract phrases. The study provided no evidence 
that left-hand gestures trigger the use of metaphorical language within abstract context 
compared to right-hand gestures or not gesturing at all. In addition, it provided no evidence 
that gestures compared to meaningless tapping hand movements trigger the use of 
metaphorical language. However, we found that lengthier explanations increased the 
likelihood of using metaphorical language. The possibility of ‘verbosity’ determining 
metaphorical language use (e.g., the more we speak, the more likely we are to use 
metaphors), and that of gestures affecting verbosity should be further explored.  
Chapter 5 investigated whether action gestures when produced alone (without 
speech), prime the semantic categorisation of subsequent action sentences as literal or 
metaphorical. Do action gestures that match the meaning of a subsequent sentence help (i.e., 
fast response) the semantic categorisation of the sentence as metaphorical or literal? It also 
investigated the role of the hand choice for gesturing for the potential priming effect. The 
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study provided no evidence for priming effects of gestures when produced alone on semantic 
categorisation of sentences. We only found that producing gestures (matching or 
mismatching with the sentences) slowed down the categorisation of subsequent sentences 
compared to producing no gestures. This finding suggested that the baseline condition of no 
gesturing had a reduced cognitive load compared to the gesturing conditions. In addition, 
there was no evidence for different priming effects between metaphorical and literal action 
sentences, and no evidence that matching left hand gestures particularly facilitate the 
semantic categorisation of metaphorical rather than literal sentences. The null results are not 
sufficient to understand the effect of gesture when produced alone on semantic processing, 
and further research is needed.  
Chapter 6 investigated whether semantics plays a crucial role for the right-
hemispheric involvement during metaphorical speech production. We used the mouth 
asymmetry technique to capture the hemispheric involvement during speech production. The 
study found that the right-sided mouth asymmetry reduced during metaphorical compared to 
concrete explanations, and this reduction was driven by the production of content rather than 
function words. We concluded that semantics, as in producing content words to represent 
distant, metaphorical mappings, is why the right hemisphere is particularly involved during 
metaphorical speech production. 
 
7.2 Implications 
7.2.1 Embodiment 
The thesis built on the embodied semantic perspective, which suggests that action-
perception mechanisms are functionally important components of the semantic systems in the 
brain (Pulvermüller, 2013). It has been proposed that sensory-motor activation is automatic, 
fast and somatotopic when processing meaning that describes action (Boulenger et al., 2006; 
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Buccino et al., 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller, 1999). This has also been confirmed for 
processing metaphorical action sentences (Desai et al., 2011; 2013), idiomatic sentences 
(Boulenger et al., 2009), and abstract transfer sentences (Glenberg et al., 2008). In addition, 
gestural representation of action may modulate processing of metaphorical action meaning 
(Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). The thesis aimed to advance the field by investigating how gesture 
production, concurrent with speech and isolated, influences people’s representation, 
comprehension and production of abstract meaning in the form of metaphor. 
The thesis goes beyond the previous literature in an important way. Chapter 3 showed 
that left hand gestures enhanced metaphor explanation (descriptively so did right hand 
gestures). In line with the Gesture-as-Action-Simulation account (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) 
and the Information Packaging Account (Kita, 2000), it seems that gestures served as 
simulators of concrete concepts and helped the conceptual mapping of concrete meaning on 
to abstract meaning in the form of metaphor. Explanation of metaphors involves activation of 
imagery that relies on simulations of perception and action (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), 
therefore this process can be enhanced by gestures that highlight visuo-motor information 
(Alibali et al., 2011). Chapter 4 aimed to further extend the embodied accounts using a 
different task, which measured the spontaneous use of metaphor related expressions within 
abstract context. It predicted that gestures, as opposed to meaningless tapping movements, 
might trigger representation of abstract meaning in the form of metaphor, and in turn increase 
the likelihood for metaphorical language use. In addition, Chapter 5 predicted that 
comprehension of metaphorical and literal action sentences would rely on sensory-motor 
information encoded in gestures, hence preceding, matching, action gestures would prime 
sentence comprehension. However, the null results from those two chapters were not 
sufficient to confirm either the embodied or disembodied accounts.  
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7.2.2 Functions of gestures 
The thesis built on theories about gestures’ facilitative effects on cognitive processes, 
namely theories about self-oriented functions of gestures, and advanced the field by 
identifying a mechanism behind them. It has been suggested that gestures may help speakers 
identify which lexical features to use, as the Lexical Processing model suggests (Krauss & 
Hadar, 2001; Rauscher et al., 1996). Also, gestures may reinforce our mental images and help 
maintain them in memory, as the Image Maintenance account suggests (de Ruiter, 1995; 
Wesp et al., 2001). In addition, gestures may help speakers identify which features of a 
mental image to mention and organise information to be uttered, as the Information 
Packaging account suggests (Alibali & Kita, 2010; Alibali, Kita & Young, 2000; Kita, 2000). 
Finally, gestures may lighten up cognitive load in working memory (Goldin-Meadow et al., 
2001). The current thesis investigated, for the first time, whether right and left hand gestures 
differ in the degree of impact they have on language processing.  
Chapter 3 provided evidence that right and left hand gestures differed in the degree of 
the facilitative effect they have on metaphor explanation. When encouraged to gesture with 
one of the hands, while the other hand was prohibited from gesturing, speakers produced 
more enhanced metaphorical explanations when gesturing with the left hand, compared to the 
right hand or not gesturing at all. This indicated that left-hand gestures enhanced performance 
in the explanation task because they enhanced metaphorical processing involving the contra-
lateral right hemisphere. This left-hand gesturing advantage cannot be due to distraction or 
discomfort due to prohibition of right-hand gesturing. This is because, spontaneous left hand 
gestures enhanced explanations compared to not gesturing with it by choice, and not 
gesturing by choice vs. by instruction did not influence the level of metaphoricity. 
Furthermore, this left-over-right-hand gesturing advantage was higher for speakers with 
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stronger right hemispheric involvement during speech production. This correlational finding 
further suggested the hemisphere specific impact of gestures and confirmed that the 
somewhat small difference between the two gesturing conditions (the mean difference of 
metaphoricity levels in the left hand gesturing condition minus the right hand gesturing 
condition is .14 with SD = .30) is important and relates to the degree of the right hemispheric 
processing of the participants. This study extended previous findings showing that 
hemispheric involvement during linguistic tasks may determine hand choice for gesturing 
(Kimura, 1973; Kita et al., 2007; Mumford & Kita, under review) by providing evidence for 
the reverse link. In addition, it extended the Information Packaging Hypothesis for self-
oriented functions of gestures (Alibali & Kita, 2010; Alibali, et al., 2000; Kita, 2000), by 
showing that left hand gestures help the conceptual mapping from a source to a target domain 
of metaphor, thereby influences thinking (Alibali et al., 2011) and content of verbal output 
(Alibali & Kita, 2010; Rime et al., 1984). How exactly does this work? Gestures, and 
especially those with the left hand, offer a visuo-motor representation of a concept, which 
taps into and boosts speakers’ conceptual knowledge, and in turn helps the right-hemisphere 
specific process of mapping concrete concepts on to abstract ones in the form of metaphor 
(Jung-Beeman, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). We introduced this as the “hemisphere-
specific feedback hypothesis” for gestures self-oriented functions, such that gestures with a 
particular hand facilitate cognitive processes in the contra-lateral hemisphere. Thus, gestures 
are not merely hand waving. They rather shape our thoughts and can modulate the content of 
what we say.  
Chapters 4 and 5 provided no evidence for the hemisphere-specific feedback 
hypothesis in tasks other that metaphorical explanation such as metaphorical judgment (task 
difference is further discussed in the next section). However, the unexpected (although 
tenuous) pattern of results in Chapter 4, that gestures (regardless of the hand used) compared 
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to meaningless tapping movements increased the length of explanations (i.e., number of 
words uttered) points towards an influential role of gestures on properties of speech, such as 
“verbosity”, and could be further explored.  
 
7.2.3 Gestures, metaphor and the right-hemisphere 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 drew upon the relative hemispheric involvement of the right 
hemisphere for metaphor processing (Winner & Garnder, 1977; Anaki et al., 1998; Bottini et 
al., 1994), and investigated whether gestures with the left hand can facilitate this right 
hemisphere specific metaphor processing. Previous research (Kimura, 1973; Kita, de 
Condappa, et al., 2007; Mumford & Kita, under review) showed that relative hemispheric 
involvement for a linguistic task determines hand choice for gesturing. For example, Kita, de 
Condappa, et al. (2007) showed that right hand preference for gestures reduced when 
explaining metaphorical compared to non-metaphorical phrases. The current thesis, for the 
first time, explored the reverse causal chain. Although there are studies showing that gestures 
increase production of spatial metaphors (Bos & Cienki, 2011), there is no study 
investigating the differential effect that left and right hand gestures might have on such a 
facilitation effect. Only Ciantar, Finch, and Copland (2013) explored the effect of hand 
choice for movement, but they used complex meaningless movements (rather than gestures), 
and they focused on memory tasks (rather than a hemispheric specific linguistic task such as 
metaphor processing). In addition, the current thesis drew upon the Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a) and investigated whether conceptual knowledge and 
metaphorical mappings underlie and motivate different components of metaphor processing 
(e.g., metaphorical explanation, production and categorisation) such that they will be 
enhanced by gestural representation of sensory-motor information. 
Chapter 3 provided, for the first time, evidence that gesturing with the left hand 
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enhanced metaphorical explanation involving the right hemisphere compared to right hand 
gesturing and not gesturing at all. This finding was further strengthened because the left-
over-right-hand gesturing facilitation effect on metaphor explanation positively correlated 
with the right hemispheric involvement during speech production. In addition, metaphor 
explanation was improved when participants spontaneously gestured with the left hand 
compared to not gesturing with it by choice (while this was not found for the right hand). It 
seems that representing meaning with the left hand “feeds back” and facilitates the processing 
of metaphorical mapping (e.g., explain how the “beans” represent a “secret” in the phrase “to 
spill the beans”), which is crucial for metaphor processing and the involvement of the right 
hemisphere during metaphorical explanation (Jung-Beeman, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980a). 
 Chapters 4 and 5 provided no evidence for such facilitation on metaphor production 
and semantic categorisation. This may relate to differential hemispheric involvement for 
different tasks. It could be that explanation of metaphors, to include the underlying 
conceptual metaphor and metaphorical mapping, engages the right hemisphere and allows the 
left hand gesture to enhance processing. In contrast, spontaneous use of metaphor related 
expressions (Chapter 4) and semantic classification of a sentence as metaphorical or not 
(Chapter 5) might not require processing of the metaphorical mapping, and thus are not right 
hemisphere specific processing. These tasks may not be sensitive and hemisphere specific 
enough to allow facilitative effects from left hand gestures. The thesis combines the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (R. W. Gibbs et al., 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; Nayak & 
Gibbs, 1990) and the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor (Anaki et al., 1998; Bottini 
et al., 1994; Winner & Gardner, 1977), and partially supports them (based on findings from 
Chapter 3). That is, metaphor explanation depends heavily on the knowledge of conceptual 
metaphors and understanding of distant, metaphorical mappings hence it is right hemisphere 
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specific, and is facilitated by representation of sensory-motor information in gestures 
(Chapter 3). However, this may not be the case for spontaneous production of metaphorical 
expressions or classification of sentences as metaphorical or not (Chapters 4 and 5). Our 
findings do not provide evidence to support the alternative metaphor theories as discussed in 
section 2.2.1. Finally, the current thesis points towards differential effects of gestures on 
metaphor processing depending on the degree of right hemispheric involvement and the 
reliance on metaphorical mappings. This is in line with the differential effects of gestures on 
different stages of analogical reasoning found in Cooperrider and Goldin-Meadow (2014). 
Given that both tasks rely on some sort of ‘transfer’ (e.g., metaphorical and analogical 
transfer), it would be interesting for future research to explore the left vs. right hand gesturing 
differences in analogical reasoning tasks.  
 
7.2.4 Metaphor and the right-hemisphere 
Chapter 6 addressed the issue of whether the right hemisphere is involved during 
metaphor production, and if semantics is crucial for this involvement. As far as we know, 
there is only one study focusing on metaphor production (Benedek et al., 2014), and one 
exploring the role of semantics on metaphor processing (Cardillo et al., 2012). However, 
Benedek et al. (2014) did not explore the role of semantics. Also, Cardillo et al. (2012) 
proposed that semantic rather than syntactic features are important for the hemispheric 
involvement during metaphor processing. However, they focused on comprehension, rather 
than production, and they did not assess non-metaphorical stimuli. Our study filled in this 
gap. We found that, while overall the right side of the mouth opened wider than the left when 
speaking (thus suggesting the involvement of the language dominant left hemisphere for 
speech production; in line with Graves & Landis, 1985; 1990), this right-sided mouth 
asymmetry significantly reduced during metaphorical compared to non-metaphorical (e.g., 
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concrete) speech production. Importantly, this reduction was particularly pronounced for the 
production of content rather than function words. The study confirmed the Right Hemisphere 
Hypothesis for Metaphor (Anaki et al., 1998; Bottini et al., 1994; Winner & Gardner, 1977) 
providing evidence, for the first time, from online, production tasks. Additionally, it extended 
the theoretical explanation for this right hemispheric involvement for metaphor (Jung-
Beeman, 2005). It showed that during metaphor production, semantics and, in particular, 
using content words to represent the distant, metaphorical mappings might determine the 
relative involvement of the right hemisphere.  
 
7.2.5 Experimental design 
The current thesis can inform the experimental design of future studies on self-
oriented functions of gestures, the differential effects of right-hand and left-hand gestures, the 
hemispheric involvement for cognitive tasks, and metaphor processing. 
Firstly, the experimental manipulations of gesture elicitation via gesture 
encouragement and gesture prohibition proved effective. Encouraging participants to gesture 
has been used in a number of studies (Broaders et al., 2007; Chu & Kita, 2011; Cook et al., 
2012). Our data from Chapters 3 and 4 showed that the majority of the gestures produced 
following encouragement instructions were representational gestures (rather than, for 
example, stress related self-touching gestures). In addition, our data from Chapter 3 showed 
that the observed effects are due to gesturing with the one hand, rather than prohibiting the 
other. The control study in Chapter 3 showed that metaphorical explanation was enhanced 
when spontaneously gesturing with the left hand compared to not gesturing with it by choice, 
and for both right and left hands performance was comparable when not gesturing by choice 
vs. by instruction. Therefore, gesture prohibition is not artificial or distracting (in line with 
Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001, and Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005), but it is also not 
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sufficient to explain the observed effects of enhanced metaphorical explanation.  
Secondly, the order in which participants performed each condition (e.g., first gesture 
with the left hand, then with the right, and in the end do not gesture) may affect performance 
in tasks that measure the effect of gesture handedness on properties of speech production. 
Data from the order analysis in Chapter 4 showed that for participants who were prohibited 
from moving in the first block of trials gesturing, as predicted, increased the likelihood for 
metaphorical language use compared to no gesturing, and, tapping reduced metaphorical 
language use compared to no tapping. Descriptively, and as predicted, the difference between 
gesturing and tapping was more apparent within the left hand free condition. Importantly, 
metaphorical language use did not differ in the baseline, prohibition conditions for the 
gesturing and tapping groups. This was not the case for participants who were prohibited in 
the second/third blocks. It seems that gesture production in the first block(s) increased the 
likelihood for metaphorical language use and this effect lingered on to the subsequent blocks, 
when gesturing was prohibited, indicating a “sustained beneficial” effect of gestures on 
metaphorical language use. This finding is in line with Chu and Kita (2011) who showed that 
the beneficial effect of co-thought gestures in a mental rotation task could be extended even 
in a subsequent block of trials in which gesturing is prohibited. But, more importantly, it 
indicates that a random, instead of blocked, order of trials with left, right and no gesturing 
could be more effective when measuring spontaneous speech production as a function of 
hand choice for gesturing.  
Thirdly, different tasks and measurements may give different results. We have already 
discussed (section 7.2.3 “Gesture, metaphor and the right-hemisphere”) that measuring levels 
of metaphoricity in explanations of metaphorical mappings may be more sensitive to activate 
the right-hemisphere specific component of metaphor processing and manifest the 
hemisphere-specific facilitative effect from gestures, compared to measuring spontaneous 
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production of metaphor related expressions. In addition, Chapter 6 indicated that semantic 
categorisation of sentences (e.g., decide if a sentence is metaphorical or literal) is a complex, 
multifaceted task, which requires more than one level of processing: conceptual 
representation of the sentence meaning, comprehension and then categorisation as a response. 
Therefore, it may be difficult to measure the priming effect from gestures on this complicated 
response. For example, it is possible that gestures prime the representation of a subsequent 
sentence, but not its semantic classification. This finding suggested that, when targets are 
sentences, we could use the priming paradigm combined with different tasks. For example, 
categorisation tasks that refer to general categories (e.g., is a sentence sensible or not) reduce 
the development of response strategies (Bowers & Turner, 2003) (e.g., if the O-NP is 
abstract, the sentence is metaphorical, and if it is concrete, the sentence is literal) .  
Finally, the mouth asymmetry technique is a valid, sensitive, online, non-invasive and 
inexpensive measurement that could be used to capture differential hemispheric involvement 
for different speech production tasks, and even for production of different types of words. For 
example, Chapter 3 and 6 used two different samples, and they both showed that the right-
sided mouth asymmetry reduced while explaining metaphorical compared to non-
metaphorical phrases. Mouth asymmetry can be particularly useful for speech production 
studies with an individual-subjects localisation approach of language processing.  
 
7.3 Limitations 
There are some limitations to the current thesis that we should consider while 
interpreting the findings. Firstly, our sample included right-handers only. Like all studies on 
metaphor and gesture, we controlled for manual handedness, in order to control for patterns 
of cerebral dominance for speech and gesture production. However, it would be useful to 
explore how gesture and speech interact in the brain of left-handers. Secondly, our sample is 
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mixed in terms of gender. In Chapters 3 and 6, we deliberately tested males only to control 
for cerebral asymmetries often found in women (Hausmann & Güntürkün, 2000). In Chapters 
4 and 5, we aimed to extend findings by including females. However, practical difficulties 
during recruitment did not allow us to test a proportionate sample of males and females, but 
future studies should allow so. Additionally, we focused on uni-manual gestures only and not 
bi-manual. This was a necessary manipulation to test our hemisphere-specific feedback 
hypothesis. However, it is not artificial, because uni-manual and bimanual gestures are 
spontaneously produced in natural conversations (K. Miller & Franz, 2005). Finally, one 
could argue that the small sample size was a possible limitation. However, given the 
observed significant differences between left and right gesture and left and no gesture with a 
sample size of 31 (Chapter 3), and following Howell (2007, p.226) that ‘retrospective power 
offers no additional information for explaining non-significant results’, we cannot suggest 
that small sample size resulted to non-significant findings in the remaining chapters. Of 
course, future research could employ power analysis a priori to determine sample size.  
 
7.4 Future work  
The current thesis has also raised interesting questions and motivated future research 
at least towards four directions.  
Firstly, future research could investigate the qualitative differences between left-hand 
and right-hand gestures. Anecdotal evidence from already collected data in the thesis 
suggests that left-hand gestures tend to be more “exploratory” compared to right-hand 
gestures (e.g., when using the left hand, participants would produce fluid gestures placing 
their abstract thoughts in the space in front of their body, while right-hand gestures would 
firmly represent an object). In addition, it was easier to segment gestures with the right than 
left hand. We could further explore these qualitative differences between left and right hand 
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gestures, and their differential effects on speaking and thinking.  
Secondly, future research could investigate the effect of gestures on qualitative 
properties of speech. The study in Chapter 4, unexpectedly, showed that lengthier 
explanations increased the likelihood of using metaphor related expressions. We could 
explore further the facilitative effect that gestures might have on “verbosity” and in turn 
creative thinking.  
Thirdly, future research could investigate the variations in metaphor comprehension 
and production at an individual level. Experiment 1 in Chapter 3 showed that people vary in 
the degree of right-hemispheric involvement in speech production, and this variation relates 
to the degree of the left-hand gesture facilitation effect on metaphorical explanation. 
Individual variation in cognitive processing (e.g., ability of people to understand distant 
semantic links) and its relation to variations in metaphorical processing could be further 
explored to inform experimental designs of future studies on metaphor. Furthermore, we 
could develop a project to measure hemispheric involvement during speech production via a 
direct physiological method, instead of the indirect mouth asymmetry measurement.  
Finally, future research could investigate the neural substrates of metaphorical and 
literal action comprehension. We could combine the cross modal semantic priming paradigm 
from Chapter 5 with brain-imaging methodologies to investigate whether the sensory-motor 
system is modulated similarly (e.g., strength and/or location of activity) as a function of 
linguistic properties (i.e., comprehension of metaphorical and literal action sentences) and 
matching of stimuli (i.e., congruent and incongruent combinations between gesture primes 
and target sentences, no prime).  
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Appendix Chapter 3 
Supplemental Material Text S1 
The following inventory was adjusted from Oldfield (1971). 
The modified Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
Please indicate your preference in the use of your hands in the following activities by circling 
the appropriate option. If you are indifferent, select “Either”. 
1.   With which hand do you normally write? left either right 
2.   With which hand do you draw? left either right 
3.   Which hand would you use to throw a ball to hit a target? left either right 
4.   With which hand do you use your toothbrush? left either right 
5.   Which hand holds a knife when you are cutting things?  
(not with a fork)  
left either right 
6.   Which hand holds the thread when you are threading a                   
needle?     
left either right 
7.   When you strike a match, which hand holds the match? left either right 
8.   When you open a box, which hand holds the lid? left either right 
9.   Which hand holds the spoon when you are eating a soup?  left either right 
10. With which hand do you use scissors? left either right 
11. Which hand is at the upper part of the broom? left either right 
12. Which hand holds the hammer when you are driving a nail? left either right 
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Supplemental Material Text S2 
Coding Manual for Metaphoricity Levels in the Metaphorical Explanation Task 
(Developed by Paraskevi Argyriou and Sotaro Kita) 
 
You (the coder) will need to code the metaphoricity of the explanations that 31 
participants (orally) gave for a total of 18 metaphorical idiomatic expressions, such as “to 
spill the beans”. The level of metaphoricity is measured based on whether the explanations 
include an explicit link between the literal and metaphorical meanings, that is, whether 
participants explicitly referred to the metaphorical mapping between the source and target 
domains of the conceptual metaphor underlying each idiomatic expression. According to the 
conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, 1980b), metaphor is a matter of 
conceptualizing one conceptual, abstract domain (target domain) in terms of another, 
concrete (source domain). For example, “time passing” is often understood in terms of 
“motion”, hence expressions such as “the time is here… the time for action has arrived”.  
The metaphoricity of each explanation was rated on a three-point scale (0 to 2) using 
the following guidelines: a ‘‘0’’ rating indicated that the explanation did not contain words or 
phrases referring to the source domain of the relevant conceptual metaphor, therefore there 
was no metaphorical cross-domain mapping; a rating of ‘‘1’’ indicated that the explanation 
contained words or phrases that might be construed as references to the source domain, but 
the references were ambiguous or vague, and the mapping between the two domains implicit 
or underspecified; a rating of ‘‘2’’ indicated that the explanation contained words or phrases 
that explicitly and clearly refer to the source and target domains, and the mapping was 
explicit. 
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Exemplar coding for the expression “To dodge the bullet”  
1. To dodge the bullet, means when you have a situation where you might be under 
some kind of danger or attack or something like that. Αnd you find a way to to save 
yourself from that. And it's pretty self-evident that if a bullet's coming towards you, 
it's gonna harm you if it touches you, or it hits you. So you you run, and jump out the 
way. 
This explanation is coded with “0” because it is too concrete (referring only to the source 
domain), and the speaker does not mention how “bullet” and “dodge” represent abstract 
concepts, "to avoid something dangerous". 
2. Τo dodge the bullet means to sort of avoid something bad that could have happened to 
you. Τhe bullet representing the bad thing because bullets can kill you and to dodge 
the bullet that means you don't get shot. 
This explanation is coded with “1” because it vaguely refers to the metaphorical mapping for 
"bullet" (= “bullet representing the bad thing”). The representation of “dodging” is quite 
concrete (= “you don’t get shot” rather than “avoiding something dangerous”). 
3. To dodge the bullet means to avoid consequence, that’s sort of bad consequence of 
one of your actions. And the bullet signifies the consequence, which is sort of 
punishment. And so to dodge means, you avoid it. 
This explanation is coded with “2” because it explicitly refers to the two key metaphorical 
mappings (= “bullet signifies consequence”, “dodge means avoid”) 
 
Specific coding issues for the application of the coding to the speech data: 
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1. Coding is done in Microsoft Excel file, where each raw includes the verbal response for 
each metaphorical explanation. You add the number 0, 1, 2 in the column named 
“Metaphoricity Rating”. 
2. We are not coding for accuracy. In some cases participants give an “unconventional” 
metaphorical mapping, which is “wrong” from the viewpoint of dictionary definitions. 
However, this should not affect the metaphoricity coding. If the explanation includes the 
mapping and the representation of the concepts, even though this might be different from 
what you (the coder) have in mind or the dictionary definitions, you should code it with a 
“2”. For example, the explanation below should be coded with “2” because it explicitly 
represents the concepts (= “bullet is the main important thing”, “to dodge is to try to get 
out”) even if they are not the right ones according to the dictionary.  
E.g., “Τo dodge the bullet. Well, to dodge, well the bullet is the main important thing, which 
is happening in the current moment, if you were trying to dodge it, it means that you're trying 
to get out having to think about the important issue of yeah I think, possibly.” 
3. The length of the explanation is not necessarily related with how elaborate the 
explanation is in terms of metaphoricity; in some cases short descriptions include the 
representation of each concept and the metaphorical mapping, thus may be coded with a 
“2”. (Short descriptions may lack examples of situations for which the expressions can be 
used, which are not relevant for the coding) 
4. The order that the representations should not affect the coding. So, for example in the 
explanation of the expression “to dodge the bullet” you might see the representation of 
the bullet first and then the one for dodging, or vice-versa.    
5. If a response includes the meaning of the expression only (e.g., “to spill the beans is to 
tell a secret”), then it should be coded with a “0”. 
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Supplemental material Text S3 
Coding manual for maximum mouth opening laterality 
(Developed by Sotaro Kita, Sarah Aldgate, Heather Golden, and Paraskevi Argyriou) 
 
1. During speech the mouth opens and closes repeatedly without full closure except for the 
beginning and the end. We measure the laterality of the mouth (right, left, equal) at each 
maximum opening.  
2. The coder selects one of the following options: the right side opens more, the left side 
opens more or they open equally. You make a judgment about opening based on the vertical 
dimension (not horizontal). Note, that during the production of one word more than one 
mouth openings might occur. The following pieces of information help determine the 
judgment: 
(a) You can compare the maximum distance between the upper and the lower lips on the right 
and the left hand side. How much of the teeth you can see in each side can be helpful. But, 
note that you need to take into account how straight the teeth are arranged on each side.  
(b) A “pull” in the upper or lower lip in a particular direction is informative. Sometimes, the 
muscle around the upper or the lower lip is contracted more so than the opposite side (i.e., 
left vs. right). When the upper lip is pulled, it looks thinner. When the bottom lip is pulled, it 
looks thicker. Note, however, you need to take into account the fact that some people 
naturally have a lip thinner/thicker on one side than the other. In some cases the wider 
opening is on the opposite side of the lip that is pulled. For example, the upper left lip is 
pulled and the right side of the mouth opens wider (This should be coded as “the right side 
opens more”).  
(c) How the lips are joined in the two corners of the mouth can be informative.  
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(d) How the lips open and close before and after the maximum opening may be informative. 
If one side opens sooner then that side maybe the side that opens at the maximum opening. 
(Note that which side opens wider may change during opening. But, we code the laterality for 
the maximum opening only). If one side closes sooner then that side may have been opened 
less wide than the other.  
Specific coding issues for the application of the coding to the video recordings: 
(1) You do not code the mouth openings in the beginning of each trial when participants 
repeat the phrase to be explained (e.g., “To spin a yarn means that”).  
(2) You do not code the mouth when it opens for non-speaking purposes, such as smiles.  
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Supplemental Material Text S4 
Analysis with metaphoricity treated as ordinal 
Data from the metaphorical explanation task were analysed using cumulative link 
mixed effects (CLM) models and the package ordinal in the R Project for Statistical 
Computing environment, version 3.1.1 (Bates & Sarkar, 2012; Hothorn et al., 2012; R 
Development Core Team, 2011). Results remained the same. All ordered mixed effects 
regressions in the present study were carried out with “clmm()” function with Laplace 
approximation. 
We fit CLM model to the measurement of the level of the metaphoricity. In the 
model, the hand, which was free for gesturing (left, right, no hand) was fixed effect and the 
“no hand” condition was treated as the reference category. We included random intercepts 
and slopes by subjects and items (phrases) for the fixed factor. We obtained p-values 
following the likelihood-ratio test approach for model comparison. 
The contrasts of the maximal model are reported in Table 1. Likelihood model 
comparison with the null model with no fixed effect (same random effect structure) indicated 
that the addition of which hand was free for gesturing (left, right, none) improved the model 
fit: χ2(2) = 15.171, p < .001. Thus, gestures with the left compared to the right hand and not 
gesturing at all enhanced metaphorical processing as measured through the level of 
metaphoricity in metaphorical explanation.  
 
Table 1 Contrasts of the model. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
No – Left Hand  -.952 .229 -4.157 < .001 
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No – Right Hand -.428 .227 -1.879 .060 
Right – Left Hand  -.524 .227 -2.303 .021 
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Supplementary material Text S5  
Analysis with length of explanations as dependent variable 
In this section, we focused on a different property of participants’ responses, which is 
not metaphor related. We investigated whether which hand was free might have an effect on 
the length of participants’ metaphorical explanations measured in number of words produced 
(M = 97.05, SD = 43.13). Note that this measurement does not capture number of different 
words produced. Any potential effect on length of explanations or speech rate may confound 
the observed effects on levels of metaphoricity (i.e., participants may be more metaphorical 
when they gestured with the left hand because they also produced more words compared to 
the other conditions). However, our research questions or theoretical background do not 
predict such effects, therefore we do not make strong claims based on this post-hoc, 
supplementary analysis.  
We fit LME model to the measurement of length of explanations. Hand free (left, 
right, no hand) was fixed effect and the “no hand” condition was the reference category. We 
included random intercepts and slopes by subjects and items (phrases) for the fixed factor.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 1. Likelihood model comparison with the null 
model with no fixed effect (same random effect structure) indicated that the addition of 
gesture handedness (left, right, none) did not improve the model fit: χ2 (2) = 2.699, p = .259. 
Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) revealed non-significant 
contrasts (see Table 2). Thus, we have no evidence that left or right hand gesturing or not 
gesturing at all affects the length of metaphorical explanations.  
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Table 1 Model estimates for the effect of hand free on length of explanations. No hand 
condition is the reference category.  
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept)  93.248 6.716 13.884 
Left Hand 3.848 2.970 1.296 
Right Hand 5.902 3.832 1.540 
 
Table 2 Contrasts for the effect of gesture handedness on length of explanations. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
No – Left Hand  -3.848 2.970 -1.296 .395 
Right – Left Hand 2.054 3.630 .566 .837 
No – Right Hand -5.902 3.832 -1.540 .270 
 
Next, we assessed the relationship between length of explanations and levels of 
metaphoricity. Averaged across participants, we found no significant correlation between the 
length of the explanations and levels of metaphoricity, r (29) = -.206, 95% CI [-.522, .159], p 
= .264. Thus, we have no evidence that metaphoricity levels in explanations relate to the 
amount of words participants produced. 
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Supplemental Material Text S6 
Analysis of the mouth asymmetry data 
We tested which side of the mouth opened wider during metaphorical and concrete 
explanation tasks. The left-side mouth dominance index was significantly lower than zero in 
the concrete (M = -.11, SE = .08, range = -.09 to 0.77), t (30) = -2.71, p = .011 but not in the 
metaphorical (M = -.24, SE = .09, range = -1 to .77), t (30) = -1.39, p = .176, condition. That 
is, in the concrete condition, the right side of the mouth opened wider than the left reflecting 
the important role of the left hemisphere for speaking. In the metaphorical condition, the 
same tendency was found numerically, but was not statistically significant.  
In addition, we compared asymmetry of mouth openings during concrete and 
metaphorical explanations. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA performed on the left-
side mouth dominance index with linguistic task as the independent variable yielded 
significant effect of the task, F (1,30) = 6.45, p = .016, ηp2 = .18. The left-side dominance 
score was significantly higher in metaphorical explanations (M = -.11, SE = .08, range = -.09 
to 0.77) than in concrete explanations (M = -.24, SE = .09, range = -1 to .77). This replicates 
the results from Argyriou et al. (2015) and indicates that the right hemisphere was 
particularly involved during metaphorical phrase explanations, providing more evidence for 
the Right Hemisphere Hypothesis for Metaphor (Bottini et al., 1994). It is also line with other 
studies showing that mouth asymmetry measurement is sensitive to the relative involvement 
of the two brain hemispheres in speaking tasks (Graves & Landis, 1990). Finally, it further 
validates the mouth opening asymmetry as an index of the hemispheric involvement in 
speech production during the explanation tasks used in the current study. 
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Supplemental Material Text S7 
Analysis with metaphoricity treated as ordinal 
Data from the metaphorical explanation task were analysed using cumulative link 
mixed effects (CLM) models and the package ordinal in the R Project for Statistical 
Computing environment, version 3.1.1 (Bates & Sarkar, 2012; Hothorn et al., 2012; R 
Development Core Team, 2011). All ordered mixed effects regressions in the present study 
were carried out with “clmm()” function with Laplace approximation. 
We fit CLM model to the measurement of the level of the metaphoricity. The model 
included two fixed effect factors and the interaction between the two. The one fixed factor 
was the hand free (left, right; dummy coded; “right” was the reference category). The model 
automatically selected “right” as the reference category against which the comparisons are 
made. The second fixed factor was presence/absence of spontaneous gestures (dummy coded; 
“absence” was the reference category). We included random intercepts and slopes by subjects 
and items (phrases) for the main effects and interaction of the fixed effect factors.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 1. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main effects only (same random effect structure). Adding the 
interaction did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 (1) = .984, p = .321. Though the 
interaction was not significant we further explored the contrasts for two reasons. Firstly, we 
had a priori predictions for the comparison of the spontaneous presence/absence of gestures 
within each hand condition. Secondly, a large number of missing values in the data made the 
test of interaction less powerful. Only 12 out of 32 participants had cells in all four conditions 
and fully contributed data for estimating the interaction effect. This was, mainly, because 
many participants did not have any trials without right-hand gestures (e.g., they 
spontaneously gestured in all right-hand free trials) and some participants did not have any 
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trials with spontaneous left-hand gesture. In contrast, more participants could be included if 
we analysed the effect of presence/absence of spontaneous gestures for the left hand and for 
the right hand separately (e.g., 19 participants for the left hand and 18 participants for the 
right hand), which would lead to more reliable results. The tests of (function lsmeans()) 
revealed that the contrast between presence and absence of spontaneous gestures was 
significant for the left hand, but not for the right hand (the rest of the contrasts were not 
significant) (see Table 2). Thus, spontaneously gesturing with the left hand increased the 
level of metaphoricity in metaphorical explanation compared to not gesturing with it by 
choice.  
 
Table 6 Coefficients of the maximal model. Right Hand Free and Absence of Spontaneous 
Gesture are the reference categories 
Fixed Effect Estimate  SE p-value 
Left Hand  -.447 .795 .574 
Gesture Present .658 .626 .294 
Left Hand: Gesture Present .791 .800 .323 
 
Table 2 Contrasts for interaction.  
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Left Hand Gesture Present vs. Absent 1.450 .466 3.107 .010 
Right Hand Gesture Present vs. Absent .658 .626 1.050 .719 
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Appendix Chapter 4 
Supplemental Material Text S1 
Coding Manual for Metaphor Identification in the Abstract Explanation Task  
(Developed by Paraskevi Argyriou, Sotaro Kita, Louisa Hughes, University of Birmingham) 
 
Criteria for metaphor identification: 
1. Idiomatic metaphorical expressions, such as, “to sit on the fence”, “to tie up loose ends” 
are identified as metaphorical units.  
E.g. “To finalise details is like at the end of a process to almost tying up the loose ends”.   
2. A unit is metaphorical if there is a physically/spatially related concrete equivalent 
expression, which can serve as the source domain of the metaphor.  
E.g. “let a memory go” ~ “let the dog go/ let my hand go” (= concrete; we let an object go) 
[MEMORIES ARE OBJECTS], thus the first “let go” is metaphorical. 
E.g. “give away information” ~ “give away old clothes” (= concrete; we give away objects) 
[IDEAS/INFORMATION ARE OBJECTS] [SAYING IS GIVING], thus the first “give 
away” is metaphorical. 
3. A unit is metaphorical if the coder can detect an underlying conceptual metaphor such as 
[IDEAS ARE OBJECTS] [LOVE IS A JOURNEY] etc. For every unit identified as 
metaphor, the coder should be able to detect (and note down) these conceptual schemas; 
either the underlying conceptual metaphor and/or the systematic metaphor (= more specific 
context metaphorical schema; note in italics). 
E.g. “focus on important aspects” [UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING]  
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E.g. “get knocked back” [LIFE IS A WAR] DISAGREEING IS FIGHTING 
Note 1: Most of the times criteria 2 and 3 are met together. However, coder should be always 
able to identify a conceptual metaphor. So, there might be cases where only criterion 3 is met. 
Then, again the unit should be identified as metaphor. Think of the example “to look to the 
future”. The expression “look to” does not have an equivalent concrete/physical (in English 
we use “look at something” instead of “look to”). However, it is identified as metaphor 
because there is an underlying conceptual metaphor [TIME IS VISIBLE SPACE].  
Note 2: If a coder is “sitting on the fence” for identifying the conceptual metaphor because of 
ambiguity, then the explanation should be coded as non-metaphoric. For example, “go 
against that” > is not clear where the referential pronoun “that” is referring. 
Note 3: The coder should read the explanation from start to end before coding. There might 
be cases when an expression is identified as metaphorical only after you read the proceeding 
sentence. For example, “to control means to put chains to someone, to restrain someone and 
influence their behavior like parents do with their children”. The expression in red when read 
alone without proceeding to the next sentence, is concrete and literal. However, it should be 
identified as a metaphor because it cannot be a literal reference to putting chains to children.  
 
Special cases: 
1. Do not include similes (metaphorical or non-metaphorical ones). E.g., “a catastrophe is 
like the worst possible thing that could happen”.  
a. NOTE: “like” can be used as a filled pause when for example speakers are struggling to 
find the correct word. This use of “like” is not similes. 
2. Do not include personifications (= humane features to inanimate concepts). E.g., “this is an 
unhelpful situation”. [A SITUATION IS A PERSON] 
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a. BUT do include examples when you can explain them with a different (from the [STH IS 
A PERSON]) underlying conceptual schema: e.g. “a situation rises” [A SITUATION IS AN 
OBJECT WHICH BECOMES VISIBLE] 
3. Do not include highly frequent nouns: thing, -thing (as in something), part, way (if we do, 
it will result to very lengthy lists of metaphors and ceiling effects).  
4. Common verbs, such as, keep, give, carry, get, go, come, have need special attention 
Do not include cases, such as, “keep (on) trying” but do include cases such as, “keep a 
secret” (= the verb “keep” has a possessive meaning and “secret” is an abstract concept 
considered as an object in possession). 
Do not include cases, such as, “carry (on) doing” but do include cases such as, “carry a 
meaning” (= the verb “carry” has a possessive meaning and “meaning” is an abstract concept 
considered as an object in possession). 
Do not include cases, such as, “give up on someone” but do include cases such as, “give 
someone information” (= the verb “give” has a transitive meaning and “information” is an 
abstract concept considered as an object to be transferred). 
Do not include cases, such as, “get used to something” but do include cases such as, “get 
your point across”; “it’s gotten out of hand” 
Do not include cases, such as, “go on with what you do”, “something goes wrong” but do 
include cases such as, “go back in time and think what you have done” (= the verb “go” has 
the meaning of physical movement and “time” is considered a space to move into). 
Do not include cases, such as, “come up with an idea” but do include cases such as, “an idea 
came to my mind” (= the verb “come” has the meaning of physical movement and “idea” is 
an abstract concept considered as a concrete object moving and entering a space). 
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Do not include cases, such as, “have a discussion” when “have” has no possessive meaning, 
rather represents the “experience of discussing”, or cases when “have” is used as an auxiliary 
verb (e.g., I have played) but do include cases such as, “have free time” (= the verb have has 
a possessive meaning and “time” is an abstract concept considered as an object in 
possession). 
5. Do not include prepositions, such as, in(to), over, behind, on, up, down, within, between, 
out of, from through, by, for, of.  
a. BUT do include examples when a unit (verb + preposition) creates a spatial source domain 
for a metaphor.  
E.g. “to forgive is to put behind you something bad that has happened”. EXPERIENCES 
ARE OBJECTS, TIME IS A LINEAR PATH, PAST IS BEHIND. 
6. Do not include highly frequent adjectives about size or texture, such as big, small, huge, 
hard, tough. E.g., “small details”, “big problem”, “huge disruption”, “hard question”. And 
especially the metacognitive comments by speakers, such as, “this is hard to explain without 
using the abstract word”. 
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Supplemental Material Text S2  
Effect of type of hand movement and hand free on the length of explanations  
In this section, we focused on a different property of participants’ responses, which 
was not metaphor related. We investigated whether type of hand movement and hand free 
might have an effect on the length of participants’ abstract explanations measured in number 
of words produced (M = 56.45, SD = 21.86). Note, this measurement does not capture 
number of different words produced.  
We fit LME model to the measurement length of explanations (= number of words 
used in each explanation). The model included two fixed effect factors and the interaction 
between the two. The one fixed factor was the type of hand movement (tap, gesture; dummy 
coded; “tapping group” was the reference category). The second fixed factor was the hand 
free (left, right, no hand; “No hand” was the reference category). The random effects 
structure was kept maximal. The model included (a) random intercepts and slopes by subjects 
for the effect of hand free (type of hand movement was between-subjects manipulation hence 
a random slope by subjects was not necessary) and (b) random intercepts and slopes by items 
for the interaction between type of hand movement and hand free.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 1. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model with the main effects only (same random effect structure). Adding the 
interaction between the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) and hand free (left, right, none) 
did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 (2) = .887, p = .641 (see Figure 1). 
  
Table 1 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction between the 
type of hand movement and hand free and on length of explanations. “No hand” and “tap” 
group were the reference categories. 
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 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 51.582 2.858 18.044 
Left Hand .167 1.991 .084 
Right Hand -2.292 2.023 -1.133 
Gesture 10.439 3.987 2.618 
Left Hand:Gesture .252 2.737 .092 
Right Hand:Gesture 2.611 2.896 .902 
 
 
Figure 1 Mean length of explanations (= number of words uttered) in each gesturing and 
tapping condition. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the means.  
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We proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main effect of 
type of hand movement. We compared the model with the main effects of type of hand 
movement and hand free with the model with the main effect of hand free only. Adding the 
effect of the type of hand movement (gesture, tap) improved the model fit: χ2 (1) = 10.843, p 
< .001. Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) showed that 
participants who gestured were more talkative and produced lengthier explanations compared 
to those who tapped (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Significant Tukey contrasts for the model with the main effect of type of hand 
movement on the length of explanations. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Gesture – Tap  11.853 3.467 3.419 < .001 
 
Note that this was an unexpected finding, which does not fall within the focus of the 
present thesis. However, it seems that there is difference even between the baseline 
conditions; that is when participants from either group did not move. Therefore, 
interpretation is tenuous and the effect of type of hand movement on ‘verbosity’ should be 
investigated in future research (i.e., in a within subjects design). 
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Appendix Chapter 5 
Supplemental Material Text S1  
Pre-test  
In the following sections the pre-test is described in detail. Pre-testing was essential to 
select the stimuli for the main experiment. It was completed in two phases by participants 
different from the ones participated in the main experiment.  
 
Pre-test Phase 1 
Material and methods 
Participants 
12 subjects (5 males; age: M = 22.17 years, SD = 3.27) took part in the experiment for 
payment of £6 upon completion of the tasks. All participants were right-handed, English 
native speakers and students at the University of Birmingham. Handedness was assessed with 
a 12-items questionnaire based on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). 
Two bimanual items (from Oldfield’s long list) were added to his recommended 10-items 
questionnaire to equate the number of unimanual and bimanual items. Text S1 in Appendix 
Chapter 3 includes the questionnaire. Each “left” answer was scored with 0, each “either” 
answer with 0.5, and each “right” answer with 1. A total score of 8.5 and above determined 
right-handedness (M = 11.17, SD = .49).  
 
Stimuli 
Videos We selected 10 English transitive action verbs (see Table 1). We asked 3 native 
English speakers, right-handers to gesturally depict the 10 action verbs. We created a detailed 
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description of the kinematic parameters for each gesture (see Text S2 in the current Appendix 
for details). A right-handed male was recruited and videotaped while performing the 10 
unimanual (right-hand only) gestures following this detailed description. Stimuli were 
videotaped in order to obtain first-person perspective, they were object-empty gestures (no 
physical object was present) although the action directs to an object - this way in the main 
priming task we would test visuo-semantic activations prompted exclusively from gesture 
execution rather than physically presented objects - and they lasted 2.5 seconds each (see 
Figure 1 for static example).  
 
Table 1 Complete list of action verbs used to be gesturally depicted in videos 
Action verbs  
Bash Bend Grasp Pull Push 
Raise Shake Spin Stir Twist 
 
Figure 1 Snapshots from video stimulus to depict action “to bend”.  
 
Sentences We used the 10 action verbs and created 3 sentences with metaphorical and 3 with 
literal meaning for each verb (see Table 2). Each pair of metaphorical and literal sentences 
shared the same subject noun phrase (S-NP hereafter), the same verb (in simple past form) 
and differed in the object noun phrase (O-NP hereafter). The S-NP was always an animate 
agent (e.g., The artist). The metaphorical sentence had an abstract O-NP (e.g., the idea) and 
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the literal sentence had a concrete O-NP (e.g., the painting). In total, we created and tested 62 
sentences. Note, that for the verb “twist” we created 4 sentences with metaphorical and 4 
with literal meaning. Each metaphorical and literal pair was matched for frequency of the 
object noun phrase using the CELEX English linguistic database. A paired samples t-test 
yielded non-significant difference between the frequency of the literal and metaphorical O-
NP: t (30) = .55 p = .581.  
 
Table 2 Complete list of literal and metaphorical action pairs of sentences. Pairs were 
matched for the frequency of the O-NP. 
Metaphorical Action Sentences Literal Action Sentences 
The artist bashed the proposal The artist bashed the painting 
The employee bashed the idea The employee bashed the door 
The reporter bashed the decision The reporter bashed the window 
The worker bent the rule The worker bent the wire 
The technician bent the facts  The technician bent the stick 
The builder bent the truth The builder bent the wood 
The student grasped the solution The student grasped the flowers 
The boy grasped the meaning  The boy grasped the bottle 
The daughter grasped the concept The daughter grasped the handle 
The leader pulled the financing The leader pulled the lever 
The performer pulled the audience The performer pulled the handle 
The producer pulled the movie The producer pulled the flower 
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The minister pushed the plan The minister pushed the desk 
The leader pushed the reforms The leader pushed the button 
The workers pushed the scheme The workers pushed the handle 
The boss raised the wage The boss raised the beer 
The mother raised the income The mother raised the bottle 
The decorator raised the price The decorator raised the box 
The terrorist shook the authority The terrorist shook the weapons 
The thief shook the borough The thief shook the matchbox 
The fireman shook the nation The fireman shook the tree 
The player spun the truth The player spun the ball 
The lady spun the tale  The lady spun the thread 
The presenter spun the news The presenter spun the wheel 
The artist stirred the emotions The artist stirred the paint 
The cook stirred the senses The cook stirred the beans 
The magician stirred the crowd The magician stirred the liquid 
The climber twisted the facts The climber twisted the rope 
The man twisted the plot The man twisted the wire 
The designer twisted the truth The designer twisted the hair 
The scientist twisted the proof The scientist twisted the wire 
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Procedure 
The first task (approx. 25-30 minutes) was a judgment of similarity of the gesture 
videos. This task informed us to create the mismatching combinations for the incongruent 
conditions between prime and target in the main experiment. Participants watched two 
gesture videos in successive order (video gesture A first and video gesture B second). The 
videos were presented in a laptop screen (MacBook Pro, 13 inches) through a PowerPoint 
presentation. They were asked to rate on a scale from -3 to +3 “how similar is the meaning 
represented with gesture A to the meaning represented with gesture B” (“-3” being 
“extremely dissimilar”, “-2” being “very dissimilar”, “-1” being “moderately dissimilar”, “0” 
being “difficult to say if similar or dissimilar”, “+1” being “moderately similar”, “+2” being 
“very similar”, “+3” being “extremely similar”). The similarity rating focused on semantics, 
that is the meaning represented by each gesture and how participants would label it, rather 
than the kimematic parameters of the hand movement (e.g. hand shape, position of fingers, 
speed of movement, direction of movement, sharpness of movement). We tested all 55 
possible combinations. The order of the video presentation (first-second video) was 
counterbalanced across participants. The task ran in 3 blocks (20 trials, 20 trials, 15 trials) 
with two brief breaks when/if needed. Participants gave their responses orally and 
experimenter kept a note of their rating. 
Next, there was a task (approx. 7 minutes) of video naming to ensure that participants 
interpret the meaning of the gestures as expected. The experimenter showed each gesture 
video once and asked participants “please watch the video and tell me what is the meaning of 
the gesture you saw by using an action verb to label each gesture”. Participants gave their 
responses orally and experimenter kept a note of their labelling. 
In turn, participants completed 3 computer-based tasks to collect information for the 
target sentences in terms of the following: (a) surprising element of the O-NP following the S-
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NP (O-NP predictability), (b) level of figurativeness, (c) familiarity of the verb phrase (verb + 
O-NP). All tasks were run through experimental software E-Prime. Each trial started with a 
fixation point (a red dot) in the middle of the screen. For tasks (a) and (b) sentences were 
presented as follows: first the S-NP (e.g., “The artist”) appeared on the centre of the screen 
for 700 msec. It stayed in the middle of the screen and then the verb and the O-NP (e.g., 
“bashed the proposal”) was displayed a bit lower on the screen until a response was given. 
For task (a) (no more than 7 minutes) participants were asked to rate on a scale from -3 to +3 
“how surprising was the second part of the sentence you read” (“-3” being “extremely 
unsurprising”, “-2” being “very unsurprising”, “-1” being “moderately unsurprising”, “0” 
being “difficult to say if unsurprising or surprising”, “+1” being “moderately surprising”, 
“+2” being “very surprising”, “+3” being “extremely surprising”). For task (b) (no more than 
7 minutes) participants were asked to rate on a scale from -3 to +3 “how metaphorical was 
the sentence you read” (“-3” being “extremely literal”, “-2” being “very literal”, “-1” being 
“moderately literal”, “0” being “difficult to say if literal or metaphorical”, “+1” being 
“moderately metaphorical”, “+2” being “very metaphorical”, “+3” being “extremely 
metaphorical”). For task (c) (no more than 5 minutes) participants saw the verb phrases in 
one part (e.g., “bash the proposal”; “bash the painting”) and rated on a scale from -3 to +3 
“how familiar to you was the phrase you read” (“-3” being “extremely unfamiliar”, “-2” 
being “very unfamiliar”, “-1” being “moderately unfamiliar”, “0” being “difficult to say if 
unfamiliar or familiar”, “+1” being “moderately familiar”, “+2” being “very familiar”, “+3” 
being “extremely familiar”). Order of trials (literal – metaphorical) was random. Response 
was given through keyboard by pressing the respective key from 1 to 7. A reminder of each 
scale was given throughout the task as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Scale reminder for rating tasks.  
 
Results 
In general, participants rated the combinations of the gesture videos as being 
“moderately to very dissimilar” (M = -1.58, SD = .56). From all possible combinations we 
selected the five most dissimilar ones (mean ranging from “very” to “extremely dissimilar”) 
(see Table 3). For example, in the incongruent conditions in the main experiment we used: 
raise (gesture prime) – twist (target sentence) and twist (gesture prime) – raise (target 
sentence). 
 
Table 3 Incongruent pairs for main experiment. Means are all across participants (N= 12).  
Incongruent Pairs Mean Similarity Judgment 
Raise Twist -2.50  
Spin Bend -2.17 
Pull Shake -2.42  
Push Grasp -2.25 
Bash Stir -2.42 
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In general, participants gave the gesture videos the expected associated meaning. 
Note, that even if they did not use the exact action verb they would use synonyms (e.g., 
“grab” instead of “grasp”) or they would answer “yes” in experimenter’s question “would 
this mean grasp?” See Text S3 in the current Appendix for complete list of the verbal labels 
given to the 10 gestures.  
The complete list of the paired sentences did not differ significantly in terms of the O-
NP predictability, t (30) = 1.868, p = .072, and verb phrase familiarity, t (30) = -.642, p = 
.526. As expected, there was a significant difference in terms of figurativeness with 
metaphorical sentences being rated as more metaphoric than the literal, t (30) = 28.309, p < 
.001.  
We reduced this balanced list of sentences into 20 pairs of literal and metaphorical 
sentences. To do so, we carefully examined each sentence pair and excluded pairs according 
to the following criteria: (a) rating on each scale (predictability, figurativeness, familiarity) 
was 2SDs above/below the mean, (b) sentence pair had more than 1 points difference in O-
NP predictability and familiarity rating, (c) metaphorical sentence was rated as literal or vice-
versa. Therefore, we created a reduced list to be used in the main experiment (see Table 4). 
Paired comparisons between the metaphorical and the literal sentences of the reduced list 
yielded the following results: (a) frequency of O-NP, t (19) = .272, p = .788, (b) predictability 
of the O-NP, t (19) = 2.284, p = .034, (c) familiarity, t (19) = -1.056, p = .304, and (d) 
figurativeness, t (19) = 27.075, p < .001.  
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Table 4 The list of sentence stimuli for the main experiment. 
Metaphorical Action Sentences Literal Action Sentences 
The employee bashed the idea The employee bashed the door 
The reporter bashed the decision The reporter bashed the window 
The worker bent the rule The worker bent the wire 
The technician bent the facts The technician bent the stick 
The boy grasped the meaning The boy grasped the bottle 
The daughter grasped the concept The daughter grasped the handle 
The leader pulled the financing The leader pulled the lever 
The performer pulled the audience The performer pulled the handle 
The leader pushed the reforms The leader pushed the button 
The workers pushed the scheme The workers pushed the handle 
The mother raised the income The mother raised the bottle 
The decorator raised the price The decorator raised the box 
The terrorist shook the authority The terrorist shook the weapons 
The thief shook the borough The thief shook the matchbox 
The lady spun the tale The lady spun the thread 
The presenter spun the news The presenter spun the wheel 
The artist stirred the emotions The artist stirred the paint 
The magician stirred the crowd The magician stirred the liquid 
  
249 
 
The man twisted the plot The man twisted the wire 
The designer twisted the truth The designer twisted the hair 
 
Conclusions 
The pairs of metaphorical and literal sentences to be used in the main experiment (a) 
were perfectly matched for the frequency of the O-NP and for familiarity of the verb phrase, 
(b) had a difference in terms of the O-NP predictability, with the literal sentences having a 
more surprising O-NP to follow the S-NP than the metaphorical sentences, and (c) were 
clearly differentiated in terms of figurativeness. We believe that performance in the main task 
could not be modulated by the observed differences in the O-NP predictability.  
 
Pre-test phase 2 
Material and methods 
Participants 
12 subjects (3 males; age: M = 22.42 years, SD = 6.01) took part in the experiment for 
0.2 credits upon completion of the tasks. All participants were right-handed, English native 
speakers and students at the University of Birmingham. Handedness was assessed with a 12-
items questionnaire based on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Two 
bimanual items (from Oldfield’s long list) were added to his recommended 10-items 
questionnaire to equate the number of unimanual and bimanual items. Each “left” answer was 
scored with 0, each “either” answer with 0.5, and each “right” answer with 1. A total score of 
8.5 and above determined right-handedness (M = 11.25, SD = .94). Text S1 in Appendix 
Chapter 3 includes the questionnaire.  
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Stimuli 
Based on the data from the first phase of the pre-test we created all 80 possible 
combinations for the video-sentence similarity task. For example, participants would watch 
the video with the gesture “raise” and (a) read the sentences “the mother raised the income” 
(Congruent and Metaphorical), “the decorator raised the price” (Congruent and 
Metaphorical), “the mother raised the bottle” (Congruent and Literal), “the decorator raised 
the box” (Congruent and Literal), and (b) read the sentences “the man twisted the plot” 
(Incongruent and Metaphorical), “the designer twisted the truth” (Incongruent and 
Metaphorical), “the man twisted the wire” (Incongruent and Literal), “the designer twisted 
the hair” (Incongruent and Literal).  
 
Procedure 
For the task of the video-sentence similarity (approx. 15 minutes) participants 
watched the videos with the gestures, and after the video they read the sentences presented in 
two parts as follows: first the S-NP (e.g., “The artist”) appeared on the centre of the screen 
for 700 msec. It stayed in the middle of the screen and then the verb and the O-NP (e.g., 
“bashed the proposal”) was displayed a bit lower on the screen until a response was given. 
They were asked to rate on a scale from -3 to +3 “how well did the meaning of the gesture 
you watched match the meaning of the sentence you read” (“-3” being “extremely bad 
match”, “-2” being very bad match”, “-1” being “moderately bad match”, “0” being “neither 
bad nor good match/ difficult to say if bad or good match”, “+1” being “moderately good 
match”, “+2” being “very good match”, “+3” being “extremely good match”). We expected 
that (a) the congruent conditions will be rated as “good matches” and the incongruent 
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conditions as “bad matches”, and (b) there will be no significant difference between 
metaphorical and literal sentences for the congruency rating. 
 
Results  
A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of prime type 
(congruent, incongruent), F (1, 11) = 677.357, p < .001, ηp2 = .984. On average and as 
expected, participants rated the incongruent video-sentence combinations as “very bad 
matches” (M = -2.096, SE = .115) and the congruent combinations as “very good to 
extremely good matches” (M = 2.263, SE = .103).  There was no significant effect of the 
sentence type (metaphorical, concrete), F (1, 11) = 2.292, p = .158. On average, participants 
rated the metaphorical (M = .031, SE = .088) and literal (M = .135, SE = .066) sentences as 
“moderately good matches” with the preceding video gesture. There was no significant 
interaction between prime and sentence type F (1, 11) = 4.129, p = .067.  
 
Conclusions 
The combinations of gesture videos-sentences, which were the prime-target 
combinations in the main experiment, were successfully constructed in terms of congruency, 
and were matched for both metaphorical and literal sentences.  
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Supplemental Material Text S2 
Gestures’ description for gesture enactment 
Bash: Tight fist (thumb on the index finger, fingers facing left). Forward rapid movement (as 
if I am bashing something in front of me, in the centre). 3 quick repetitions.  
Bend: Fist tightly closed; thumb on the index finger, facing down. Slow rotatory movement 
from the elbow from left to right. 
Grasp: Open palm, facing left, loose fingers. Hand moves to the centre. Fingers close to 
create a fist. Vertical upward movements (not towards body) and tight closure. 
Pull: Palm semi-close as in before forming a fist, horizontal movement from outside towards 
body while fist is closing (thumb on the index finger). Basically, reach out, clench, and pull. 
Push: Palm open, facing front, comes close to the body. Rapid and forceful movement away 
from the body (palm remains as it is). 
Raise: Open palm, fingers loose, facing up and slow movement upwards (as if something on 
the palm).	 
 Shake: Open palm facing left as if holding big glass. Hand moves from side to side 
(horizontally). 
Spin: Index finger sticking out and pointing left. Circular movement of the arm horizontally.  
Stir: Fingers closed, facing down (as if holding stick). Hand comes in front of the body in the 
centre. Rotatory movement with the whole arm clockwise (as if stirring something in a big 
bowl). 
Twist: Closed fingers, thumb on the index finger. Rotatory movement of the wrist from left 
to right (as if turning a key in a key hole).  
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Supplemental Material Text S3 
Complete list of verbal labels given to gesture videos.  
Video Watched First Verbal 
Label 
Number of 
Participants 
Second Verbal 
Label 
Number of 
Participants 
Bash Bang 1 Bash 3 
 Bash 3 Punch 2 
 Punch 7 Hit 1 
 Push 1 Saw 1 
Bend Bend 2 Bend 4 
 Pour 7 Pour 2 
 Turn 2   
 Twist 1   
Grasp Close 1 Collate 1 
 Grab 4 Grab 1 
 Grasp 5 Grasp 1 
 Pick up 2 Pick up 1 
Pull Lift 1 Pull 2 
 Pour 2   
 Pull 9   
Push Push 11 Clear away 1 
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 Stop 1 Shove 1 
   Stop 2 
   Wait 1 
Raise Hold 1 Drink 1 
 Lift 2 Lift 3 
 Pick up 4 Pick up 3 
 Raise 5 Raise 1 
   Salute 1 
Shake Shake 12 Mix 1 
   Size 1 
Spin Circle 1 Keep going 1 
 Go around 1 Mix 1 
 Spin 7 Repeat 1 
 Turn around 1 Rotate 1 
 Twirl 2 Stir 2 
   Twirl 2 
Stir Mix 1 Mix 4 
 Stir 11   
Twist Turn 6 Open 1 
 Twist 4 Turn 3 
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 Unlock 2 Turn over 1 
   Twist 1 
   Unlock 1 
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Supplemental Material Text S4 
Example of a sentence repetition for each experimental condition 
 
1. Congruent Metaphorical Left [Condition CML] e.g. The employee bashed the idea 
2. Incongruent Metaphorical Left [Condition InML] e.g. The employee bashed the idea 
3. Congruent Metaphorical Right [Condition CMR] e.g. The employee bashed the idea 
4. Incongruent Metaphorical Right [Condition InMR] e.g. The employee bashed the idea 
5. Metaphorical [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The employee bashed the idea 
6. Metaphorical [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The employee bashed the idea 
7. Congruent Literal Left [Condition CLL] e.g. The employee bashed the door 
8. Incongruent Literal Left [Condition InLL] e.g. The employee bashed the door 
9. Congruent Literal Right [Condition CLR] e.g. The employee bashed the door 
10. Incongruent Literal Right [Condition InLR] e.g. The employee bashed the door 
11. Literal [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The employee bashed the door 
12. Literal [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The employee bashed the door 
13. Congruent Metaphorical Left [Condition CML] e.g. The reporter bashed the decision 
14. Incongruent Metaphorical Left [Condition InML] e.g. The reporter bashed the 
decision 
15. Congruent Metaphorical Right [Condition CMR] e.g. The reporter bashed the 
decision 
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16. Incongruent Metaphorical Right [Condition InMR] e.g. The reporter bashed the 
decision 
17. Metaphorical [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The reporter bashed the decision 
18. Metaphorical [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The reporter bashed the decision 
19. Congruent Literal Left [Condition CLL] e.g. The reporter bashed the window 
20. Incongruent Literal Left [Condition InLL] e.g. The reporter bashed the window 
21. Congruent Literal Right [Condition CLR] e.g. The reporter bashed the window 
22. Incongruent Literal Right [Condition InLR] e.g. The reporter bashed the window 
23. Literal [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The reporter bashed the window 
24. Literal [Baseline with no prime] e.g. The reporter bashed the window 
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Supplemental Material Text S5 
Results from rating tasks in detail 
All participants rated the stimuli after the main task. In this section, we compared the 
ratings between the literal and metaphorical sentences. This way we ensured that no other 
linguistic properties could account for any observed effects between metaphorical and literal 
sentences, and that the target stimuli were carefully controlled based on the ratings’ by the 
same participants who completed the main task. 
There were no significant differences between the literal and metaphorical sentences 
in terms of their familiarity t (37) = -.561, p = .578. Participants rated the metaphorical 
sentences as “moderately familiar” (M = 1.089, SE = .11) and the literal sentences as 
“moderately familiar” (M = .998, SE = .14) at a comparable level. As expected and to 
confirm the figurativeness level of the stimuli, there was a significant difference between the 
literal and metaphorical sentences in terms of their figurativeness t (37) = -27.536, p < .001. 
Participants rated the metaphorical sentences as “very metaphorical” (M = 2.014, SE = .08) 
and the literal sentences as “very literal” (M = -2.081, SE = .08). Overall, participants rated 
both metaphorical and literal sentences as having a “moderately unsurprising” second half 
(Verb + O-NP) part following the S-NP. As in the pre-test, there was a significant difference 
between the literal and metaphorical sentences in terms of the predictability of the verb 
phrase (t (37) = 2.814, p = .008) with participants rating the literal sentences as having a more 
surprising verb phrase (M = -.443, SE = .12) than the metaphorical sentences (M = -.778, SE 
= .09). However, we do not think this difference is relevant to the nature of the task and to 
participants’ performance.  
For the video-sentence similarity task, overall participants rated that the meaning of 
the sentence and the meaning of the gesture were a “very good match” for both literal and 
metaphorical sentences in the congruent combinations. Also, they rated that the meaning of 
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the sentence and the meaning of the gesture were a “very bad match” for both literal and 
metaphorical sentences in the incongruent combinations. A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
yielded a non-significant effect of the sentence type F (1, 37) = 3.132, p = .085, a significant 
effect of the prime type F (1, 37) = 904.704, p < .001 and (contrary to the pre-test) a 
significant interaction effect F (1, 37) = 35.881, p < .001. This indicates that similarity ratings 
were more moderate for the metaphorical (M = 1.84, SE = .085) than the literal sentences (M 
= 2.14, SE = .075) (see Figure 1). This is not surprising. Comparing the meaning of an 
abstract metaphorical sentence to that of a concrete visual action gesture was more “difficult” 
than comparing literal sentences with gesture videos. Hence, participants’ ratings were 
accurate for both metaphorical and literal sentences, but expressed in a “less confident” way 
for the metaphorical sentences. We believe this difference could not account for any observed 
differences in the main task, where the videos were not used.  
 
 
Figure 1 Rating of similarity between the meaning of the gestures and the meaning of the 
sentences.  
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Supplemental Material Text S6 
Accuracy Results 
Firstly, we assessed the 2 x 3 interaction between sentence type and prime type. We 
fit GLME model to the measurement of accuracy of semantic categorisation. The model 
included two fixed effect factors and the interaction between the two. The one fixed factor 
was the sentence type (metaphorical, literal; dummy coded; “literal” was the reference 
category). The second fixed factor was the prime type (congruent, incongruent, no prime; “no 
prime” condition was the reference category). For the random effects structure it was 
necessary to use a data-driven approach and simplify it to reach convergence. The maximal 
model to include (a) random intercept and slope by subjects for the interaction between 
sentence type and prime type and (b) random intercept and slope by items for prime type did 
not converge. Thus, we included random intercepts only by subjects and items (phrases) 
assuming that sentence and prime type are invariant across subjects and items. 
Model estimates are reported in Table 1. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced including the main fixed effects only (same random effect structure). Adding the 
interaction between sentence and prime type did not significantly improve the model fit: χ2 
(2) = .191, p = .908 (see Figure 1). Thus, there is no evidence that the interaction between 
type of action sentences (metaphorical or literal) and prime type (congruent, incongruent, no 
prime) modulated the accuracy of participants’ semantic categorisation task.  
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Table 1 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and interaction of the 
sentence and prime type on accuracy of semantic categorisation. “Literal” sentences and “No 
prime” were the reference categories. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 3.832 .255 14.973 < .001 
Metaphorical .588 .276 2.127 .033 
Congruent -.006 .195 -.035 .972 
Incongruent -.057 .194 -.298 .765 
Metaphorical:Congruent  .107 .324 .333  .739 
Metaphorical:Incongruent -.032 .314 -.105 .916 
 
 
Figure 1 Accuracy of semantic categorisation of literal and metaphorical sentences in the 
three priming conditions. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the means.  
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Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of prime type. We compared the model including the main effects of sentence and 
prime type with the model including the main effect of sentence type only. Adding the effect 
of prime type (congruent, incongruent, no prime) did not significantly improve model fit: χ2 
(2) = .430, p = .806. In addition, we compared the model including the main effects of 
sentence and prime type with the model including the main effect of prime type only. Adding 
the effect of sentence type (metaphorical, literal) improved model fit: χ2 (1) = 7.806, p = .005. 
In particular, participants were more likely to be accurate when categorising metaphorical 
than literal action sentences (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Tukey contrasts for the model with the main effect of sentence type on accuracy of 
semantic categorisation.  
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Metaphorical – Literal  .609 .207 2.933 .003 
 
Secondly, we assessed the 2 x 2 x 2 interaction between sentence type (metaphorical, 
literal), prime type (congruent, incongruent) and hand (left, right). We excluded the baseline 
condition of “no prime” (trials reduced to 5722). We fit GLME model to the measurement of 
accuracy. The model included three fixed effect factors and the interaction between the three. 
The one fixed factor was the sentence type (metaphorical, literal; dummy coded; “literal” was 
the reference category). The second fixed factor was the prime type (congruent incongruent; 
“incongruent” was the reference category). The third fixed factor was the hand used for 
gesturing (left, right; “right” was the reference category). For the random effects structure we 
had to use a data-driven approach and simplify the model to reach convergence. The maximal 
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model to include (a) random intercept and slope by subjects for the interaction between 
sentence type, prime type and hand, and (b) random intercept and slope by items for the 
interaction between prime type and hand did not converge. Thus, we included random 
intercepts only by subjects and items (phrases) assuming that sentence type, prime type and 
hand used were invariant across subjects and items.  
Model estimates are reported in Table 3. We compared the maximal model with the 
reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect structure). Adding 
the three way interaction between sentence, prime type and hand did not significantly 
improve the model fit: χ2 (4) = 1.806, p = .771 (see Figure). Thus, there is no evidence that 
the interaction between the type of action sentence (metaphorical or literal), prime type 
(congruent, incongruent) and hand used for gesturing (left, right) modulated participants’ 
accuracy in the semantic categorisation task.  
 
Table 3 Parameters estimates for the model with the main effects and three-way interaction of 
sentence type, prime type and hand used for gesturing on accuracy. “Literal” sentences, 
“Incongruent” condition and “Right Hand” were the reference categories. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 3.664 .270 13.525 < .001 
Metaphorical .636 .362 1.754 .079 
Congruent .014 .280 .050 .960 
Left Hand -.129 .271 -.478 .632 
Metaphorical:Congruent -.156 .454 -.344 .730 
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Metaphorical:Left Hand -.206 .438 -.472 .637 
Congruent:Left Hand .078 .385 .205 .837 
Metaphorical:Congruent:Left Hand .592 .643 .921 .357 
 
 
Figure 2 Accuracy for the semantic categorisation of the literal and metaphorical sentences 
for congruent and incongruent conditions, with the left and the right hand. Error bars 
represent 1 standard error of the means.  
 
Next, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the two-way 
interaction between sentence and prime type. We compared the model including the two-way 
interaction with the reduced model including the main fixed effects only (same random effect 
structure). Adding the interaction did not significantly improve model fit: χ2 (1) = .158, p = 
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.690. Thus, there is no evidence that the interaction between the type of action sentence 
(metaphorical or literal) and the prime type (congruent, incongruent) modulated participants’ 
accuracy in the semantic categorisation task.  
Finally, we proceeded to model reduction and comparisons to investigate the main 
effect of prime type. We compared the model including the main effects of sentence and 
prime type with the model including the main effect of sentence type only. Adding the effect 
of prime type did not improve model fit: χ2  (1) = .419, p = .517. In addition, we compared the 
model including the main effects of sentence and prime type with the model including the 
main effect of prime type only. Adding the effect of sentence type improved model fit: χ2 (1) 
= 6.14, p = .013. Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses (Tukey Contrasts) revealed 
that participants’ semantic categorisation was more accurate for metaphorical than literal 
sentences (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Tukey Contrasts for the model with the main effect of sentence type on accuracy.  
 Estimate SE z-value p-value 
Metaphorical – Literal  .584 .222 2.631 .008 
 
To sum up, we did not draw conclusions from the accuracy analysis, however it is 
worth to note that the sentence type had a significant effect on the accuracy of categorisation. 
Participants were more accurate in the semantic categorisation of metaphorical than literal 
action sentences. Note, this finding was not predicted and it was revealed while overall 
accuracy was at ceiling. A possible explanation for this could be that participants had a 
response bias towards the marked metaphorical stimuli.  
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Appendix Chapter 6 
Supplemental Material Text S1  
Information about words that appear in both concrete and metaphorical conditions 
 
The table below includes the complete list of words that appeared in both concrete 
and metaphorical conditions at least once. We provide information about the token frequency 
in each condition in percentages (the number in brackets indicates the exact count of the 
word’s occurrence in each condition). Note, that some words appear in both word categories. 
For example, “any” was coded as a content word when used as adverb and as function word 
when used as determiner. We indicate in brackets the role of the word based on the context. 
 
Content Words Function Words 
 Concrete 
Task 
Metaphorical 
Task 
 Concrete 
Task 
Metaphorical 
Task 
Action  60% 
(3) 
40% 
(2) 
A  68% 
(39) 
32% 
(18) 
Any  
(Adverb) 
67% 
(2) 
33% 
(1) 
All 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
Bad 6% 
(1) 
94% 
(15) 
And 60% 
(56) 
40% 
(37) 
Basically 31% 69% Any 50% 50% 
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(5) (11) (Determiner) (1) (1) 
Being  
(Intransitive) 
33% 
(2) 
67% 
(4) 
Be 
(Auxiliary) 
33% 
(12) 
67% 
(24) 
Certain  67% 
(2) 
33% 
(1) 
Before 
(Conjunction) 
67% 
(2) 
33% 
(1) 
Current  17% 
(1) 
83% 
(5) 
Being 
(Auxiliary) 
17% 
(1) 
83% 
(5) 
Different  60% 
(3) 
40% 
(2) 
Can 60% 
(3) 
40% 
(2) 
Fire  13% 
(4) 
88% 
(28) 
Have  
(Auxiliary) 
50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
Generally  50% 
(2) 
50% 
(2) 
Is 70% 
(70) 
30% 
(30) 
Get  8% 
(1) 
92% 
(11) 
It 63% 
(27) 
37% 
(16) 
Got  67% 
(2) 
33% 
(1) 
One 
(Determiner) 
50% 
(2) 
50% 
(2) 
Hammer  50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
Or 74% 
(14) 
26% 
(5) 
Have  71% 29% So 30% 70% 
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(Transitive) (5) (2) (18) (42) 
Head 50% 
(11) 
50% 
(11) 
Someone 57% 
(8) 
43% 
(6) 
High 25% 
(1) 
75% 
(3) 
Something 37% 
(13) 
63% 
(22) 
Higher 45% 
(22) 
55% 
(27) 
Than 50% 
(2) 
50% 
(2) 
Hit 61% 
(14) 
39% 
(9) 
That 47% 
(24) 
53% 
(27) 
Hitting 33% 
(2) 
67% 
(4) 
The 27% 
(15) 
73% 
(40) 
Indicates 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
Them 33% 
(2) 
67% 
(4) 
Involve 50% 
(2) 
50% 
(2) 
This 43% 
(3) 
57% 
(4) 
Just 50% 
(2) 
50% 
(2) 
What 33% 
(1) 
67% 
(2) 
Kind 25% 
(3) 
75% 
(9) 
When 38% 
(6) 
63% 
(10) 
Know 50% 50% Where 55% 45% 
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(2) (2) (6) (5) 
Like 35% 
(7) 
65% 
(13) 
Which 71% 
(10) 
29% 
(4) 
Low 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
Would 38% 
(9) 
63% 
(15) 
Made 50% 
(3) 
50% 
(3) 
You 53% 
(41) 
47% 
(36) 
Make 15% 
(2) 
85% 
(11) 
Your 37% 
(10) 
63% 
(17) 
Maybe 29% 
(2) 
71% 
(5) 
   
Mean 29% 
(2) 
71% 
(5) 
   
Meaning 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
   
Means 40% 
(10) 
60% 
(15) 
   
Nail 6% 
(1) 
94% 
(16) 
   
Normally 25% 75%    
  
270 
 
(2) (6) 
Object 95% 
(19) 
5% 
(1) 
   
Oil 57% 
(28) 
43% 
(21) 
   
Part 33% 
(1) 
67% 
(2) 
   
Poor 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
   
Pour 79% 
(11) 
21% 
(3) 
   
Pouring 38% 
(3) 
63% 
(5) 
   
Put 96% 
(25) 
4% 
(1) 
   
Quite 13% 
(1) 
88% 
(7) 
   
Really 25% 
(1) 
75% 
(3) 
   
Refer 40% 60%    
  
271 
 
(2) (3) 
Representing 17% 
(1) 
83% 
(5) 
   
Round 63% 
(5) 
38% 
(3) 
   
Sky 67% 
(2) 
33% 
(1) 
   
Sort 39% 
(7) 
61% 
(11) 
   
Spending 33% 
(1) 
67% 
(2) 
   
Spin 69% 
(9) 
31% 
(4) 
   
Spinning 29% 
(2) 
71% 
(5) 
   
Substance 71% 
(5) 
29% 
(2) 
   
Then 50% 
(5) 
50% 
(5) 
   
Things 79% 21%    
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(15) (4) 
Touch 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
   
Try 33% 
(1) 
67% 
(2) 
   
Used 85% 
(11) 
15% 
(2) 
   
Very 67% 
(2) 
33% 
(1) 
   
Wrong 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
